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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to establish the general
nature of the relations between the Palestinians
and their respective Arab Host-States during the
period l9L9_l967. The political attitudes and acti-
vities of the Palestinians constitute our central
concern and those of the Arab Host-States are
analyzed only in asmuch as they are related to the
Palestinians.
The theoretical framework of this study in-
corporates the hypothesis which, while examining the
status of the Palestinians relative to various
definitions of minorities, stateless persons and
refugees, gives basic importance to Pan-Arabism as a
common-bond. It is also of great significance that
the dual character of nationalism and Pan-Arabism is
shared both by the Palestinians and the Arab states
at large.
This study is broadly divided into three major
eras: the era of formation, the era of transition
and the era of revival. In addition, this study
undertakes two case studies of the Palestinians in
Jordan and in the Gaza Strip.
The era of formation which covers the period
1 9 49-1 95 2 had witnessed the dispersion of the Pales-
tinian Arabs. The roots of the relations between
the Palestinians and their respective Host-States
were laid down during this era.
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The era of transition which covers the period
1952-1963 was characterized by a Palestinian drive
towards educational and academic attainment. More-
over, this era saw an increase in Palestinian
political activism which was mainly manifested
through political part{es and political literature.
The era of revival which covers the period
1963-1967 brought a shift in the political attitude
of the majority of the Palestinian Arabs from a
major stress on Pan-Arabism and Arab unity to one
of recognition of a Palestinian identity and the
revival of Palestinian entity which culminated in
the establishment of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and the emergence of A1-Fatah: Palestine
National Liberation Movement.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 1968, a Boeing 707 EL AL aeroplane
in flight from Rome to Tel-Aviv was hijacked by
Palestinians and forced to land in Algeria. That
incident marked the beginning of what has been known
since as acts of t international terroris&. Many
similar incidents followed suit and involved many
countries. The effect was stunning. People all over
the world started wondering and asking, "why?", and ,
"who are those	 One could answer the
first question by suggesting that it could be a
Palestinian shock treatment to dispel what they
considered to be the apathy of the world to their
problem and sufferings. The question remains, how-
ever, " who are the Palestinians?". A simple question
perhaps, but the answer is far from that.
It is customary for any researcher to encounter
the initial difficulty of choosing the topic of his
or her research, yet, more difficult indeed is the
ability to succeed in that undertaking which should
combine the originality, the academic criteria, and
the stimulation needed to satisfy both the writer
and the reader.
This research is no exception. The choice of
this topic which deals with the relations between
the Palestinians and the Arab Host-States during the
period 1949-1967 was determined by the following
factors. There appears to be no comprehensive study
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readily available of the relations between the
Palestinians and the Arab Host-States which treats
this topic as one unit and which deals with the
various social,demographic, political, economic,
educational and military aspects of this relation-
ship. This research was, therefore, conducted with
the aim of shedding some light on the nature of
Palestinian-Arab relations during the period of our
study, Furthermore, it is contended that the
Palestine Problem, and consequently the Palestinians,
were at the core of the politics of the Arab Host-
States since l99, and that the understanding of
Palestinian-Arab relations constitutes, therefore,
an important contribution to the understanding of
the politics of the Arab states in general, and the
Arab Host-States in particular, during the period
of our study. Finally, this study was conceived
as being a broad study which cuts across almost
all important aspects of Palestinian relations with
the Arab Host-States during the period l99-l967.
In this sense, this study neither undertakes an
intensive elaborate analysis of specific aspects
of Palestinian relations with Arab Host-States during
the period 191t9-l967, nor does it claim to be a
complete study of that relationship. Rather, the
intention is to portray more broadly the relations
between the Palestinians and the Arab Host-States
during the period 1949-1967.
The choice of the period 1949 - 1967 was
determined by the fact that in 1949, the armistice
agreements between Israel, on the one side , and
Egypt,Syria, Lebanon and Jordan on the other side were
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signed. This marked the de facto acceptance by these
Arab Host-States of the demarcation lines of Israel
thus ending a period of uncertain hope for a quick
settlement and the return to the homeland by the
dispersed Palestinians. The year 1967, with its
June War and its clear-cut results in terms of the
undisputed Arab defeat and loss of territory, which
included the remaining part of Mandate Palestine
under Arab control as well as parts of the territor-
ies of Egypt and Syria, had a drastic impact on the
Arab political scene, thus marking the end of an era
in Arab politics and the beginning of a new one.
During the process of preparing for this
research, the writer was confronted by a variety of
problems which were mainly related to the last four
chapters. Most of these problems emanated from the
nature of the topic itself. The topic of this
research is largely considered by both the Pales-
tinians and the Arab Host-States as being a sensi-
tive issue which is usually not discussed directly
in public.
This was clearly reflected in the absence of
reliable data, statistics and information on the
topic, whether on the official governmental level or
on the academic level in the form of research projects
or serious books. The reasons behind this sensitivity
varied from one Host-State to another. Jordan, for
example, which houses the majority of the Palestinian
See Chapter Seven, pp. 3L63ll7.
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people considered the Palestinians in Jordan as
Jordanian citizens and did not, therefore, under-
take or even permit the publication or otherwise
of any data, statistics or information which pertains
solely to the Palestinians or which account for the
Palestinian origin of its Jordanized Palestinian
population. In the case of the Gaza Strip, which
comes next to Jordan in the number of its Palestinian
population, Egypt, as the administrative power,
restricted its published information to official
decrees. The same applies to Syria. As for Lebanon,
the government published practically nothing. Some
United Nation agencies - especially UNRWA and UNESCO,
are the main source of statistics on Palestinians in
the Arab Host-States.
In order to overcome this lack of data,
statistics and information, the writer of this
research relied, among other things, on interviews
with people who participated, either directly or
indirectly, in the shaping of Palestinian relations
with their respective Host-States during the period
of the study. This was not an easy undertaking.
Locating these people who were dispersed in various
countries was itself a problem. More difficult,
however, was the task of convincing them to talk
freely about information they have. Some refused,
some talked frankly and others reservedly. Most of
them, however, insisted that their identity remain
anonymous. The gathering of information about the
emergence of the Al-Fatah: Palestine National
Liberation Movement was most difficult and daunting.
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Nonetheless, circumstances played a great helping
role in giving the writer the chance to interview
two of Al-Fatah's prominent lenders who revealed
some very interesting information. In addition
to interviews,the writer of this research relied
on some unpublished documents, local newspapers,
books written by Palestinian thinkers as well as
United Nations documents and publications.
This study consists of six chapters in
addition to the introduction and the conclusion.
Chapter one sets out the conceptual framework. It
attempts a theoratical analysis of the concepts of
minorities, stateless persons and refugees according
to which the analysis of the status of the Palestin-
ians in the Arab Host-States is based. An analysis
of the dual-character of nationalism and Pan-Arabism
which is enjoyed by the Palestinians and the Arabs
at large is then undertaken to point out the common
bonds between the Palestinians and their respective
Arab Host-States. This is followed by the hypothesis
which suggests that the Palestinians in the Arab
Host-States constitute the intruding-element and the
Host-States the existing-elements. The hypothesis
is spelled out in detail in the remaining part of
this chapter.
Chapter two, which covers the period l9Z9 -
1 95 2 , begins with a brief historical background of
the Arab Palestinians as well as the political
organization and the pan-Arab attitude of the Arab
Palestinians before 1948. This chapter covers the
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demographic dispersion of the Palestinians in the
aftermath of the 1948 War, and is followed by an
analysis of the responses of each of the Arab Host-
States to the influx of Palestinian refugees. The
latter part of this chapter spells out the basic
political taboos of the Palestine Problem as seen
both by the Palestinians and the Host-States. The
chapter, ends up with an analysis of the Palestinians'
attitude towards the solution of the Palestine refugee
problem, as well as that of the Arab statest.
Chapter three covers the period 1952-1963, and
deals with the impact of the dispersion of the
Palestinians on their political views and activities.
The chapter begins with an assessment of the
Palestinians t educational and academic potential
combined with an analysis of their achievements in
this field. A survey of Palestinian political
activities during the same period is then undertaken
' by means of an examination of Palestinian political
literature and the role of the Palestinians in
political parties in the Host-states.
Chapters four and five give detailed case
studies of the Palestinians in Jordan and in the Gaza
Strip respectively. The purpose of these two case
studies is to give a detailed account of the relations
between the Palestinians and the Jordanian regime and
the Palestinians and the Egyptian regime. These two
case studies also undertake an elaborate analysis of
the political attitudes and activities of the
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Palestinians in Jordan and the Gaza Strip and on
the ways and means which were adopted by both Jordan
and Egypt in dealing with the Palestinians.
Chapter six covers the period 1963 - 1967
which saw the revival of Palestinian entity3 . The
chapter begins with an analysis of the factors
behind the revival of Palestinian entity from the
point of view of both the Palestinians and the Arab
states. This is followed by an account of Arab
states - sponsored attempts to revive Palestinian
entity during the period 19119 - 196 11 which serves as
a prelude to the analysis of Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) as an Arab states - sponsord form
of Palestinian entity. The analysis of the PLO
includes a consideration of the attitudes of the
Palestinians towards the establishment of the PLO,
the Palestinian conception of the PLO compared with
the Arab states conception of the PLO, and , finally,
the analysis of PLO ideology , political and
military strategy. The last part of this chapter is
devoted to an analysis of the Al-Fatah: Palestine
National Liberation Movement as a Palestinian -
sponsored form of Palestinian entity. This analysis
of Al-Fatah provides a background to the origin of
Al-Fatah and it owes much to interviews with Yasser
Arafat (Abu Alnmar)Uand Khalil El-Wazir (Abu Jihad)3
The term t Palestinian entity t is the one officially
used by the Palestine Liberation Organization.
3* He has been Head of Al-Fatah and Chairman of the
PLO since 1968.
3*3	 .He is one of the original founders of Al-Fatah and
a member of its central committee.
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The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to an
analysis of the political and military strategy of
Al-Fatah.
Finally, one should reiterate that this study
was conducted against a background of numerous
limitations and difficulties which were beyond the
control of the writer. A reader might come across
points which are not sufficiently explored or some
statistics which are either incomplete or go beyond
the scope of our period of study. If and when this
takes place during the course of this study, it is
simply due to the non-availability of any authentic
information despite the efforts of the writer to
obtain or generate such information. Nevertheless,
the writer fully acknowledges his responsibility
for the study t s unavoidable imperfections.
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CHAPTER ONE
A CONCEPTUAL FRA}IEWORK
The rise of nationalism in Europe, which
followed the French Revolution and was stirred up
by the Napoleonic wars, led to the decline of
religious fervour and the destruction of the tradi-
tional dynastic poly-ethnic or multi-national
empires as the basis of the political system. The
latter were replaced by the nation-state as the
basic unit of the European political system.
The destruction of poly-ethnic or multi-
national empires in Eastern and Central Europe, and
their transformation into nation-states, took place
through a series of regional, continental and world
wars, the outcome of which was to lead to the
emergence of the problems of minorities, state-
lessness and refugees in their contemporary setting.
The forceful destruction of multi-national empires
subjected the emergence of the successor nation-
states to a complexity of factors. Amidst these
factors, the consideration of ethnic homogeniety
in planning the boundaries of the successor nation-.
states received, by and large, relatively secondary
consideration in practice although in theory ethnic
homogeniety and nationalism were their very raison
d'être.. Accordingly, a situation developed where
the territories of some new t nation-states 1 engulfed
part or parts of the populace and historical
territories of other nations, which paved the way
for the emergence of both the minority problem and
- 1k -
the refugee problem. In other instances, some
distinct groups, who had been able to live and to
identify themselves within the broad boundaries
of the poly-ethnic or multi-national empires,
became stateless in the new world of supposedly
nation-states. This gave rise to all the limi-
tations imposed on such groups by the very nature
of nationalist ideology which, when there is a
contradiction between " the interests of one's
own nationality and those of other nationalities"
may become "a movement bent externally on aggression
and internally on domination, discrimination,
forcible assimilation or total exclusion of other
ethnic groups"1.
Nationalism, which reflects "the conscious
will to be a nation" is often linked with the
ethnic phenomenon of the nation rather than with
the political phenomenon of the state 2 . Although
the ultimate aim of nationalism is to be translated
politically into the form of a state which repre-
sents the nation, it is the rule rather than the
exception that, in the process of achieving this
goal, nationalism, in an hetero-ethnic state, acts
in contradiction to the interests of the state as
a whole to the extent that it reflects only the
nationalism of the dominant ethnic group 3 in that
state. Such a situation is most likely to develop in
1Benjamin Akzin, State and Nation (London: Hutchinson
University Press, 1964), pp. 52 - 53.
2lbid.,pp. 7, L9.
3The term "dominant ethnic group" does not necessarily
indicate numerical majority, in as much as it indicates
political influence and domination of the political
institutions of the state.
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an helero - ethnic state when the ethnic integration
of the majority of the people in the state is in-
complete, or when there is a concentration of a
large number of "a non-dominant ethnic group"
especially if such a concentration is confined to
a part of the state's territory which is a border
area1 . Under such conditions when an ethnic group
or groups in a poly-ethnic state "have been aroused
to present claims of a political nature bearing on
the basic values or organizational structure of the
state concerned", and which are consequently in
contradiction to the dominant ethnic group in that
state, then such an ethnic group or groups must be
considered as "nationalities" 2 . In pursuing their
nationalist goals, the non-dominant nationality or
nationalities in the state frequently attempt to
change the existing political status quo. The
dominant arguement is that,
".... should contradictions develop between
• the interests of one's own nationality and
those of other nationalities, the latter
may and should be sacrificed to the former
irrespective of their relative merits"3
This is very likely to invite the resistance of the
"forces of the status quo" in the machinery of the
state, and a confrontation would seem, under the
circumstances, to be inevitable. Alternatively,
1flenjamin Akzin, op.cit, p. 143.
____ pp. L&3 -
3lbid., pp. 52 - 53.
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and on the basis that "ethnjc and national con-
sciousness is the first ingredient of nationalism",
a solution could come through the integration or
assimilation of the non-dominant ethnic group or
groups which could take place through "a toning
down of their identifying group characteristics
in favour of those of the dominant ethnic group,
1leading to their gradual submergence in the latter"
The same process could take place on a larger scale
if all or most of the ethnic groups in a poly-ethnic
state 'tone down their identifying group character-
istics', thus giving birth to a new nationality;
new in the sense that its characteristics do not
resemble any one of the ethnic groups concerned.
Thus the state begets a nation in a certain sense.
On these lines, the status of the Palestinians
•	 2in the Arab Host-States provides a different
insight into the general'line of analysis regarding
the transformation of ethnic groups into nationali-
ties on the one hand, and the relationship between
the ethnic groups in an hetero-ethnic state on the
other hand. However, before we procede in
analyzing these aspects, it is important to clarify
the legal status of the Palestinians in the Arab
Host-States, as this constitutes the legal basis
governing the legal relationship between the
Palestinians and their respective Host-States,
'Ibid., pp. 45 - 54.
2The term "Arab Host-States" refers to the Arab
States in which the Palestinians took refuge,
en masse, during and after the 1948 War in Palestine.
These States are Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt
(including the Gaza Strip which, after 1948, was
administered by Egypt).
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hence, the mutual rights and obligations of the
Palestinians and their Host-States.
The literature on human rights provides three
categories under which the status of non-dominant
nationalities could be classified. These are:
minority status, refugee status, and stateless
persons status.
a. The Palestinians as a minority
The literature on minorities accepts the
existence of certain characteristics as being
the bases which govern the existence of a
minority status. These are cultural, ethnic,
religious and linguistic. 1 In the context
of these characteristics, a minority can be
defined 2 as a group of people who live in a
state as lawful citizens and who preserve
1lnis L. Claude, National Minorities: An International
Problem (cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955),
pp. 2 and 203.
James Frederick Green, The United Nations and
Human Rights (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1956), pp. 93-94.
A.H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London:
Oxford University Press, 1911.fl, pp. 1-14.
Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National
Minorities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945),
pp. XII - XIII.
2For other definitions see: mis Claude, op.cit.,
pp. 208, 210. Also see: United Nations Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Report of the Fourth
Session, Doe. E/CN.4/641 (Oct. 25, 1951), p.43.
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either ethnic, .linguistic, cultural, or religious
characteristics, in any combination, which are
different from those enjoyed by the majority of
the people living in that state. Given the above
mentioned characteristics, the crystallization of
a minority status might sometimes be based, on a
group of people, regardless of its being a
majority or a minority in numerical terms, con-
ceiving of itself as being a minority. In other
words, the element of minority-consciousness,
whether self-developed or imposed by other
distinct group or groups in the state, might
serve, regardless of the size of the group con-
cerned, as a basis for the crystallization of a
minority status1 . The existence of a minority
in a state becomes a problem in two cases. First,
if the majority, whether in si.ze or influence,
adopts or practises any sort of policy or action
that might be interpreted by the minority, whether
in size or in influence, as being hostile to its
right of practising and preserving any of its
distinctive characteristics. Second, if the
minority, whether in size or in influence, trans-
lates its distinctive characteristics into
political terms, with political objectives that
are ultimately in contradiction to those of the
majority.
Any attempt to apply mirxrity status to the
Palestinians in the Arab Host-States would reveal
1For example, the situation in Pakistan prior to
the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, when the majority
in East Pakistan was dominated by the minority
in West Pakistan.
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that the Palestinians in Egypt and Syria do not
meet the basic criterion which govern the status
of a minority since they do not hold the citizen-
ship of either of these countries. As for
Lebanon, the majority of the Palestinians residing
there do not have Lebanese citizenship, and ,
therefore, cannot be classified as a minority.
A certain number1 of the Christian Palestinians
residing in Lebanon were granted the Lebanese
citizenship however. This was a significant
development during the period 1952-1958. The
motive behind this was an attempt by the Lebanese
Government to maintain the critical sectarian
balance on which the Lebanese political system
is based and according to which the Christians
enjoy a slight majority of 53% (according to the
only census in the history of Lebanon which took
place in 1943). Since 1943, the Christian
majority had been decreasing due to the higher
birth rate among the Lebanese Moslems.
The Christian Palestinians in Lebanon who
acquired Lebanese citizenship do not fall within
the minority status because of two main factors.
First, Lebanon is a minority-based country. It
1No official figures were released by the Lebanon
Government, and no estimates, according to my
knowledge, were made of the number of Palestinians
who were granted Lebanese citizenship. However,
based upon private talks with some Lebanese and
Palestinians in Lebanon, this figure could range
between 20,000 - 70,000.
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consists of different minorities with none of
them constituting an absolute majority and who,
in various degrees, conceive of themselves as
minorities. The Lebanese political system is
based on the continuous existence of an accepted
balance between these sectarian groups. Second,
in case of any disruption of the existing order
in Lebanon, the Lebanized Christian Palestinians
belong, according to the rules of the sectarian
game, to the Christian sect, which is, hypothe-
tically, in the majority status.
The Palestinians in Jordan pose a different
problem. On constitutional grounds 1 , the
Palestinians in Jordan are Jordanian citizens.
In this capacity, the Palestinians have constituted,
all the time, an absolute majority of the populace
of Jordan2 . Thus, they cannot, theoretically and
in numerical terms, be classified as a minority.
In practice, however, the Palestinians in Jordan,
conscious of their actual inferior status,
conceive of themselves as a minority3.
1According to the Jordanian Constitution of 1950,
which was drafted after the unification of the
West Bank and Trans-Jordan in December 1949.
For more information see Chapter 4, pp. 170-186.
1950, the population of Jordan was 1,337,000
with 506,000 Trans-Jordanians, and 864,000
Palestinians. See Chapter 4, p.191.
3See Chapter 4.
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b. The Palestinians as Refugees
The status of the refugee is governed by the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
According to this Convention, the term refugee
applies to "any person who owing to well founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence, is unable, or
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it".
This international definition of the refugee,
which was essentially devised to deal with post-
Second World War refugees, was not applied to the
Palestinians, nor was the care of the Palestinians
entrusted to the International Refugee Organiza-
tion. This, in itself, reflects an appreciation,
by the world community, of the peculiar nature of
the Palestine refugees, as a problem not of
individual refugees, but rather of a whole people.
Instead, a special agency, under the name United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA), was created by the United
Nations to take care of the basic humanitarian
needs of the Palestine refugees 2 . No definition
1Ian Brownhie (ed.). Basic Documents on Human Rights
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 136-137; Also
see, Louise W. Holborn. The International Refugee
Organization: Its History and Work, 196-1952(London:
Oxford University Press, 1956) PP . 584-587.
2For more information 0nUNRWA see Chapter 2, pp.63-66, 70-72, 84
-90 , 94-97.
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of the 'Palestine refugee' was made by the United
Nations. However, UNRWA devised its own defini-
tion which, for practical reasons, related to
facilitating the work of UNRWA, defines a
Palestinian refugee as being "a person whose
normal residence had been Palestine for a minimum
of two years preceeding the 1948 conflict and who,
as a result, had lost both his home and his means
of livelihood"1.
The UNRWA definition of the Palestinian refugee,
which was devised with the sole aim of laying-down
a criterion for eligibility to UNRWA assistance
and which therefore stresses economic need rather
than political status, cannot, for this reason, be
taken as a basis for determining the refugee status
of the Palestinians in the Arab Host-States. It
is thus far from the international definition of
the refugee, as laid-down by the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which gives
basically a political definition. Accordingly,
the analysis of the refugee status of the Palestine
refugees, which is an essentially political as well
as an economic analysis, will be conducted on the
basis of the political definition, that is, the
international definition of the refugee, and not
on the basis of the working definition as laid
down by tJNRWA.
The majority of the Palestinians in the Arab
Host-States are normally referred to as being
1UNRWA. Information Paper No. 6. The Problem of the
UNRWA Rolls: 1950-1962 (Beirut: UNRWA, 1962), P.10;
for more information see Chapter 2, pp. 63-72.
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'refugees'. In principle, this might be true of
all the Palestinians who left their homes and
lands and who took refuge in the neighbouring
Arab States, with the exception of the original
inhabitants of the West Banlc1 and the Gaza Strip
who did not leave their homes and lands. In
theory, however, the situation differs. On April
24, 1950, the West Bank ceased to exist, at least
officially, as part of Palestine, and became a
2part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan , with all
its inhabitants, whether refugees or not, becoming
Jordanian citizens. Thus, all the Palestinians
residing in the West Bank and Transjordan, refugees
and non-refugees alike, became Jordanian citizens
living in their country-Jordan 3 . In practice, the
situation was also different from all the above.
According to TJNRWA, a Palestinian is considered
as being a refugee only if he is registered by
UNRWA as such 4 . This, of course, covered the
Palestinian refugees in Jordan (including the West
Bank) who hold Jordanian citizenship. As for the
Arab States themselves, the use of the term
this study, the term West Bank refers to the
Arab-held central part of Palestine which became
part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan after
1949. For more information, see, Chapter Four.
2For more information on this unification, see
Chapter 4, pp. 170-186.
3See the international definition of the term
'refugee', p.22.
41n accordance with UNRWA definition, see Chapter
Two, p.66.
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'refugee' differed. In Jordan, for example,
although all the Palestinians residing there were
Jordanian citizens, the term 'refugee' was
normally used to refer to the Palestinians who
live in UNRWA 'refugee camps'. In Lebanon, the
-term 'refugee' had a wider application, and
covered all those Palestinian refugees residing
in Lebanon who did not hold Lebanese citizenship.
While in Lebanon the term refugeeV connoted a
markedly inferior status in the society, such
connotations were absent from the Syrian applica-
1tion of the term • In the Gaza Strip. The
application of the term 'refugee', with reference
to both the international definition and IJNRWA
definition of a refugee, poses more controversy
than anywhere else in the Arab Host-States.
According to the international definition of a
refugee, all those Palestinians who took refuge
in the neighbouring Arab States during and after
the 19k8_19 L19 hostilities in Palestine qualify,
at least theoretically, for being considered as
refugees. However, those Palestinians who took
refuge in the Gaza Strip are still on Palestinian
land and hence, at least theoretically, are still
living inside their "country of former habitual
residence" 2 . Nevertheless, the majority of' the
original inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, although
they did not leave their homes, lost their lands
and their means of livelihood 3 . Accordingly,
1For more information, see Chapter Two,pp. 78-80.
See P.22.
3U.N. Doe. A/1905, para. 2L1, p.4.; For more
informatjon see Chapter 2, p.66.
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they have a case as refugees in the economic sense,
or as "economic refugees"'. Thus, the term
'refugee' as applied to the Palestinians in the
Arab Host-States is rather controversial and
diversified in its connotations. However, the
fact remains that some of the Palestinians in the
Arab Host-States, whether they are called refugees
or not, meet the universally accepted criteria
governing the status of refugees.
c. The Palestinians as Stateless Persons
'Stateless persons' are defined by the 195k
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons. According to this Coiivention, the term
'stateless persons' applies to "a person who is
not considered as a national by any state under
the operation of its law"2.
An application of the status ' of stateless•
persons to the Palestinians in the Arab Host-
States reveals that all the Palestinians residing
in Jordan cannot be considered as stateless because
they hold Jordanian citizenship, and are consider-
ed by the Jordanian Government as being nationals
"under the operation of its law". As for Lebanon
and Syria, the majority of the Palestinians there
are stateless because they are not coflsidered as
nationals by the Lebanese and Syrian Governments
respectively, or by any other government. A more
controversial situation exists in the Gaza Strip
where the Palestinians live on 'Palestinian lfld
1Ibid
2Ian Brownlie (ed.), op.cit., p. 15k.
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yet are considered stateless due to the following
factors. First, there is no Palestinian state.
Second, the Gaza Strip has never been an indepen-
dent state as It was under the Egyptian Military
Government from 1948_19671. Third, the Palestin-
ians in the Gaza Strip, whether refugees or not,
were not considered by the Egyptian Government,
or by any other Government, as being nationals
tunder the operation of its lawt during the
period of our study.
The status of the Palestinians in the Arab
Host-States is not clearly defined. Although
they are partly minority, partly refugees and
partly stateless, yet, as a whole, they are none
of these. Moreover, the existence of Pan-Arabism2
as an accepted political ideology by the Arab
States and the Arab masses, provides a unique
aspect to the status of the Arab Palestinians,
as minorities or refugees or stateless persons,
and their relationship with their respective
Arab Host-States. The reason for this is that,
Pan-Arabism provides a general framework which
includes every Arab State and all the Arab people,
including the Palestinians. Some might suggest
that this Pan-Arab framework is theoretical and
cannot be taken seriously when it comes to the
1With the exception of the period November 1956-
March 1957, when the Gaza Strip was under the
Israeli occupation.
2Pan-Arabism is a political doctrine which stresses
the unity of the Arab people and the Arab land,and
calls for the integration of the Arab people into
one state. The League of the Arab States which was
founded in 19 1t5, was the first official expression,
by the Arab regimes, of Pan-Arabism. The merger of
Egypt and Syria, in 1958, into the United Arab
Republic, was another example of Pan-Arabism. For a
discussion of the Pan-Arab attitude of the
Palestinians prior to 1948, see Chapter 2,pp.52-63.
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actualities of politics. It might be true that
Pan-Arabism is as theoretical as Pan-Africanism
or Pan-Europeanism. However, one basic difference
between Pan-Arabism and the other two-isms is the
fact that Pan-Arabism is not optional. Since 19L18,
no Arab regime, irrespective of its colour or
nature has dared to reject Pan-Arabism and to
dissociate itself from it, at least in declaratory
policy. Besides, during of major crises between
one or more Arab State and a non-Arab State, for
example, Israel, Pan-Arabism has proved to be a
viable framework for rallying Arab support and
promoting solidarity among the Arab States.
".... the Arab World has as its
objective a broader nationalism
which, while preserving the integrity
of the various Arab States, looks
towards the eventual amalgamation
of them into a larger whole. In
fulfilling this aim, we cannot
logically ignore the area formerly
known as Palestine, where an un-
resolved issue, involving a million
displaced persons, remains as a
living illustration of a grave
injustice and of the Zionist
threat in the heart of the Arab
World"1.
The token military participation of many Arab
States which do not neighbour Israel, in the war
effort against Israel during and after the 1956,
1967 and 1973 Wars, in Egypt and Syria, was a
manifestation of this Pan-Arab framework. More-
over, the reaction of the Arab masses to the
1956 attack on Egypt, and the merger of Egypt
1	 .H.M. King Hussein of Jordan.Uneasy Lies The Head:
An Autobiography (London: Heinemann, 1962) p.105.
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and Syria into the United Arab Republic in 1958,
are but two examples of the strong bonds of Pan-
Arabism among the Arab masses.
In the context of this Pan-Arab relationship,
an analysis of the nature and objectives of
Palestinian political attitudes and activities
in the Arab Host-States during the post-19L18
period requires a full understanding of the
Palestinian conception of the nature of the
relationship between themselves as Arab
Palestinians and the Arab States, and the Arab
peoples at large. The importance of under-
standing the nature of this relationship stems
from the fact that, during the post-19k8 period,
the Palestinians were operating neither in a
purely Palestinian atmosphere, nor in a vacuum,
but rather from within the broad framework of
the Arab World in general, and the Arab Host-
States in particular. However, it should be
pointed out that this study concentrates on the
Palestinian views, and only considers those of
'the Host-States to the extent that they are im-.
portant' from the Palestinian point-of-view.
While one cannot be understood without the other,
it is the Palestinians whd are our central con-
cern. Accordingly, an analysis of the Host-
States' conception of the relationship between
themselves and the Palestinians residing on
their respective territories will only be conducted
through an analysis of the responses and reactions
of the Host-States to the political attitudes and
activities of the Palestinians, as this constitutes
an important contribution to the understanding of
the general relationship between the two sides.
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The general bases governing this theoretical
approach are as follows:
First,	 the Palestinians in the Arab Host-States
constitute the intruding-element and the
Host-State the existing-element
Second, the actions and policies of any existing-
element, which are a reflection of the
various national interests of that
element, do not require, irrespective
of the rationality or moral bases of
such actions or policies, legitimization
or justification because they simply
reflect the legitimate existence and
sovereignty of the existing-element.
The Palestinians in the Host-States,
as the intruding-element, do not enjoy
such legitimacy or sovereignty because
they operate, in their intruding-
capacity, from within the framework of
one or more of the existing-elements.
To this, the Palestinians in Jordan
are a theoretical exception1.
Accordingly, the intruding_element t s conception
of the nature of the relationship between itself
11n theory, and on constitutional grounds, the
Palestinians in Jordan are lawful citizens of
the State: accordingly, they constitute an integral
legitimate part of the existing-element. In
practice, the situation might not be a true
reflection of the theoretical constitutional
status of the Palestinians in Jordan. However,
the situation of the Palestinians in Jordan will
be dealt with extensively in Chapter k.
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and the existing-elements requires a full under-
standing as it constitutes the basis on which
the intruding-element legitimizes and justifies
operating from within the framework of the
existing-elements. Within the context of the
Arab World, this analysis must take account of
the problem of the dual-character which is
shared by the Arab peoples and the Arab States.
The two sides of this dual-character are Pan-
Arabism and nationalism. Within the framework of
Pan-Arabism, all the Arab peoples are fellow
citizens and brothers who are bound together by
the strong bonds of Pan- Arabism and its ultimate
goal of Arab unity. This is in theory. In
practice, however, the dual-character produces
different attitudes in different contexts. In
the context of the relationship between the
different Arab existing-elements, the national
aspect prevails over the Pan-Arab aspect. In
the context of a confrontation between any number
of Arab existing-elements and non-Arab existing
elements, the Pan-Arab aspect prevails over the
national aspect. In the context of the relation-
ship between an Arab intruding-element and an
Arab existing-element, the national aspect
prevails. However, when an Arab intruding-
element is confronted by a non-Arab existing-
element, the Pan-Arab aspect in the relationship
between the Arab intruding-element and the Arab
existing-element prevails over the national
aspect. Similarly, when an Arab existing-element
is confronted by a non-Arab intruding-element, the
Pan-Arab aspect in the relationship between the
Arab intruding-element(s) and the concerned Arab
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existing-element(s) prevails over the national
aspect. Therefore, as applied to the Arab World,
and within the context of the relationship
between the Arab intruding-element and the Arab-
existing-elements, a confrontation between any
of the Arab elements and a non-Arab element(s)
results in the prevailence of the Pan-Arab
aspect of the dual-character in the relation-
ship between the Arab intruding-element and
the Arab existing-elements. Similarly, the'
absence of a non-Arab-Arab confrontation
results in the prevailence of the national
aspect of the dual-character in the relation-
ship between the Arab intruding-element and
the Arab existing-elements. Accordingly, the
study of the PalestinianArab relations, which
is the subject matter of this research,
necessitates the exclusion of any confrontation
with non-Arab elements as a central theme due
to the neutralizing effects of such confronta-
tions on the realities of Palestinian-Arab
relations, since any confrontation between
an Arab element and a non-Arab element results
in the prevailence of the Pan-Arab aspect in
the relationship between the Arab intruding-
element and the Arab-existing-element(s).
This sutdy concentrates on Palestinian
relations with the Arab Host-States, although
it does not ignore the effects on these
relations of the triggering of Pan-Arabism by
the frequent confrontation with non-Arab
elements.
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We can elaborate the following general hypo-
thesis about the relationship between the Palestin-
ians, as the Arab intruding-element, and the Arab
Host-States, as the Arab existing-elements.
First, the intruding-element attempts to establish
as many common-bonds with the existing-
element as possible. Furthermore, the
intruding-element seeks to stress most
among those common-bonds the ones which
suit its cause and needs best.
Second,following the establishment of the common-
bonds, the intruding-element acts with the
aim of linking its cause to that of the
existing-element. In doing so, the intruding-
element attempts to identify its cause in
terms of the broad national interests of
the existing-element. The intruding-
element thus seeks legitimacy through
identifying its interests with those of
the existing-element.
Third, the intruding-element tends to advocate,
create and support extra-national tendencies
and movements in the existing-elements.
Through the existence of such tendencies
and movements, the intruding-element hopes
to be able to fit in and to find a legitimate
place for itself within the framework of the
existing-elements and to favour its own
specific interests.
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In the Arab case, the existence of Pan-Arabism
as an extra - national framework which is broadly
accepted by the Arab peoples and the Arab States,
facilitates the attempts of the Arab intruding-
element towards promoting and creating extra-
national tendencies and movements within and
across the boundaries of the Arab existing-elements.
It is, however, to be observed that although
the intruding-element advocates extra-national
tendencies, it, nevertheless, exhibits a high
degree of national self-consciousness which serves
as ameans towards preserving its own national
identity as a substitute to the non-existent
1political entity . The achievement of the
nationalist goals of the intruding-element con-
stitutes, in fact, the essence of its extra-
national attitude in its relations with the
existing-elements.
In pursuing these goals, the intruding-element
can follow three main courses:
1. The penetration of the masses of the existing-
elements. This penetrationcould be attained
through various channels, the most important
of which are the popular political parties, the
professional associations, literature (which
also includes the Press) and inter-marriage.
In the case of Jordan, the situation is
different because the intruding-element is in
itself an integral part of the masses of the
existing-element. Thus by definition the need,
on the part of the intruding-element, for
1See Chapter 2, pp. 92-101.
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penetrating the masses does not arise. However,
when such a situation exists, the intruding-
element finds itself in the favourable position
of having the right, as a lawful part of the
existing-element, to penetrate the ruling elite
as a substitute for penetrating the masses in
other existing-elements, where the intruding-
element does not enjoy the status of being a
lawful part of the indigenous population
When, for any reason, the penetration , by the
intruding-element of the ruling elite of the
existing-element concerned fails, then the
intruding-element may move in the direction of
attempting to overthrow that regime in its
capacity as a lawful part of that existing-
element1.
A similar attitude towards the ruling elite
is likely to develop if the intruding-element
succeeds in penetrating the ruling elite of the
relevent existing-element but persistently
fails in achieving what it seeks after such a
penetration.
2. The penetration of important non-political
institutions of the existing-elements which
cover primarily the educational and economic
'For example, if the Palestinians in Jordan, who
are Jordanian citizens, attempt to overthrow the
regime, such a move could be interpreted by the
inhabitants of Jordan and the outside world as
•	 well, as being a domestic issue. But if the
same thing were to happen in Lebanon and Syria,
where the Palestinians are not Lebanese or
Syrian citizens respectively, then such a move
could be interpreted by the Lebanese or Syrian
people, and by the outside world, as a foreign
intervention in the domestic affairs of either
Lebanon or Syria.
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sectors. The penetration of the educational
sector would bring the intruding-element into
direct contact with the masses, and would
enable it to influence the thinking of the new
generations of the existing-elements through
the process of education. By having an
influence on the economy of the existing-
elements through such sectors as trade, industry
and management, the intruding-element hopes to
indicate to the regimes and peoples of existing-
elements the importance of its role in economic
development. Moreover, this educational and
economic build-up can provide the intruding-
element, as a productive force, with more
chances of acceptance within the existing-
elements. It is, however, to be observed that
such a policy is basically two-edged. While
such a penetration might improve the position
of the intruding-element and enhance its chances
of acceptance by the existing-element, equally
it could damage the position of the intruding-.
element and hinder its chances of being accepted
by the existing-element on the grounds that
penetration by the intruding-element, of the
educational and economic sectors of the existing-
element, takes place at the expense of the
indigenous population. It could be argued that
the occupation of jobs by members of the
intruding-element (with perhaps the exception
of specialized jobs and those requiring expertise)
constitutes deprivation of and competition with
the indigenous population, and that all profits
made by the members of the intruding-element
are made at the expense of the indigenous
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population. This state-of-affairs is most likely
to come about if the intruding-element has
different characteristics from those of the
indigenous population such as race, language,
religion, and culture. In the case of the Arab
World, such differences are basically insigni-
ficant since the intruding-element has similar
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural
characteristics to those of the existing-elements.
Accordingly, in this case, the reaction of the
existing-elements to the intruding_elementts
penetration of such sectors as education and the
economy is likely to be minimal because the
intruding-element operates under the Pan-Arab
umbrella. Yet, it is important to point out that
this minimal-reaction by the existing-elements
is very much dependent upon, among other things,
which side of the dual-character in the relation-
ship between the Arab intruding-element concerned
and the Arab existing-element(s) concerned,
prevails at that period of time. In other words,
the prevailence of the national aspect of the
dual-character in the relationship between the
Arab intruding-element and the Arab existing-
element over the Pan-Arab aspect tends to affect
the minimal-reaction negatively, and vice versa.
3. After succeeding in having its cause identified
by the masses and the regime of the relevent
existing-element as being the nationalist cause
of the existing-element itself, the intruding-
element could then acquire an important role as
the political-conscience of the people of the
existing-element as far as the cause is concerned.
In other words, the attitude of the intruding-
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element, vis-á-vis any policy or political
attitude adopted by the regime(s)of the existing-
element(s) with regard to the new joint-cause,
could serve as an indicator to the masses of the
existing-element as to whether they should accept
and support that particular policy or attitude
or not. This would be due to the fact that such
policies or attitudes would affect the intruding-
element directly and to a higher degree than the
existing-element, because the realization of the
joint-cause would mean national restoration and
political survival for the intruding-element,
which is not the case for the existing-elements.
Accordingly, the masses of the existing-elements
would regard the intruding-element as the
vanguard of the joint-cause. Subsequently, and
in this capacity, the attitude of the intruding-
element vis-á-vis any regime of the existing-
elements would play a significant role in affect-
ing the attitude of the peoples of this or that
existing-element towards its own regime. Most
important, it would determine the degree of a
regime t s popularity among its own masses and the
masses of the other existing-elements who would
share together the same joint-cause 1 . This,
however, does not necessarily mean that the lack
of the intruding-element t s support for this or
'The Economist,(London: February 20, 1960), p. 698.
In a commentary entitled "discord" (p.698), The
Economist says "Whether stateless people, displaced
persons, or dwellers under the cloudy sovereignty of
Egypt (at Gaza) or Jordan (east of Jerusalem), the
Palestinians appear to hold the key to supremacy
over the entire Arab world. He who can capture the
loyalty of these poor people will automatically .become
the saviour of the Arabs-or so it seems to be assumed
by President Nasser, King Hussein and General Qasim
alike.".
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that particular regime of the existing-elements
would lead to the downfall of that regime ,
although it might eventually have a bearing on
it.
This model is a tentative framework for
examining the empirical relationship between the
Palestinians and their respective Arab Host-
States. With the aid of this framework, we shall
now examine that relationship.
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CHAPTER TWO
PALESTINIAN-ARAB RELATIONS: THE ERA OF FORMATION,
929 - 1952
The Arab Palestinians: A Brief Historical Background
As a province of the Ottoman 	 Palestine
was no exception in acquiring the diseases suffered
by the aging Empire. Arab Palestinian society was
an extension of traditional Ottoman society where
the peasants and rural population made up its wide
Ubase, and the administrative effendis 	 , landed-
gentry, clergymen, tribal chiefs and important
merchants, constituted its social elite. Economic-
ally, Palestine gained momentum through its universal
religious importance and its strategic location as
a transit area. "With its fertile coastal plain,
its mountains, streams and springs, its ancient
cities and places of pilgrimage, it continued
through the centuries to be one of the most pros-
perous, most highly cultivated and most densely
1populated parts of the Arab World."
Under Ottoman rule, Palestine was divided into the
Sanjak (governorship) of Jerusalem which was under
the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Capital Asetanah
(Istanbul); and the Sanjaic of Acre and Nablus which
formed part of the vilayat (state) of Sham (Syria)
and was, in 1883, incorporated with the vilayat
of Beirut.
"An Ottoman social title for upper middle class.
UNRWA. Why Are They Still Refugees? A general
brief on the origins of the Palestine refugee
rob1em and the reasons why it remains unsolved.
(Beirut: UNRWA, 1964), p. 1 (for internal
distribution only).
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In accordance with the Ottoman feudal tradition,
a few Arab Palestinian families were elevated to the
social strata of the class of notables. In order to
preserve its social privileges, the Palestinian
class of notables allied itself, politically, with
the Ottoman regime, thus, dominating the senior
governmental and religious ranks in Palestine.
Numerically, members of this class constituted an
insignificant proportion of the total Palestinian
population.
According to the 1922 census, the population of
Palestine was composed of1:
430,000 rural population (both peasants and
countrymen)
264,000 urban population (including 68,500 Jews
and other minorities)
60,000 Beduins
The Palestinian rural population enjoyed a high
average income per capita compared with the prevail-
ing Middle Eastern standards. A Palestinian peasant
could earn up to 400 dollars per annum. Most of the
Palestinian peasants owned a house and a plot of
2land
The society of the Arab Palestinian village was
basically highly patriarchal. An average Palestinian
village would normally shelter a few thousand
Survey of Palestine.Vol. I (Palestine: the
Government Printer,1946), p. 50.
Doc. 16(A/1905), para 1, p.1.
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inhabitants, who, in totality, could be reduced to
a few big families (hamouleh)*. A total of two or
three prominent members of each hamouleh, in the
village, would constitute the council of elders
which ran that village. The most prominent among
the members of the council of elders would be the
UMukhtar of the village. In such society, the
hamouleh was "the highest unit that commanded any
great loyalty"1.
The small Palestinian urban population had at
its apex a very numerically restricted class of
notables. The core of the remaining urban
population was middle class. The Palestinian middle
class was composed of professional people, merchants,
small landlords, skilled artisans and craftsmen. As
for industry, it was traditional and manual. The
number of Palestinians working in industry was
relatively small, and most of the workers had family
ties with their employers.
In the ruraly-dominated Palestinian society, the
absence of a strong and influential middle class was
evident. This was due to the weakness of the class-
structure of the essentially merchant Arab
Palestinian middle class. Although it had emerged
early, yet, the Arab Palestinian middle class was
emasculated by social and economic relations
prevailing within Arab Palestinian society at that
time. The supremacy of family and personal loyalties
Ilamouleh means a big family whose members might
count up to a few hundred.
U Mukhtar means literally "the selected man". He is
the mayor of the village.
Ibid.
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in the traditional Palestinian society, and the sub-
sequent absence of class-consciousness contributed
much to the weakness of the Arab Palestinian middle
class. The agricultural-based Palestinian economy,
the backwardness and illiteracy of the Arab Pales-
tinian rural population, the absence of a central
planning and development body, and the well-
developed Jewish competition in the fields of trade
and industry, had all weakened, still further, the
Arab Palestinian middle class. This, in turn,
paralysed the social mobility within Palestinian
society, and prevented the middle class from playing
its historic role as the natural successer to the
traditional feudal elite.
When the British forces entered Palestine in
1917, Arab Palestinian society was still organized
in the Ottoman tradition, and inevitably the social
and political hegemony of the class of notables
continued. However, with the transformation of the
British occupation of Palestine into a Mandate, as
from July 24, 1922, Article Four of the Mandate
formalized a new element. It recommended that:
" An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be
recognized as a public body for the
purpose of advising and co-operating
with the Administration of Palestine
in such economic, social and other
matters as may affect the establishment
of the Jewish national home and the
interests of the Jewish population
in Palestine .... ni
1J.C. Hurewitz. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East:
A Documentary Record, 1914-1956, Vol. II (Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956),p.235.
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In this context,.the Mandate had profound impacts on
Arab Palestinian society and its traditional leader-
ship. First, the recognition of the Jewish right to
a national home in Palestine, which was in fulfilment
of the goals and aspirations of Zionist ideology',
Zionist ideology took its first organized form in
1897 when, during the period August 29-31, The First
Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland. In
this Congress, the Zionist Organization was created.
The Organization adopted a programme known as the
Basle Programme. According to this programme,
"Zionism strives for the establishment of a publically
and legally secured home in Palestine for the Jewish
people".(See, Walid Khalidi(ed.). Fron Haven to
Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine
Problem Until 1948 (Beirut: The Institute for
Palestine Studies, 1971), p.89). This end-goal of
the Zionist Organization, as stated explicitly in the
Basle Programme, was virtually the Zionist solution
to the problem of preserving the Jewish identity
"which was imperilled by emancipation and assimila-
tion". (Nahum Goldman, The Genius of Herzl and
Zionism Today (Jerusalem: Zionist Executive, 1955),
p.19).
The colonization of Palestine was essential for
the achievement of the Zionist goal, and until the
establishment of a Jewish national state in
Palestine, immigration and land settlement con-
stituted the core of the Zionist Organization's day-
to-day activities. This, in itself, was in
contradiction with the interests of the Arab
Palestinians who, in 1922, represented 88% of the
total population of Palestine, as compared to 11%
Jews. In the same year, the Arab Palestinians
owned about 96% of the total land of Palestine,
while the Jews owned only 2%. By 1946, as a result
of the Zionist policy of immigration, the population
of Palestine more than doubled with the Arabs
representing 64% of the population as compared to
34% Jews. Nevertheless, the Jews owned only about
7% of the land while the Arab Palestinians owned
about 92% (see UNRWA: Why Are They Still Refugees?
p 5 cit., p.2.)
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constituted a blow to the Arab Palestinians t aim
which was "not to drive the Jewish community out of
Palestine but to make the Jews realize that they
formed part of a predominantly Arab area and that
they would have to come to terms with the Arabs in
order to continue to live there" 1
 . Second, the
traditional Arab Palestinian leadership was forced
to shoulder the responsibility of leading the Arab
Palestinians in their struggle against the Zionist
policies" and against the Mandate
which stipulated, among its goals in Palestine,
that the British should help in the achievement of
the Zionist goals. The traditional Arab Palestin-
ian leadership, however, was destined to face the
sophisticated Zionist machinery which enjoyed the
backing of the majority of world Jewry and its
vast resources.
The political activities and mode of struggle
of the Arab Palestinian community, prior to 19k8,
were determined, to a great extent, by its culture
and social structure. The persistence of the class
of notables on the top of the social and political
pyramid of Arab Palestinian society had served to
preserve the existing order. The traditional Arab
Palestinian leadership, in order to preserve its
privileges, did not allow any change in the status
quo, as this could have shaken the very basis of
the social system which sustained it. This was
Mosely Lesch. "The Palestine Arab Nationalist
Movement Under The Mandate", in, William B.Quandt,
Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of
Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973), p. 17.
- 45 -
the basic premise underlying the political attitudes
and modes of struggle . that were endorsed by the
traditional Arab Palestinian leadership. The family
remained the basic unit of the social and political
system. Family loyalty reigned supreme over any
other loyalty. Since Arab Palestinian society was
patriarchal, it was, therefore, inevitable that
political differences would be expressed through
family polarizations and reivairies. Thus, the
rivalry between the Husseini family and the
Nashashibi family resulted in the splitting of the
country into two loose, rival political groups:
the Majlisiyyin (Councilites ) who supported the
Husseinis and the Husseini-dominated Islamic
Councils ; and the Mu'aridin (Opposition) who sup-
ported the Nashashibis and who, consequently, were
opposed to the Islamic Council. The traditionalism
and family-factionalism reflected themselves very
much on the form of political organization and mode
of struggle pursued by the traditional Arab
Palestinian leadership.
The election of the Islamic Council (Al-Majlis Al-
Islami) took place in 1922. The electoral body
covered all adult Palestinian Moslem males. The
holding of such a large-scale election, in order to
choose four persons to supervise the endowment
property and institutions, caused serious splits in
the country. The importance attached to the
Islamic Council came from the Arab Palestinians'
conception of the Council, in the absence of an
independent state, as some form of an Arab 'self-
government' within the state. The Islamic Council,
therefore, transcended its religious functions and
became loaded with political duties. The Husseinis
won the elections, hence, became Majlisiyyin or
(Councilites), and the Nashashibis lost them, hence,
became Mu'aridin or (Opposition).
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Reflections on the Arab Palestinian Political
Organizations Before 191t8:
The Moslem-Christian societies were the first
form of political organization introduced by the
traditional Arab Palestinian leadership. The
'struggle against zionism' was the stated purpose
of these societies. Apparently, such a struggle
was to take place through a Moslem-Christian
coalition. The large number of such societies was
not a sign of health however as their membership
was confined to a limited class, the class of
notables 1 , the mode of struggle of these societies
was limited to organizing rallies, delivering
speeches and sending telegrams of protest to the
British authorities and international organizations2.
Most of these societies were short-lived. Nonethe-
less, they led to the emergence of the Palestinian
congresses as a new form of political organization,
through sending delegates to represent the Moslem-
Christian societies in various cities, at the
congresses.
During the period March 1919 - June 1928, seven
Palestinian congresses were held. These congresses
were dominated by the traditional Arab Palestinian
leadership. The composition and resolutions of
'Abdul Wahhab Kayyali. Tarikh Faistin Al-Hadith
(The Modern History of Palestine). (Beirut: The
Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1970),
pp. 108-109.
2
Abdul Wahhab Kayyali (ed.) Documents of Arab
Palestinian Resistance to British Occu pation and
Zionism: 1918-1939. (Beirut: The Institute for
Palestine Studies. 1968), Doc. No. l , pp. 1-3.
Also see: Kayyali, Tarikli, p.cit., pp.115-121.
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these congresses were, thus, a reflection of the
interests, attitudes and rivalries of the Arab
Palestinian leaders. Although the Palestinian
congresses were a new form of political organization,
they, nevertheless, were doomed to failure due,
mainly, to the following reasons:
First, these congresses did not represent the Arab
population of Palestine, but rather one
class of it. This narrow representation,
which was due, among other things, to the
prohibition, by the Mandate authority, of
holding general elections to elect delegates
to the various congresses, imposed severe
limitations on the effectiveness and
viability of the Palestinian congresses.
Personal and family rivalries had to be
solved through compromise resolutions. The
Seventh Palestinian Congress, held in
Jerusalem in June 1928, had to elect an
executive committee of 28 members in order
to satisfy all family groupings and blocs
represented in the Congress.1
Second, these congresses lacked a social or political
programme, or even a tentative plan of work,
that might have served as a guideline for the
conferees in their political or organizational
activities. The absence of such a programme
was partly a result of the limited represen-
tative capacity of the congresses, where the
enlightened Arab Palestinian middle class
1Abdul Wahhab Kayyali, Tarikh, op.cit., p. 228.
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was in the minority; but mainly it reflected
the 'conservative, 'disorganized', 'incap-
able', 'weak', and	 leadership1.
Besides, it was not in the interest of the
traditional Arab Palestin:ian leadership to
pave the way for any basic change in the
status quo in Palestine through the
adoption of a political programme with
social content2.
Finally, the Palestinian leadership failed to trans-
form these congresses into a framework for
organizing the masses of the Arab Pales-
tinian people. Once more, this failure
was caused by the limited representative
capacity of the Palestinian congresses,
and the absence of a coherent political or
social programme.
The failure of the Palestinian congresses gave
way to the emergence of politicial parties as a
new channel for political work and political
organization. During the first half of the 1930's,
six Arab Palestinian political parties were formed.
These were: The Arab Palestinian (Arabi) Party, the
National Defence (Difaa') Party, the Reformation
(Islah) Party, the Arab Independence (Istiqial)
1khmad Al-Shukairy. Arba'un Amma Fi A1-Hayat Al-
Arabiyyah Va A1-Dawliyyah(Forty Years in Arab and
International Life). Vol. 1 (Beirut: An-Nahar House
for Publishing, 1969), pp. 105-114.
2Don Peretz. "The Palestinian Arabs: A National
Entity" in Michael Curtis(ed.), People and Politics
in the Middle East (New Jersey: Transaction Books,
1971), p. 73.
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Party, the Youth (Shabab) Party and the Liberal
(Ahrar) Party.
The last three parties were founded by middle
class Arab Palestinian intellectuals, in an attempt
to take the lead from the traditional Arab Pales-
tinian leadership. The first three parties were
founded by the traditional leadership, and were,
practically, family-parties. The Husseini family
formed the Arab Palestinian Party, the Nashashibi
family formed the National Defence Party, and the
ithalidi family formed the Reformation Party. In
no time, the family-parties were able to drive the
middle class parties out of the market. The current
of events, in the second half of the 1930 t s, proved
the ineffectiveness and futility of the Palestinian
political parties. This was due to a variety of
factors:
First, the Palestinian political parties did not
reflect a change in the substance of the
Palestinian leadership. They were just a
new innovation by the same old traditional
leadership. In this context , the
Palestinian political parties were merely
political-titles for the different and
rival leading Palestinian families.
Second, all Palestinian political parties, without
exception, lacked an ideological, social or
political programme. They only proclaimed.
broad slogans, which did not even reflect
the actual line of policy adopted by the
party concerned. The policy of a party was
always designed to meet the personal or
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family interests of the leaders of that
party. Such interests differed in time and
circumstances and were reflected in the
policy of the party.
Third, all the political parties in Palestine had
to be licensed by the British authorities,
and this imposed severe limitations on
their behaviour vis-á-vis British policy in
Palestine, and the information they had to
provide affected the secrecy of their work,
and thus, their room for manoeuvre.
Fourth, the Palestinian political parties failed to
mobilize the Palestinian masses. This was
in the xature of things, since the Pales-
tinian political parties lacked the two
basic requirements needed for building a
proper party; namely, a coherent programme,
and a proper party organization.
It was, therefore, inevitable that the Pales-
tinian political parties should run behind events
in Palestine, instead of initiating them. Popular
upheavals in Palestine often surprised Palestinian
party leaders as much as they surprised an outsider.
The major test for the viability of the Palestinian
political parties took place in 1936, when the Arabs
all over Palestine decided to go on nation-wide
strikes . The Palestinian party-leaders who, neither
The nationwide strike started on April 20, 1936 and
lasted for six months. It was called off at the
request of some Arab Heds of State. See: Kayyali,
Tarikh, op.cit, pp.303-323.
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planned the strike, nor called it 1 , combined their
efforts to control it by forming the Arab Higher
Committee (ABC) 2 which included leaders from the
six parties under the chairmanship of Haj Amin
Husseini.
The Arab Higher Committee (ABC) was the last
formula for political work introduced by the
traditional Arab Palestinian leadership. The
rivalry among the members of the ABC pushed them
towards the practice of brinksmanship as each
sought to outdo the other which led to a lack of
realism and which hindered the effectiveness of the
ABC as the leader of the Arab Palestinians.
The "all-or-nothing" policy which always
characterized the attitudes of the traditional Arab
Palestinian leadership 3 , was also a major
characteristic of the ABC.
The Political Attitudes of the Palestinians Before
a brief account:
The political attitudes of the Arab Palestinians
before 19L18 reflected their Pan-Arab orientation and
their strong belief in being part of the Arab people
1Abdul Wahhab Kayyali. Tarikh, op.cit., pp.303-3014.
2lbid.,pp. 305-306.
3Walici Katnhawi. Al-Nakbah Wa A1-Binaa' Fil-Waten
Al-Arabi (The Catastrophe and the Construction In
The Arab World), Vol. 1, (Beirut: Dar Al-urn Lil-
Malayeen, 1962), pp. 5'-6k.	 -
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at large. This Pan-Arab orientation of the Arab
Palestinian people prior to 1948 had its roots in
the state-of-affairs which prevailed inthe Arab
World under the Ottoman rule. During that period,
the political boundaries which defined what were
known after the First World War as Syria, Lebanon,
Transjordan and Palestine, were non-existent. All
these countries were one area known as bilad al-
Sham (Greater Syria) which was sub-divided,
administratively rather than politically, into
different vilayats or districts. With the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire, Greater Syria was divided
between the British and the French, which in turn
ultimately led to its political division into four
countries of which Palestine was one.
The political division of Greater Syria was not
accepted by the Palestinians who kept on stressing
that they were part of the Syrian people and that
Palestine was nothing more than "South Syria". The
General Syrian Congress -which was held in 1919 and
which had representatives from Palestine, stated
that, among other things, "there should be no
separation of the southern part of Syria, known as
Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone which
included Lebanon, from the Syrian country" 1 . The
same Congress stressed that "the unity of the
country (Greater Syria) should be guaranteed against
partition under whatever circumstances". A similar
See p.40.
'As quoted in, Marie Syrkin. "The Palestine Refugees:
Resettlement, Repatriation, or Compensation?", in
Irving Howe and Carl Gersham (eds.). Israel, The Arabs
and the Middle East (New York: Bantam Books, 1972),
pp. 172-173.
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attitude to that of the General Syrian Congress was
expressed by the Arab ,
 Palestinian Congress which
was held in Jerusalem during the period January 27-
February 10, 1919. In its resolutions, the Arab
Palestinian Congress stated, inter alia, that
1
"Palestine is a part of Arab Syria" and that
"South Syria or Palestine must not be separated
from the independent Arab Syria"2.
On April 4, 1920, during the Easter and Nabi
Musa festivals in Palestine, Moslem and Christian
Palestinian leaders addressed the Palestinian masses
calling for "Arab Unity" and ?tindependenceu, and
Usaluted King Feisal as "the King of Syria and
Palestine" 3 . In September 1920, the announcement,
by the British Government, of the separation of
Palestine from Syria produced an immediate reaction
which was reflected in both the Syrian and
Palestinian press when both called for resistance
to this move even if "more sacrifices were required"4.
This Palestinian attitude was not a calculated step,
reflecting some sort of political maturity, but was,
'Abdul Wahhab Kayyali. Tarikh, op.cit., p. 127; also
see, Don Peretz. "The Palestine Arabs: A National
Entity", in Michael Curtis (ed.), op.cit., p.70.
2Abdul Wahhab Kayyali, Tarikh, op.cit., p.128.
Nabi Musa is a Moslem religious occasion.
UThe second eldest son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca.
He was C. in C. of the Arab armies which fought
against the Ottomans in the First World War. He
was declared King of Syria in March 1920, but was
soon overthrown by the French Army in July 1920
3Abdul Wahhab Kayyali, op.cit.,pp. 147-148.
4lbidqpp. 144-145.
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rather, a natural continuation of a long historical
process which had extended over many centuries and
under which the Palestinians had not enjoyed a
political entity of their own, but were always
either related to or part of a larger political
entity. This contributed to the non-development,
among the Arab Palestinian people, of a nationalist
consciousness of their own'. Consequently, when
the Palestinians were faced with the Zionist
"threat" whose immediate target was a Jewish
national home in Palestine, the Arab Palestinians
reacted in two ways. First, to preserve and assert
the links which bind Palestine, as "South Syria",
with the Arab World and the 'Arab National Movement'.
In so doing, the Palestinians have consistently
argued that while the Zionist 'colonial threat'
was confined to Palestine alone, it was, never-
theless, also directed at the very 'heart' of the
'Arab national movement' and the goal of Arab unity
through the lifting of the Arab character of
Palestine and its transformation into a state with
Jewish majority2 . Second, the development of a
Palestinian national character was a counter-
measure to Zionist national claims in Palestine
which called for "the establishment of a publically
and legally secured home in Palestine for the
Jewish people" 3 . This Palestinian national
1Ahmad Shukairy, Forty Years, op.cit., p.8.
2	 .Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh. "Arab Cultural Nationalism in
Palestine During the British Mandate", in, Journal
of Palestine Studies. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Beirut: The
Institute of Palestine Studies and Kuwait University,
1972), p.38.
3The Institute for Palestine Studies (trans.). "The
Basle Programme: 30 August, 1897", in, Valid Khalidi
(ed.).From Haven to Conquest:Readings in Zionism and
the Palestine Problem Until l9Li8Beirut: The Institute
for Palestine Studies, 1971), p.89.
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response did not necessarily contradict the original
Pan-Arab attitude of the Palestinians, but was
rather designed, as we will see later, to refute
Zionist national claims in Palestine on the grounds
that Palestine, although originally part of 'Greater
Syria' which is in turn part of the Arab World,
nevertheless, has always been inhabited by the
Palestinians, the majority of whom are Arabs, and
that Palestine is, therefore, not a country without
an indigenous population. In this sense, the
development of the Palestinian national character
was not meant to refute the Pan-Arab character of
the Palestinians, but rather to refute Zionist
national claims in Palestine. In other words, when
the Arab Palestinians conceived an increase in the"
level of the Zionist 'colonial threat t to Palestine,
they tended to assert their national character more
than their Pan-Arab character. A brief analysis
of the Palestinian political literature during the
British Mandate would provide many illustrations
of the Palestinians' two responses to the Zionist
t colonial threat'.
The Palestinian literature during the British
Mandate reflects a major tendency towards Pan-
Arabism. This Pan-Arab tendency overshadowed the
call of some Palestinian nationalist writings for
the assertion of the Palestinian national character.
"It must be acknowledged, naturally, that
the number of Palestinian Arabs who were
immersed in the cultural nationalist
climate was small in comparison with the
total Arab population of the country and
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was generally limited to the towns"1.
In tackling the nationalist issue, the
Palestinian writers adopted a combined theme which
envisaged the Palestinian nationalist idea within
the framework of' the 'Arab national movement', and
the "threat" of Zionism was subsequently linked,
not to Palestine as such, but to the 'Arab national
movement' as a whole. In his book, Filastin wa al
Urubah (Palestine and Arabism) which was published
in Jerusalem in 1929, Mohammad Izzat Darwazah
called for Arab unity as a solution to the Zionist
Darwazah also stressed that the"threat"
to Palestine should serve as a unifying force
among the Arabs, and that the "loss" of Palestine
would constitute a big blow to the 'Arab national
2
movement' • A similar line to that of Darwazah
was advocated by the joint work of Amin Aqi,
Ibrahim Najm and Umar al-Nasr under the title
Jihad Filastin al-Arabiyya (The Holy War of Arab
Palestine) 3 , which stressed the need for "Arab
solidarity" as a means of "savbng Arab Palestine!
In the period following the 1936-1939 rebellion
in Palestine and the subsequent publication by the
'Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh, op.cit., p.38.
2Filastin wa al Urubah (Palestine and Arabism),
(Jerusalem: 1 9 29), as mentioned in Abu-Ghazaleh,
op.cit., p.52.
3Jihad Filastin al-Arabiyya (The Holy War of Arab
Palestine), (Beirut, 1939), as mentioned in Abu-
Ghazaleh, Op.cit., p.53.
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British Government of the White Paper which en-
visaged, among other things, an independent
Palestine, with an Arab majority, within ten years,
there was a relaxation of tension and a feeling of
security among the Palestine Arabs who "began to
feel that the Arab character of Palestine had
become secure, as the Arabs would be a majority in
the proposed state" 1 . Consequently, the Arab
Palestinian intelligentsia began discussing the
future place of Palestine within the Arab national
movement' • This reflects how the degree of
assertion, by some Palestinian writers, of the
Palestinian national character was very much
determined by the Arab Palestinians t conception of
the level of Zionist "colonial threat" to Palestine.
The Arabism of the Palestinian historians was
evident in their writings. Although there were
some Palestinian historians, like Arif el-Arif, who
wrote about the local history of Palestine and who
"demonstrated a desire to spread Palestinian
national	 it is clear that the
majority of such historians emphasized the 'Arab
of Palestine rather than advocated the
Palestinian national character vis-á-vis Pan Arabism.
However, in the introduction to his book Tarikh al-
L.Quds (History of Jerusalem) , Arif el-Arif explains
his motives as follows:
1Abu-Ghazaleh, op.cit., p.5k.
2.Ibid
3Ibid
kpublished in Cairo, 19k7.
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"My acquaintance with the line of argument
used by the Jewish writers to assert the
Jews' historical links with Palestine
makes it my duty to try to refute their
claims by examining the history of
Jeru5alem, their links with which the
Jews have stressed most, and to make it
clear that the history of the Holy City
reveals its Arab character....
Nevertheless, most of the Palestinian historians
adopted a different approach from that of el-Arif.
In his book, Turath al-Arab al-Ilmi (The Scientific
2Heritage of the Arabs ), Qadri Tuqan tries to
impress on new generations the greatness of Arab
scientific contributions to world civilization, and
to inspire the Arab people to revive the glory of
their past. On the other hand, Nicola Ziyadeh's
Wathbat al-Arab (The Rise of the Arabs to Power3)
reflects "the pride which Palestinian Arabs,
Christian and Moslem alike, felt in the rise of the
Arabs under the banner of Islam to the status of a
world power". A stronger stress on Pan-Arabisin
prevailed in the historical writings of Mohammad
Izzat Darwazah who treated the history of the Arab
World as one indivisible unit.5
As quoted in, Abu-Ghazaleh, op.cit., p.60.
2Published in Cairo, 1941. 	 - -
3Published in Jerusalem, 1945.
4As quoted in Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh, op.cit., p.59.
5lbid .	 -
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The PalestinIan Press'adopted similar themes to
those of the Palestinian writers and historians.
Before the British occupation of alestine, the
main theme expressed by the Palestinian Press was
"the call for Arab independence and a stress on
the greatness of the Arab heritage" 2 . Under the
British Mandate, however, Palestinian Press, being
a reflection of the daily problems confronting the
masses, projected all sorts of themes and views,
but always with Pan-Arab tendencies prevailing3.
As the situation deteriorated in Palestine in the
last year of the Mandate and with the proposal of
the Partition Plan, the stress in the Arab
Palestinian Press "shifted from unity to survival
"11
of Palestine
The Pan-Arab manifestations of the Palestinians
were not only limited to political mass rallies and
literature. Throughout the period of the British
Mandate, the Palestinians manifested a deep popular
interest and concern with the domestic political
developments in other Arab countries, especially
1The press had an important role in Palestine before
1948. During the period 1876-1948,114 Arab newspapers
and 25 magazines were published in Palestine. These
were distributed as follows: 61 newspapers and 25
magazines in Jerusalem, 32 newspapers in Jaffa and
21 newspapers in Haifa. For more information see:
Ahmad Khalil Akkad. Al-Sahaf a al-Arabiyyah fi
Filastin: l876l 9 11 8 . (Arab Press in Palestine:
1876-1948)Vol. 1. (Damascus: al-Wafaa' Printhouse,
1966), pp. 32-33, 44-52.
2Adrian Abu-Ghazaleh, op.cit., p.55.
3Ibid.,pp. 55-56.
4lbid., p.56.
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Egypt. In his memories, Ahmad Shukairy describes
vividly how the Palestinians used to follow the
activities of the Egyptian nationalist movement
and how they used to react in accordance with its
achievements and setbacks.
actions and mass rallies of the
Egyptian nationalist movement and the
speeches of its leaders used to stimulate
our hearts and dominate our clubs and
meetings"1.
In addition, Shukairy sheds light on the deep
personal interest with which the Palestine Arabs
observed the details of domestic politics in Egypt.
"What we knew about Egyptian affairs,
parties, leaders and the conflicts among
Egyptian leaders wds more than what we
knew about our own affairs and our own
leaders, as if we were part of the
Egyptian land and the Egyptian people"2.
In his article, "The Palestine Arabs: A national
Entity", Don Peretz gives yet another dimension to
the Pan-Arab orientation of the Palestine Arabs.
Peretz argues that in 1943 a Lebanese, rather than
a Palestinian cause, served as a unifying force for
the Palestinian leadership.
1Ahmad al-Shukairy, Forty Years in Arab and Inter-
national Life, op.cit., p.95 (This quotation was
translated by the writer of this reserach. In the
remaining part of this study, all quotations trans-
lated by the said writer will be refered to as
(trans. L.K.).
2lbid., p. 96.
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"By l9Zi3 leaders of the former Istiqial
Party sought to revive the national movement
and to unify Palestinian Arab leadership.
Half-hearted attempts were made to rally the
local Arab community at the end of l9l3
through the Arab Chambers of Commerce at
their 15th national conference in Jerusalem.
Fortunately for the nationalists, they were
able to unite national sentiment around a
new cause, the 'defence of Lebanon', for at
this moment the French arrested the President
and cabinet of Lebanon. Committees on their
behalf sprang up throughout Arab Palestine"1.
This shows that, even at this advanced stage of the
Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine in 19t3, an Arab
cause provided a stronger impetus for Palestinian
nationalist unity than the Palestinian cause itself.
The pre_l9 Lt8 history of the Arab Palestinian
people reflects a deep-rooted belief in Pan-Arabism
and Arab unity. This belief, which was basically a
result of' a long historical process under which
Palestine had not been a separate entity, gained a
new dimension after the publication of the Balfour
Declaration, the British occupation of Palestine and
the subsequent Zionist thrust into Palestine.
Pan-Arabism had become not only an ideal goal,
but also a means of rallying Arab support to *save!
See pp. L9_5O.
'Don Peretz. "The Palestine Arabs: A National Entity",
in Micheal Curtis (ed.), op.cit., pp. 79-80.
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Palestine from the Zionist 'threat'. In addition,
Pan-Arabism was used as a means by which the
Palestinians could affirm the Arab identity of
Palestine by relating it to a larger Arab political
entity (Syria).
Pinally, the development of the Palestinian
national character which, in itself, was a reaction
to the Zionist national claims in Palestine, was
not in contradiction with the Pan-Arab orientation
of the Arab Palestinians. One can rightfully say
that the development of the Palestinian national
character before 19118 was supportive to the Pan-
Arab orientation of the Palestinians because it
aimed at preserving the Arab character of Palestine
through confirming the existence of an idigenous
Palestinian population, the majority of which were
Arabs.
The Exodus: 19118
The proclamation of the State of Israel on May
15, 1948, brought two dramatic changes: the emergence
of the Arab Palestinian refugee problem, and the
disappearance of the Arab Palestinian political
entity as a result of the transformation of the
major part of the territory of Mandatory Palestine
into the State of Israel, as the smalls of the Jewish
people. These two facts constitute the essence of
what is known nowadays as the 'Palestine Problem'.
It would be impossible to give a accurate
figure of the number of Arabs who left Palestine
during the hostilities of 1948-1949. This is due,
in part, to the absence of any previous adequate
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and accurate register of the Arab population of
Palestine, Added to this are the grave humanitarian
problems which had to be solved during that chaotic
period, which gave no time for "checking meticulously
the bona fides of all who came......, in search of
help"1.
In December 1949, the number of Palestinian
refugees was estimated, by the United Nations
Economic Survey (Clapp) Mission for the Middle East,
at 726,000, of whom 652,00o were believed to be in
need. The Arab States have claimed the number to
range between 750,000 and 800,000, while Israel has
put it at 550,000. Arab League sources, however,
state it differently3:
a) Between February-April 23, 1948, 60,000 Arabs
left Palestine.
b) Between April 23 - May 15, 1948, 390,000 Arabs
left Palestine.
c) In the winter of 1949, when the Rhodes armistice
agreements were completed, the Palestinian
refugees numbered 940,000.
'UNRWA. Information Paper No. 6. The Problem of the
Rectification of the UNRWA Rolls: 1950 - 1962
(Beirut: UNRWA, 1962), p.1.
2U.N. Doe. A/AC. 25/6 (Dec. 28, 1949):U.N.Conciliation
Commission for Palestine, Final Report of the U.N.
Economic Survey for the Middle East, Part 1. The
Final Report and Appendices, pp.18-20, 22-23.
3Yacoub Khouri. Al-Laji 'aun A1-Falastiniyyun:Bayanat
Wa Ihsa t at (The Palestinian Refugees: Statements and
Statistics) (Cairo: League of Arab States),pp.l5-16
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When UNRWA took over responsibility for relief,
on May 1, 1950, the number of refugees on relief
rolls was 957,000, and the number of refugees in
need of relief assistance was t arbitrarily t set up
at 940,0001. By June 1951, as a result of the
1950-1951 census conducted by UNRWA, the total
number of Palestinian refugees registered on UNRWA
relief rolls was 852,49l, distributed as follows2:
Lebanon ...........	 106,753
Syria .............	 80,499
Jordan............	 465,450
Gaza ..............	 199,789
For purposes of conducting the 1950-1951 census
which was designed to rectify IJNRWA relief rolls, a
definition of a refugee was necessary as a criterion
for judgement. To this effect IJNRWA formulated a
working definition which defines a refugee as
"a person, normally resident in Palestine, who has
lost his home and his livelihood as a result of the
hostilities, and who is in need" 3 . As a result of
1U.N. Doc. A/1060, para. 53, p. 20.
*In Jordan, the census had to be suspended before its
completion owing to disturbances in some of the
refugee camps in protest against the whole process.
Consequently, IJNRWA imposed a ceiling on the number
of rations to be distributed in Jordan. Also see:
UNRWA. Information Paper No. 6, OP.cit., p.9.
The original figure in UNRWA official records is
875,998, of which 23,507 refugees reside in Israel.
The number of refugees residing in Israel was deducted
from the original total number of refugees, since
the scope of this study is limited to Palestinian
refugees in the Arab Host States.
2General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session,
supp. No. 16 (A/1905), para 16, p.3.
3U.N. Doc. A/l905, para 16, p.3.
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this, TJNRWA sources state that in 1951, there were
approximately 67,000 persons in Jordan and 60,000
persons in Gaza who "are in genuine need", but who
did not qualify for assistance because, although
they had lost their 'means of livelihood', they were
still living in their homes. In real terms, these
'economic refugees t1 raised the number of refugees
in 1951 to 979,491',
In 1952 the definition of a refugee was refined
to read as follows: a refugee is " a person whose
normal residence had been Palestine for a minimum
of two years preceeding the 1948 conl'lict and who,
as a result, had lost both his home and his means
of livelihood" 2 . This refinement, however, did
riot contribute to solving the problem of the
t economic refugees t . Clearly, the definition of
a refugee did not aim at establishing the total
number of refugees who had left Palestine as a
result of the 1948-1949 hostilities, but rather the
number of those among them who were in
LIbid., para. 24 p. 4.
£This figure is the sum of 67,000 and 60,000' economic
refugees in Jordan and Gaza Strip respectively,
added to the total number of refugees (852,491)
according to the 1950-1951 UNRWA Census.
2UNRWA. Information Paper No. 6, op.cit., p. 10.
It should be borne in mind that UNRWA definition,
elaborated for working purposes and tacitly accepted
but never formally approved by the General Assembly,
is designed solely for the determination of eligibi-
lity for UNRVA assistance. There are persons who,
under resolution 194(111), of 11 December 1948, may
be eligible for 'repatriation or compensation', but
not all of these may be eligible for relief under
the UNRWA working definition. In other words, a
person who is not or has ceased to be a refugee for
the purpose of receiving relief from IJNRWA, may
still be a refugee within the meaning of the General
Assembly Resolution 194(111).
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The Dispersion of the Palestinians: 19148-191t9
As a result of the 1948-1949 hostilities in
Palestine, the majority of the Arab Palestinian
population fled to the Arab-controlled areas of
Palestine and to the surrounding Arab States. All
parties to the conflict gave different accounts of
the motives underlying the flight of the Palestin-
ians, The Israelis claim that the Palestinians were
induced to leave by their own leaders and the Arab
governments. The Arabs, on the other hand, claim
that the Palestinians were terrorised and forced to
leave by the Zionist military organizations such as
the Irgun, Stern Gang, and Haganah. In this context,
the widely publicized massacre of the entire popula-
tion of the Arab village of Deir Yassin is often
referred to as an example of Zionist terrorism.
Whatever the motive, the Palestinian exodus was
not a peculiar phenomenon, but rather a universal
one which has accompanied all wars. The uniqueness,
however, comes from the total annihilation of the
Arab Palestinian political entity and its substitu-
tion by a Jewish political entity. In addition, the
substitution of the native Arab population by Jewish
immigrants from different parts of the world,
irrespective of their country of origin, is in itself
an unusual phenomenon.	 -
"Many of the refugees, as they go about
their daily affairs, can look back across
the borders of what is now Israel and see
the towns and villages, sometimes the
very homes and farms, where they and
- 67 -
their forefathers lived and worked. Their
cup of bitterness is filled to overflowing
by the knowledge that while they are
prevented from returning home, the door is
opened wide for immigrants from else where
in the world to come and settle in their
native land, and that their homes, their
lands and property are being used to
facilitate the i'esettlement of these new-
comers and thus to consolidate their own
extrusion from their
The Demographic Dimension
The Palestinian exodus took place in many waves
and in different directions. The population of
Northern Palestine (which covers the Haifa, Safad,
Acre districts and the Galilee area) took refuge in
Lebanon and Syria. The flow of refugees to Syria
started towards the end of 1947, and to Lebanon
shortly before the termination of the British Man-
date on May 15, 1948. This flow reached its peak
in the aftermath of the 1948 War, when the refugees
increased the population of Syria by 3% and that of
Lebanon by 1o%2.
The population of Southern Palestine moved to
the Egyptian-held territory of Palestine, which
was reduced in 1949 to the narrow j-6 km..wide and
40 km. long Gaza Strip. The flow of refugees to
Gaza Strip more than tripled the original
1UNRWA. Why Are They Still Refugees? op.cit., p.10.
2U.N. Doc. 16(A/1905), paras. 7 and 8, pp. 1-2.
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population which jumped from 80,000 to 280,000, and
the density of population per square mile thus
1jumped to 2000.	 Moreover, the Strip, which was
deprived of its agricultural lands by the armistice
line, has one third of its total area as desert.
This means that more than triple the original
population of Gaza Strip were supported by only
two-thirds of the area originally inhabited by
80,000 people. In addition, the Gaza Strip was
isolated from the rest of the Arab-held territories
of Palestine, and its only links with the outside
world were the sea and Egypt, which was accessible
only after a 300-mile drive through the desert.
This situation placed the original population of
the Gaza Strip in as much need of relief as the
refugees themselves.
The population of coastal Palestine, including
those of Lod, Ramlah, Jerusalem and some inhabitants
of Jaffa and Haifa, took refuge in the Trnsjordanian-
held territory of Palestine and in Transjordan
itself. The impact of this influx of refugees was
immense, as it raised the density of population per
square mile of cultivable land in Transjordan from
80 to 107, and in the West-Bank from 200 to 580.2
The influx of these refugees reached its peak during
the period April-August 191t8.
During the period June 1951 - June 1962, the
distribution of the Palestine refugees in the Arab
'Ibid, para. 10, p.2.
2lbid, para. 12, p.2.
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I
134, 569
112,949
604, 236
251,976
I Host-States was as follows:
June 19511
Lebanon • • . . • • . . • • • ,
Syria
Jordan . . . . . S S S S S
Gaza Strip
Jtne 19552
Lebanon • . . • • • • • • , •
Syria . . . . . . . • . . . . . .
Jordan • • • , • • , • • • , , •
Gaza Strip ..........
January 1960
Lebanon • , • . • • • • • • • •
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jordan.
Gaza Strip
June 1962k
Lebanon . . . , • , . . ,
Syria
Jordan . . . . S S S S S S S S
Gaza Strip
106,753
80,499
465,450
199,789
103, 600
88,179
499, 606
214,601
144, 774
122, 227
639,145
268, 614
This growth in the numbers of Palestinian
refugees in the Host-States was a result of the high
rate of birth among the Palestinian refugees.
1U.N. Doe. 16(A/1905), pax'a. 16, p.3.
Doe. 15(A/2978), Annex. 1.2 and 1.3.
3U.N. Doe. lLt(A/4478), Appendix 2.
4UNRWA. UNRWA: A Background Information Series.
Information Paper No. 1. A Brief History of UNRWA:
1950-1962. (Beirut: IJNRWA, September 1962), p.6.
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"During the nine years which have elapsed
since UNRWA established its own lists, the
number of registered refugees has steadily
increased owing principally to the excess
of births over deaths: since June 1952 the
total has risen by approximately 238,000
to a current total of 1,120,889 - an
average annual net increase of some
30,000" •
The plight of the Palestine refugees raised
grave humanitarian problems, the most important of
which was to secure the basic needs of life for
hundreds of thousands of "homeless", "penniless"
and "distracted" Palestinians. To these problems
there was an immediate response by the United Nations
and some other independent international organizations.
During the period November 19l8 - April 1950,
relief work for the Palestinians was conducted under
the supervision of the United Nations Relief for
Palestine Refugees (UNRPR). The participants in
this relief work were the International Committee
of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies,
and the American Friends Service Committee. The
activities of each of these organizations were
limited to certain areas. The International Committee
of the Red Cross operated in Israel, " Israel -
occupied areas of Pa1estine", and Transjordanian-.
held territories of Palestine. The League of Red
1U.N. Doe. lLt(A/4'78), para. 3, p.1.
This means the areas of Palestine which were accorded
to the Arab Palestinians according to the 1947 -
Partition Plan approved by the General Assembly on
November 29, 1947.
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Cross Societies operated in Lebanon, Syria and
Transjordan. The American Friends Service Committee
operated in the Gaza Strip and Acre'.
On December 8, 1949, the General Assembly of the
United Nations passed its resolution No. 302, under
,hich it established the United Nations Relief and
1orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
ast (UNRwA). According to the same resolution,
LJNRWA was "to carry out in collaboration with local
overnments the direct relief and works programme
as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission", and
"to consult with the interested Near Eastern Govern-
ients concerning measures to be taken by them
preparatory to the time when international assistance
for relief and works projects is no longer available".
Resolution 302 specified, inter alia, that UNRWA
should commence its operations on April 1, 1950
(para. ii), and should terminate them "not later
thsn 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by
the General Assembly at its fifth regular session"
(para. 6). However, the mandate of UNRWA has been
regularly renewed2.
1UNRWA. UNRVA: A Background Information Series.
Information Paper No. 6. The Problem of the
Rectification of' the UNRWA Relief Rolls: 1950-1962.
(Beirut: (UNRWA, September. 1962), p. 6.
2To thiseffect, see General Assembly resolutions:
Resolution 393 (v) of 2 December 1950; Resolution
513 (vi) of 26 January 1952; Resolution 614 (VII)
of 6 November 1952; Resolution 720(VIII) of 27
November 1953; Resolution 818(IX) of It December
1954; Resolution 1456 (xiv) of 9 December 1959;
Resolution 1856 (xvii) of 20 December 1962; and
Resolution 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965.
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The Soclo-Economic Dimension
The flow of the Palestinian refugees to the
neighbouring Arab States was dictated, to a great
extent, by geographic and military factors. The
Arab Palestinians, in flight, sought the safest
route to the nearest Arab country. The flight of
he Palestinians should be understood with two basic
premises in mind. First, the panic which character-
Lzed their flight and which, consequently, resulted
in most of the Arab Palestinian population fleeing
in all directions with the sole aim of saving their
Lives and, if time and circumstances permitted,
taking whatever money or valuables they could manage
with them. Second, many of the Arab Palestinians,
especially those who left early, believed that their
flight was a temporary one, and that it would be
Dnly a matter of days or weeks before "they could go
1back home" • This unfulfilled belief had a serious
economic impact on the Palestinian refugees becuase,
with this belief in mind, the Palestinians who left
before the outbreak of hostilities did not bother to
take with them all they could have done, nor did
they attempt to save or invest the money or valuables
which they did take with them 2 . In addition, the
majority of the Palestinian refugees, whose flight
took place during and after the l9Z8 - hostilities,
1Arif El-Arif. Al-Nakbah: l9t7-l955.(The Tragedy In
Palestine: l917-l955), Vol. V,(Beirut: The Modern
Library for Printing and Publishing, 1960), p. 1121;
also see, IJNRWA. Why Are They Still Refugees?
oj,.cit., p.4.
2U.N. Doc. l6(A/l905), para. 12, p.2; also see, Arif
El-Arif. op.cit., pp. 1121 and 1109.
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barely managed to save the clothes they were wearing.
These refugees desperately needed the kind of
immediate help that would meet the very basic needs
of life. In dealing with this situation, the Arab
Host-States did not adopt a unified policy or a co-
ordinated plan. Each of the Host-States devised
ts own policy according to its own internal economic
Lnd political circumstances.
The panic which had characterized the flight of
bhe Arab Palestinians was accompanied by a similar
anic in the attitudes of the Arab Host-States
-is-à-vis the flow of Palestinian refugees into their
respective territories. This mutual panic which
haracterized the period l9L8-l95O (which will be
Ldentified in this study as the immediate-stage) is
of particular importance due to the diversity to which
it led in the responses of the Host-States governments
to the Palestine refugees. These responses, which
ranged, as we will see later, from the most un-
accommodating response of the Lebanese government to
the most accommodating response of the Transjordanian
government, had little effect on the rate of flow of
Palestine refugees. However, the responses of the
Host-Governments during the immediate-stage, had a
clear impact on shaping future Palestinian-Arab
relations. The foundations of the status of the
Palestine refugees in the Host-States were laid
during the immediate-stage. This status covered,
inter alia, the rights and obligations of the
Palestinians in the Host-States.
In this sense, the immediate-stage had a basic
impact on shaping Palestinian-Arab relations during
- 
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the following two decades. This impact derives its
importance from the great effect which Palestinian
relations with each of the Host-States has on the
total concept of Palestinian-Arab relations. In
other words, the nature of the relationship between
each Palestinian community and its respective Host-
tate cannot be fully understood if it is analyzed
.n isolation from the rest of the Palestinian
ommunities and the rest of the Host-States. This
.s due, mainly, to the totality of the tPalestine
roblem t in the sense that each particular aspect
if it concerns not only one Palestinian community
iut all of them. Besides, any solution of the
Palestine Problem is bound to affect all the
'alestinians in the Host-States. Hence, any step
ir steps towards effecting any solution to the
Palestine Problem r , to be taken by any Palestinian
ommunity, or similarly, by any Host-Government will
lefinitely have its bearing on the rest of the
'alestinian communities and their respective Host-
tates. In this respect, it is important to point
ut that the Host-States have also a legitimate
.nterest in the form and nature of any solution to
;he t Palestine Problem t because they shelter vast
Lumbers of Palestinians on their respective
;erritories, and the destiny of those Palestinians,
.n the event of any solution, will definitely be a
iatter of concern to the Host-States. Moreover, the
Lcloption, by the Arab States and the Arab League, of
the t Palestine Problem t and its classtfication as an
"Arab Problem" does limit the freedom of action of
any single Arab state, to the extent that such
action requires the approval of the majority of the
Arab states, and above all, the consent of the
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Palestinians themselves. The latter part of this
chapter will be devoted to analyzing the attitudes of
the Arab Host-States and the Palestinians to the
nature of the most acceptable solution, to the
t Palestine ProblemZ,
le Immediate Stage: The Lebanese Response
The confessional basis of the Lebanese political
rstem, where the delicate sectarian balance is
rupulously observed, determined the unaccommodating
?banese attitude towards the flow of Palestinian
fugees into Lebanon. The presence of more than
)O,000 Palestinians, the majority of whom are Moslems,
)uld have upset the tenuous sectarian balance if
iose refugees had become Lebanese citizens. The
Llestinian wealth which eventually poured into
banon did not help to soften the unaccommodating
;titude of the Lebanese Government. The majority of
ie wealthy class of Palestinians who fled from
1Liestine went to Lebanon • It is estimated that
iose wealthy Palestinians took with them into Lebanon
Lrt of their movable wealth which consisted of
million Lebanese Lira (L.L.) worth of jewellery,
3 million L.L. worth of commodities and in cash,
million L.L. in cash withdrawn from Palestinian
counts in Arab and foreign banks, in addition to
1 million (sterling) in cash which flowed into
banon after the Israeli Government agreed to release
1M.N. Al-Hawwari. Sirr Al-Nakbah (The Secrets of the
Catastrophe in Palestine) (Nazareth, 1950), p. 338;
also see, Fred J.Khouri."Arab Refugees and the Arab-
Israeli Dilemma", in Michael Curtis (ed.), People
and Politics in the Middle East(New Jersey:
Transaction Books, 1971), p. 145.
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Arab Palestinian accounts in banks under its control1.
This means that total, of around 185 million L.L.
(equivalent to approximately 20 million pounds
sterling) was taken into Lebanon, by the Palestine
refugees, during the period 1948-1949. In later
years, an additional 15 million L.L. or more were
Bent every year to Lebanon by Palestinians who found
,ork abroad (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya) and
sent the money to their- families residing in Leba.non2.
'urthermore, UNRWA, whose headquarters are in the
Lebanese capital, provided another source of income
for th Lebanese Government. The total expenditure
of the Lebanese Government on relief work3amounted,
by 1951, to 5.2 million L.L., in addition to another
one million L.L. which was raised by a private
organization called the Palestine Bureau4.
The Palestine refugees are regarded in Lebanon as
foreigners. They enjoy no political rights and have
rio military obligations. As foreigners, they are
expected to observe the laws of the country and also
to abide by the various regulations which were enacted
to regulate their presence in the Lebanon. By law,
they are neither allowed to work nor to open a
'Arif El-Arif. op.cit., pp. 1090-1091.
2lbid
3The Lebanese Government conducted its relief work
through a committee 'which was established in April
1948, and was composed of representatives from the
ministries concerned and headed by the Director-
General of the President t s Office. See, U.N. Doe.
16(A/l905), para, 9, p.2.
4U.N. Doc. 16(A/l905), para, 9,p.2.
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private business. Unlike foreigners in Lebanon, the
Palestine refugees are subject to some extra rest-
rictions that are justified on the ground of "public
order, security and health as well as on grounds of
policy"1 . Such restrictions cover, inter alia, the
movement of the Palestine refugees inside Lebanon,
as well as their return to Lebanon from abroad,
although there are no such restrictions on refugees
Q-ishing to leave Lebanon who do not want to come
2
ack
rhe Immediate-Stage: The Syrian Response
Syria was very accommodating. The Palestine
'efugees in Syria, the vast majority of whom were
)enniless 3 , were promptly helped both by the people
uid by the Government.
By the end of 1947, when small numbers of
alestinian refugees began arriving in Syria, the
Lssociation For The Liberation of Palestine was
stablished to provide assistance for the refugees.
U.N. Doc. 13(A/2171), p. 46.
Refugees who find employment with Arab governments
or with certain international companies operating in
the Arab World are exempted from this law. See, U.N.
Doe. 13(A/2171). p. 46.
After 1967, all such restrictions were not observed,
though legally they were still valid.
3M.N. Al-Hawwari. The Secrets of the Catastrophe in
Palestine, op. cit., p. 336.
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However, as the situation in Palestine deteriorated,
the number of refugees arriving in Syria grew so
rapidly that the Association For The Liberation of
Palestine, whose funds came from voluntary contribu-
tions, could no longer cope with the situation. In
May 1948, the Syrian Government, in response to an
appeal from the Association, took over the respon-
sibility for the relief of the Palestine refugees
in Syria. Until the establishment of UNRWA, the
Syrian Government assumed the sole responsibility
for the relief of all Palestinian refugees on its
territory. During 1948, the Syrian Government
spent between 7.2 and 8.4 million Syrian Lira (S.L.)
on its relief operations.1
On January 25, 1949, by virtue of Law No. 450, the
Syrian Government established the Palestine Arab
Refugee Institution. According to the Legislative
Act No. 70 of 16 May, 1949, the same Institution was
empowered to manage the affairs of the Palestine
refugees in Syria in such a manner that they enjoy
all the privileges of the Syrian subjects. 2 For
example, the Palestinians in Syria are allowed to
work, to open private businesses, and to practice
their professions such as lawyers or doctors. They
are also recruited into the Government and civil
service. Many of the Legislative Decrees which were
1U.N. Doc. l6(A/1905), para. 8, pp. 1-2.
*With a few "technical exceptions" which will be
mentioned as we proceed.
2U.N. Doc. 13(A/2l7l), pp. 46-48; also see, Arif
El-Arif. The Tragedy In Palestine, Vol. V, op.cit.,
pp. 1130-1131.
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passed by the Syrian Government during the period
1 950-195 2 were aimed at facilitating the possibility
of work for the Palestine refugees. However, the
Palestine refugees in Syria are not allowed to
acquire Syrian citizenship and, accordingly, are
neither entitled to vote in elections nor to be
nominated. Equally, the Palestine refugees in Syria
are exempted from military service, although they
are allowed to join the Syrian Army, as regulars,
if they wish to do 50*.
The Immediate-Stage: The Egyptian Response
The flow of Palestine refugees into Egypt reached
1its peak in mid-1948 . The immediate response of
the Egyptian Government to the flow of Palestine
refugees reflected its unwillingness to have any
substantial number of refugees residing on its
territory. Most of the Palestine refugees who took
refuge in Egypt proper, were put in huge "detention-
camps" which were specially erected near the Suez
Canal 2 . They were not allowed to leave these
"camps" into Egypt, except under the rare condition
when a refugee proved that he was financially capable
of supporting himself and had very influential
Egyptian friends to vouch for this. Inside the
4With the exception of Jordan (see Chapter Four) the
Palestine refugees are not allowed to enlist in any
other of the Host-States' or Arab States' armies.
'See pp. 68-69.
2Arif El-Arif, op.cit., pp. 1091-1092; also see, M.N.
Al-Hawwari, op.cit., pp. 316-324.
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"camps", Palestinian refugees were "suspected" and
"mistreated". They were fexp1ojtedet in the sense
that they were made to exchange their Palestinian
currency for Egyptian currency at a very unfavourable
rate. In addition, Palestinian refugee women were
"forced" to sell their jewellery at very low prices1.
During the early period of their refuge until
February 1950, the Palestine refugees in Egypt were
not allowed to work or to open a business. A fine
of 500 Egyptian Pounds or six-months imprisonment,
or both, were decreed by the General Military
Governor of Egypt, for any Egyptian who employed
2a Palestinian refugee . On February 1, 1950, the
Egyptian Government allowed about 10,000 Palestinian
refugees residing in Egypt, to earn their living
there3 . This decision came, however, after the bulk
of the Palestine refugees who went to Egypt had been
transferred, en masse, to the Gaza Strip.
The bulk of the Palestine refugees in the Gaza
Strip were those who had fled directly from their
homes into the Strip. In the Gaza Strip, the
Egyptian military authorities, who took control
there, imposed no restrictions in terms of work on
the Palestine refugees there. However, any movement
into the Strip or out of it was subject to the prior
approval of the Egyptian military authorities. No
Palestinian from the Gaza Strip, for example, was
1lbid.
The Egyptian Erime Minister at that time was, also,
the General Military Governor.
2	 .M.N. Al-Hawwari, op.cit., p . 321.
3Arif El-Arif, 2p.cit., p. 1109.
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allowed to enter Egypt unless he obtained written
permission from the Egyptian authorities in Cairo.
It was "only in few instances" that such permission
was granted1 , and only after the applicant had
proved that he had paid all his tax, and that he was
not wanted for any crime or offence. The applicant,
then, paid a set amount of money as a guarantee
that he would return to the Gaza Strip and not
remain in Egypt2.
The Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip enjoyea
the same rights and obligations as the original
inhabitants of the Strip. Mandatory Laws, in
addition to other laws introduced by the Egyptian
1ilitary Government, were enforced in the Gaza Strip
nd applied to everyone indiscriminately. This
included restrictions on association and movement
which were justified on security grounds3.
rhe Immediate-Stage: The Transjordanian Response
The bulk of the Palestine refugees went to the
rransjordanian-held part of Palestine (the West Bank)
nd to Transjordan. An estimated 350,000 refugees
settled there. The impact of this flow of refugees
was more far-reaching on Transjordan, economically,
5ocially and politically, than on any other state in
he Arab World, Although the bulk of the refugees
were in a wretched situation, yet, "some of the
1U.N. Doe. l3(A/2l71), p. 48.
2Arif El-Arif. op.cit., pp. 1091 - 1092.
3U.N. Doe. l3(A/2l7l), p. 48.
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refugees brought with them money and purchasing power
(estimated at 10 million Palestinian pounds in cash
• alone) which initially generated a considerable
economic activity in building, transport and con-
sumerst goods industries, especially in Amman; but
this tended to fall off later as funds ran out and
tile was seen to stretch indefinitely into the
iture" 1 . This "unco-ordinated spending" of refugee
alth failed to contribute to the country's real
roductivity in a way that matched the sudden huge
acrease in the population.
The Palestinian refugees in Jordan enjoy the full
ights and duties of any Jordanian citizen. They
njoy, in addition to freedom of movement and travel,
he right to vote, to run for elections, to work, and
he like. 2 The Palestinian refugees residing in
ordan acquired this status pending the unification
f the West Bank and Transjordan under the Hashemite
:ingdom of Jordan which came into affect on 11 April,
•95•3
'alestinian-Arab Relations: The Basic Political Taboos
Notwithstanding the existence of the State of
[srael, the Palestine refugees provided the only
tangible physical outcome of the 191.1.8 War in Palestine.
Since then,there have been many attempts to solve the
Palestine refugee problem as a means of settling the
1 U.N. Doc. 16(A/1905), para. 12, p. 2.
Doc. 13(A/2171), p. 1t8.
3mis unity was approved by the Transjordanian Parliament
on 13 December 1911.8. On 7 May l919 three Palestiniansjoined the Jordanian Cabinet accordingly. See, Chapter 11.
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"Palestine Problem" once and for all. In this
context, the attitude of the Palestinians vis-á-vis
the solution of the Palestine refugee problem
provides an important element in the understanding
of Palestinian thinking concerning what would for
them be an acceptable solution to the "Palestine
Problem". Equally important are the attitudes of
the Arab Host-States regarding the solution of the
Palestine refugee problem. Such attitudes are
bound to have a great influence on the relations
between the Palestinians and their Host-States,
whether individually or collectively, whether or
not the Host-States are in agreement with the
Palestinians. During the immediate-stage, and in
the years until 1967, there were three solutions
suggested for the Palestine refugee problem. These
centred on assimilation, emigration and resettlement.
The remaining part of this Chapter will be devoted
to analyzing the views of the Palestinians, and
those of the Host-States, on the issue of assimi-
lation and the alternatives. This analysis, however,
must be seen against the complexity of the "Palestine
Problem" of which the Palestine refugee problem is
1
a part
The Option of Assimilation
The basic premises underlying any attempt towards
a successful implementation of a policy designed to
1UNRWA has consistently stressed the impossibility
of isolating the Palestine refugee problem from the
"Palestine Problem" which is basically a political
problem. See, U.N. Doc. lLt(A/3212), paras. 100 and
101, pp. 12-13.
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assimilate the Palestine refugees are two-fold:
first, the approval, by the Palestine refugees, of
the principle of assimilation and their willingness
to co-operate with any scheme to that effect;
second, the approval by the states concerned, mainly
the Arab Host-States, of the principle of assimila-
tion, and the degree of their preparedness to
assimilate and integrate, en masse, the Palestinian
refugees residing on their respective territories.
The Palestine refugees have at all times expressed
their refusal of any solution short of' their return
to tPalestine'
"Today, as one year ago, the strongest
feeling, vocally and bitterly expressed
by the great mass of the refugees, is
the demand to return to their old homes."1
This attitude was reflected in the insistence, by
the Palestine refugees, on the implementation of the
General Assembly 194 (III) Resolution of 11 December
1948, This Resolution resolved that:
".... the refugees wishing to return to
their homes and live in peace with their
neighbours should be permitted to do so
at the earliest practicable date, and
that compensation should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to
return... •" (Para. II).
11J.N. Doe. 14 (A/32l2 ), paras. 101 & 102, pp. 12-13;
also see, Sami Hadawi. Bitter Harvest: Palestine
between 19l Lt_l967 (New York: The New York Press,
1967), pp. 170-173.
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According to this Resolution, the Palestine refugees -
were given the choice between 'repatriation' and
'compensation'. On the basis of this Resolution,
the Palestine refugees who chose not to be
'repatriated' after they were given such a choice,
were to be 'compensated' and assimilated. This
solution which met the Palestinian refugees demand
for return to their homeland necessitated the full
implementation of the 194 (iii) Resolution'. The
full implementation of this Resolution would only
have been possible with the agreement of the Israeli
Government to 'repatriate' all those Palestinian
refugees who wished to "return to their homes". In
this respect, the attitude of the Israeli Government
has consistently been negative on the grounds that
"the mass return of the refugees would endanger the
security of the State of Israel" 2 . The persistent
refusal of the Israeli Government to implement the
194 (iii) Resolution, and the persistent adherence
of the Palestine refugees to the necessity of its
implementation had led to a state of deadlock.
This state of deadlock induced the promotion of
emigration and resettlement as alternatives to
assimilation.
The Option of Emigration
Emigration did not constitute, at any time, a
primary undertaking by tJNRWA in the form of a major
scheme as a means of solving the Palestine refugee
problem 3 . The role played by UNRWA in the field of
1U.N. Doc. 14(A/4478), para. 4, p.1.
Why Are They Still Refugees? op.cit., p. 10.
*Emigration to countries outside the Arab World.
3U.N. Doc. 1 4(A/3 232 ), paras. 100 & 101, pp. 12-13.
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emigration was positive, although they did not take
the initiative. UNRWA would provide all the
encouragement and assistance needed for facilitating
the emigration of those refugees who were willing to
emigrate and who asked for the help of UNRWA1.
In 1953, the United States Congress passed a
special law under which 2,000 Palestinian refugees
were allowed to emigrate to the U.S.A. On Li. April,
1954, the Council of the Arab League approved, in
2principle, that decision • In spite of this, UNRWA
records show a generally hostile attitude to
emigration among the Palestine refugees. During the
period 1951-1962, only 4,294 Palestinian refugees
emigrated, with UNRWA assistance, to countries like
the United States, New Zealand, Canada, Australia
and some Latin American countries 3 . There are no
records of those who emigrated without the help of
UNRWA, although their number is "presumed to be
Li.small"
There were two major factors which helped to
inhibit the emigration of the Palestinian refugees:
first, the quantitative and qualitative restrictions
imposed by the recipient countries; second, and
most important, the strong belief among the
Palestinian refugees that they "would shortly be
1UNRWA. Why Are They Still Refugees? op.cit., p. 10.
2Ad-Difaa Newspaper, Vol. XX, No. 5513 (Jerusalem,
5 April, 1954), p.1.
3UNRWA. Information Paper No. 1, op.cit., p. 10.
4UNRWA. Why Are They Still Refugees? op.cit., p.10.
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returning to their home" 1 , and the absence of any
intention on their side of "uprooting themselves
2for good from their native land" . Thus, the
Palestine refugees "did not consciously break with
their past and seek a new life in a new land"3.
This reflects a uniqueness in the attitude of the
'alestine refugees compared to the attitude of
ther international refugees. While those refugees
rho are classified as such by the UN High Commission
'or Refugees often flee with the conscious intention
nd determination of finding a new life and a new
iomeland, that is, completely dissociating them-
elves from their past, the conduct of the Palestine
efugees reflects an entirely different picture.
'hey have resisted any move to dissociate them from
heir country of origin, and have consistently
xpressed their desire to 1 return even with the
ull knowledge that they will be living under the
ule of' their !enemy!.
he Option of Resettlernent*
The economic rehabilitation of the Palestine
efugees provided for in the UNRWA mandate 5 has
Ibid, p.4; also see, U.N. Doc. A/58l3, pp. 1-4; U.N.Doc. A/6013, pp. 4-5; U.N. Doc. A/6313, para 5, p.3;Sami Hadawi, op.cit., pp. 169-173.
UNRWA. Why Are They Still Refugees? op.cit.,p. 10.
lbid.
4U.N. Doc. A/1905, para. 37, p . 5; U.N. Doc.14(A/3212),
paras. 101 & 102, pp. 12-13; U.N. Doc. A/58l3, pp.i-k; U.N. Doc. A/60l3, pp. 4-5; U.N. Doc. A/6313,
para. 5, p.3.
Resettlement in the Arab World only.
5See, General Assembly Resolution 302(IV), of 8 December
1949.
- 88 -
.
often been linked to the resettlement of the
Palestine refugees 1 . The resettlement of the
Palestine refugees through their integration in the
economic life of the Arab States has often been
stressed, especially by Israel, as the most suitable
solution to the Palestine refugee problem 2 . The
experience of LJNRWA in this field however suggests
to the contrary. On the economic level alone,
ignoring the political and psychological problems
involved, the talk, during the early stages of the
Palestine refugee problem, about the feasability of
resettlement through economic integration did
seriously under-estimate the difficulties involved.
The original resettlement plan, suggested in
1952, envisaged a 200 million dollar reintegration
fund under UNRWA administration "to be expended on
a three-year programme of development projects3.
klthough only 48.3 million were actually received
by UNRWA, it still holds true that, even if the
entire 200 million had actually been put at the
disposal of UNRWA, and even if it had proved possible
to spend it on useful resettlement projects, "this
would certainly not have solved the refugee problem"4.
A. more realistic and accurate assessment of the
investment needed for carrying out a viable resetle-
rnent scheme was made by the Secretary-General of the
1U.N. Doc. l4(A/3212), para, 102, p. 13.
Why Are They Still Refugees? op.cit., p.11.
3lbid.
4lbid.
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United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, in his June 1959
Report to the General .Assembly, in which he estimated
that approximately 13.7 billion dollars of new
investments were needed, during the decade ending in
1970, to absorb the surplus labour force in the Arab
World. 1.7 billion out of the original 13.7 billion
r ould be required to absorb the surplus labour force
Lmong the Palestine refugees1.
'he Solution of the Palestine Refugee Problem: The
Lrab Attitude
The basic premise underlying the official Arab
ittitude to the Palestine refugee problem stressed
;he acceptance, by the Arab States, of anything which
ras acceptable to the Palestinian refugees, and
their rejection of anything short of that. In this
ontext, the meeting of the Council of the Arab
'eague, held in Cairo during the period March 25 -
Lpril 1l, 1950, decided, inter alia, to allow all
;hose Palestinian refugees who wished to work and to
'esettle in the country in which they were residing
;o do so and to be able to acquire, if they so
rished, the citizenship of that country 2 . Besides
rhich Syria and Jordan expressed their willingness
30 integrate all those Palestinians who chose not
;o be t repatriated t after the implementation of the
9L(III) Resolution3.
1The Institute For Palestine Studies (ed.). Th
Palestine Refuees: A Collection of United Nations
Documents (Beirut: The Institute For Palestine
Studies, 1970), pp. L66_482.
2E1-Arif. The Tragedy In Palestine, o.cit., p. 1110.
3U.N. Doc. GA/AH/356, of 22 Nov. 1955; also see,
Fred Khouri, op.cit., p. lt6.
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In practice, however, the attitude of the Arab
Host-States to the issue of the Palestine refugees
residing on their respective territories was deter-
mined by the delicate combination of the domestic
political and economic circumstances of each of the
Host-States on the one hand, and the non-violation
)f the taboos of the t Palestine Problem 2 on the
)ther hand. These taboos, basically self-imposed,
nd with the passage of time gaining sanctity, covered,
inter alia, the non-recognition of the existence of
the State of Israel, and the adherence to Arab rights
in Palestine as the homeland of the Arab Palestinians,
to which they have the right to return in accordance
iith the 194(111) Resolution. By and large, there
ias no basic contradiction between the domestic
requirements of the Arab Host-States and the taboos
f the Palestine Problem. This homogeniety has saved
Iwo of the Host-States, namely Egypt and Lebanon, the
embarrassment of the formidable task of assimilating
undreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees into
their ranks - Egypt for economic reasons and Lebanon
ror politico-sectarian reasons1 . As for Syria, the
ssimi1ation of some 100,000 Palestinian refugees
osed no social, economic or political problems. Its
attitude to assimilation was therefore not based on
ny domestic requirements, but rather on strict
dherence to the taboos of the Palestine problem.
.s for Jordan, the situation was completely different.
Dn December 1948, the Jordanian Parliament approved
the unification of the West Bank and Transjordan which
came officially into effect on 24 April 19502.
Fred Khouri, op.cit., p. 14
2See Chapter 4.
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As a result of' this unification, the Palestinians
in Jordan acquired the status of Jordanian citizens.
This, however, did not lead to the lifting of' the
refugee status of the Palestinians in Jordan who
continued to meet the criteria laid down by the UNRWA
in its definition of Palestine refugees.1
he Solution of' the Palestine Refugee Problem : The
alestinian Attitude
The total failure in implementing the l9L(III)
esolution led to a situation under which the bulk of
he Palestine refugees were denied the right to
repatriation" or "compensation" since only 110,000
alestine refugees were repatriated, during the
eriod 19k8-1950, under the family-re-union scheme2.
this failure paved the way for the development of
complex feeling of frustration, bitterness and
uspicion amongst the Palestine refugees3.
"The desire to go back to their homes is
general among all classes; it is proclaimed
orally at all meetings and organized
demonstrations, and, in writing, in all
letters addressed to the Agency and all
complaints handed into the area
Zi.
officers •"
'his was clearly reflected in the attitude of the
1 See, pp. 65-66
H. Davis. The Evasive Peace: A Study of the
Zionist-Arab Problem (London: John Murray, 1968),p.62.
3U.N. Doe. 11t(A/1i.'i78), para. Li., p.1.
IIU.N. Doe. A/1905, para, 37, p.5.
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Palestine refugees towards UNRWA and its development
schemes. Such feelings were translated into a set
of convictions, adopted by the Palestinians, which,
as time passed, became an essential component of the
Palestine refugees t general conception of their
status and the relationship between this status and
.e solution of the "Palestine Problem".
The importance attached by the Palestine refugees
the 19 1t(IIi) Resolution stems from their belief
at it was a major document, in which the world
mmunity, recognised Palestine as being their
meland, to which they had the right to return, or
they did not wish to do so, the right to
mpensation1 . In this context, integration would
t reflect a situation whereby Palestinian refugees
uld endorse their "defeat" by the Israelis and
urrender" their rights in Palestine, but rather a
tuation whereby the Palestinians, who chose not
to Palestine and live under the Israeli
.le, would be accordingly integrated. The price,
Lerefore, of Palestinian refugee acceptance of
tegration, in principle, was the acknowledgement
• Israel of Arab Palestinian rights in Palestine
.d the implementation of such an acknowledgement in
Le form of repatriation. It was within this frame-
rk that the attitudes of Palestine refugees towards
y plans for integration, emigration and resettle-
nt were held.
1The l9 I (III) Resolution was the only resolution to
this effect, passed by the U.N. after the State of
Israel was proclaimed on May 15, 1948. A reference
to this resolution had consistently been made by
the General Assembly in all its resolutions dealing
with the Palestine refugee problem.
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In retrospect, the non-implementation of the
l9 lt(III) Resolution put the Palestine refugees in
the difficult position of choosing between giving
in and adapting to the new realities through assimi-
lation, emigration and resettlement or not giving
in and resisting the new realities by preserving
heir refugee-status as the only means towards
reserving their right to "repatriation". The
alestine refugees clearly embarked on the second
lternative and chose to preserve their refugee-
tatus. In doing so, the Palestine refugees were
ery careful to preserve not just the refugee-title,
ut also all the characteristics of their state of
efuge.
These characteristics include: the preserva-
ion of refugee camps, the preservation of the
isery in refugee camps, the enrolment on UNRWA
ation rolls and the preservation of the niemory of
he homelands in Palestine in the mind and "hearts"
f the occupants of the refugee camps 1 . As a result
f this, the Palestine refugees viewed with suspicion,
nd violently resisted, any UNRWA plans to improve
he conditions inside the refugee camps, such as the
ubstitution of tents by concrete houses, as being a
Love towards "permanent resettlement" 2 . Similarily,
To this effect, refugee camps were given the names
of the place in Palestine from which the refugees
had originally come, for example, Jaffa, Haifa,
Ramleh etc.; see, Don Peretz. "The Palestine Arabs:
A National Entity", in Michael Curtis (ed.) People
and Politics in the Middle East. (New Jersey:
Transaction Books, 1971), p. 81k.
2UN. Doe. 16(A/1905), para, 38, p. 5; also see,
Erskine B. Childers. "The Other Exodus", in Walid
Khalidi (ed). From Haven to Conquest: Reading in
Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 197-t8(Beirut:
The Institute For Palestine Studies, 1971) p. 796.
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the provision of rations, although essential for
meeting the basic needs of life, nevertheless, was
not viewed by the Palestine refugees as an act of
charity which humiliated human dignity, but rather
as a recognition of their refugee-status 1 , and as a
"right" which they had acquired by virtue of their
refugee-status. The world community was seen as
having failed to redresse this status through the
enforcement of the 194(111) Resolution 2 . To this
effect, the Commissioner - General of TJNRWA says:
"In their (the Palestine refugees) own
eyes they are not refugees at all in
the sense in which that term is used
to describe persons who have uprooted
themselves and broken with their own
past in order to seek a new life in
a new surroundings and in a new country.
The Palestine refugees regard them-
selves rather as temporary wards of
the international community whom they
hold responsible for the upheaval
which resulted in their having to
leave their homes. As they see it,
the international community has a
duty to enable them to return to
their homes and meanwhile, to provide
for their maintenance and welfare"3.
1U.N. Doc. A/5813, para, 21, p. 5.
2UN. Doe. l6(A/1905), paras. 35, 36, 37, p. 5.
3U.N. Doc. A/58l3, p. 4.
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In another instance, the Commissioner-General of
UNRWA drew attention to the feelings and attitudes
of the Palestine refugees when he said that, "From
their standpoint, a nation has been obliterated and
a population arbitrarily deprived of its birthright.
This injustice", he pointed out, "still festers in
their minds and they hold the United Nations res-
ponsible for their lot and for extending assistance
10 them until a solution can be found to their
problems. Their longing to return to their homes,
encouraged by the General Assembly T s declaration on
repatriation and compensation in paragraph II of
Eesolution 194(111) and referred to in many subsequent
resolutions, remains unabated."1
Time was not a softening force to this hard-.
Line attitude. It acted, rather, as a consolidating
Corce. As time passed, the Palestine refugees clearly
Dbserved that the only issue which was keeping " the
Palestine Problem" alive, and acting as a reminder
to the world community of the existence of something
al1ed "The Palestine Problem", was the issue of the
Palestine refugees. Accordingly, the Palestine
refugees developed the conviction that if they allowed
the refugee problem to be solved in any way other than
that stated by Resolution 194(111), they would, then,
be endorsing the status quo in Palestine, and legi-
timizing it too, as they would in practice be
surrendering their right to "repatriation". This
conviction gave a special importance to the preser-
vation of the refugee-status of Palestine refugees.
1U.N. Doc. A/6013, pp. 4-5,
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Thus, the preservation of one status quo served, in
this case, as a de-legitimizing force of another
status quo. It was within this framework that the
Palestine refugees were always careful not to
surrender, formally and collectively, to any govern-
ment, political organization, or political party,
the right to represent them and to act on their
behalf. Although they did not exercise this right
1themselves , they, nevertheless, felt that by pre-
serving their refugee-status and by not surrendering
their rights of representation they were safeguarding
their cause and keeping it alive.
The refusal, by the Palestine refugees, to
accept any plans for solving the a1etine refugee
problem' through integration 2 , emigration 3 , or
resettlement, did not reflect the development and
flourishing of a "refugee mentality", but rather
1There are many factors behind the failure of the
Palestine refugees to take the initiative. These
factors include the dispersion of the Palestinians,
the status of the Palestinians in the Arab Host-
States and the absence of a national Palestinian
leadership. This issue will be dealt with in
Chapter 6.
2Outside the context of tthe 19k(III) Resolution.
3Emigration to countries outside the Arab World.
'l•	 .Resettlement, in a permanent sense, in the Arab World,
mainly in the Host-States.
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reflected the . political nature of the Palestine
refugee problem1.
"The work of the Agency (UNRwA) must, in
the very nature of things, be considered
against the political background of the
Palestine question, to which the refugee
problem is inextricably linked. As has
been demonstrated by events, the passage
of time has not been a healing force.
Quite to the contrary. Today, as one
year ago, the strongest feeling, vocally
and bitterly expressed by the great mass
of the refugees, is the demand to return
to their old homes. The refugees are,
in general, supported in this claim by
the Arab Governments.
In the absence of acceptable solution
to the Palestine question, the great
mass of the refugees has remained opposed
to the development of largescale projects
for self-support, which they erroneously
link with permanent resettlement and the
abandonment of hopes for repatriation."2
It is true that the Palestine refugee problem has
humanitarian and economic elements, but these are
merely aspects of the problem and do not constitute
its essence.
1 Sami Hadawi. Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 191 1t-
1967(New York: The New World Press, 1967), p. 186;
also see, U.N. Doc. l4(A/3212), para. 101, p. 12.
2UN Doe. llt(A/3212), paras. 101 & 102, pp. 12-13.
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"Although the Agency's (UNRwA) mandate
is strictly humanitarian, the refugee
problem is at the core of the Palestine
question, which is one of the most
explosive political issues in the host
1countries and in the whole Near East."
Moreover, the preservation of the refugee-status of
the Palestine refugees. serves two other major goals
for the Palestinians.
First, it acts as a constant daily reminder to the
world community and to the Arab people and govern-
ments of the "tragedy" which befell the Palestinians,
and which can only be solved through their return
2to their homeland in Palestine . Furthermore, the
preservation of refugee-status 3 serves as a de-
stabilizing element in the Host-States, due to the
daily frustration it causes to the Palestine
refugees.
"This sense of injustice, frustration and
disappointment has made the refugee
irritable and unstable. There are
occasional strikes, demonstrations and
small riots."
1	 .Ibid, para. 70, p.9.
See, pp. 9k - 98.
3lncluding the characteristics of the state of refuge,
see, pp. 93 - 94.
4U.N. Doc. 16(A/1905), para. 38, p. 5.
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This was bound to reflect itself on the relations
between the Palestinians and their respective Host-
Governments. In other words, the Host_Statest
Governments, in seeking to solve the Palestine
refugee problem peacefully, must secure the consent
of the Palestinians. Hence, the Host-Governments
can only solve the Palestine refugee problem
peacefully through Resolution 19L1(III), that is,
through "repatriation" or "compensation". But,
since the Israeli Government refused to
1
"repatriate" the Palestine refugees , the only way
which remained open for the Host-Governments to
solve the Palestine refugee problem, and consequen-
tly the "Palestine Problem", was through war. Thus,
the preservation of the refugee status of the
Palestine refugees serves as an element of tension
and instability in the area2.
Second, in its capacity as an indicator of the
origin of the Palestine refugees and consequently
of their right to return to their homelands, the
preservation of the refugee-status, when translated
politically, means the ultimate aim of having a
political entity which would represent the physical
components of a state - that is, the land and the
people. Accordingly, the "return" of the people
(the Arab Palestinians) to the land (Palestine)
indicates the ultimate goal of establishing a
political entity which would represent both the
'See, pp . 86-89 and 92-93.
we will see in Chapter 6, the Palestinians were
to introduce, in the early 1960's, the concept of
"involvement", i.e. forcing the Arab States into
War with Israel.
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people and the land- a state-in--image. In this
sense, the Palestinians view the preservation of
their refugee-status as a guarantee of the continued
existence of their state-fin-image. This view stems
from the conviction that with the transformation of
the "homeland", and the subsequent non-existence of
an Arab Palestinian political entity in Palestine,
or an internationally recognized subs Litute for
this entity, such as an internationally-recognized
government-in-exile, the Palestine refugees remain
as the only physical component of the state-in-image
whose legitimate right to "return" to the "trans-
formed homeland" is internationally recognized.
Accordingly, the lifting of the refugee-status of
the Palestine refugees through emigration, resettle-
ment or integrations, or any other solution short of
"repatriation", is destined to deprive the state-in-
image of its legitimacy through depriving it of its
only legitimate component - the Palestine refugees.
Outside the framework of the 194(111) Resolution.
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CHAPTER THREE
PALESTINIAN-ARAB RELATIONS: THE ERA OF TRANSITION,
1952 - 1963
This Chapter deals with the impact of the dis-
persion of the Palestinians on their political
attitudes and activities during the period 1952 -
1963. A brief socio-economic analysis of the
Palestinians in the Host-States constitutes a
logical prelude to the main themes of this Chapter.
An understanding of the economic and social status
of the Palestinians in the post - 1948 period may
also help in comprehending the circumstances and
factors affecting their political attitudes and
activities.
The analysis of the socio-economic status of
the Palestinians in the post-1948 period will be
conducted through an assessment of Palestinian
educational and academic potential, which, in the
Palestinian case, serves as the best and most
viable means of effecting any radical changes in
the economic and social status of the Palestinians.
This is due to the fact that the absence of a
Palestinian state and the dispersion of the Pales-
tinian people had deprived the Palestinians of the
services normally provided by the nation_state*
Such services would mainly affect the social and
economic conditions of the population through such
processes or schemes as industrialization, state-
sponsored economic development plans, or state-
1With the exception of the Palestinians in Jordan.
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sponsored social and educational services. In the
Palestinian case, the nation-state, as a medium
through which social and economic changes could be
effected, was non-existent. Consequently, the
Palestinians had to compensate for the absence of
this medium through education and hard work which
were largely based on personal rather than state
initiative.
An assessment of the Palestinian Educational and
Academic Potential
The transformation of Palestine on May 15, l9t8,
and the subsequent dispersion of the Arab Palestin-
ian people had catastrophic impacts on all aspects
of the life of the Palestinian people. Originally
"one of the most prosperous and highly cultivated
in the Arab World" 1 , the Palestinians had become
the political and economic burden of the world
community. The Palestinian people suffered all the
agonies and miseries which normally accompany the
life of refugees 2 . Such agonies and miseries were
long-term ones for the majority of the new genera-
tions of Palestinians who lacked either appropriate
funds to start a new life, or educational and
technical skills which would have provided them
with the possibility of decent work and
1UNRWA. Why Are They Still Refugees? op. cit.,
p.1.
2See, Chapter 2, pp. 73 - 82.
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employment 1 . It was, therefore, the state of being
a refugee which taught the Palestinians, as early
as l9l8, that material wealth and social prestige
without education served a Palestinian no good in
his refuge 2 , and that it was only those who were
educated, and who thus, carried their knowledge
with them, were able to start, almost immediately,
a new and decent life. This must not be seen as
in contradiction with.the Palestinian determination
to preserve their refugee-status and the characte-
ristics of the life of a refugee. On the contrary,
in seeking education, the Palestinians were not
aiming at relinquishing their refugee-status, but
rather at making their children-the new generation
of Palestinians, better equipped to meet hardships
than their fathers who lacked education, and who,,
consequently, suffered most after 19k8.
'There are no statistics regarding the number of
Palestinian refugees who had enough funds to start
a new business. Equally, there are no statistics
on the number of educated and skilled Palestinians
who left Palestine in 19L8. It is, however,
generally accepted that a high percentage of the
non-indigenous Arab employees in Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Libya and the Gulf States in the early
l95O were Palestinians.
is due to the fact that, by and large, the
wealthy class of the Palestinians in the prel9Z8
period, did not derive its wealth from trade or
industry, but rather from its ownership of land
and groves. Accordingly, when those people fled
from Palestine, they could not take with them
their land or groves, though some of them,
especially those who left early, managed either
to sell some of their land or take some cash or
valuables with them. For more information, see
Pp . 76-80.
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Palestinian Pre-University Education
The early Palestinian understanding of the im-
portance of education based on the need to secure
a high degree of qualifications, in order to
compensate for the competitive disadvantage of
being a refugee competing with the native popula-
tion for scarce opportunities to work, sparked a
massive move among the Palestinians towards
education.
"Deprived of the economic and social
base of a home and a country, Palestine
refugees start out at a disadvantage in
seeking to support themselves in the
highly competitive conditions created
by expanding population and surplus
U
manpower in the Middle East
In addition, there were other factors which played
an important role in promoting the Palestinian
thirst for education. First, the post-1948 period
witnessed a general demand for education in the
Arab World. This demand was largely due to the
exposure of Arab societies to the achievements of
Western civilization, and the emergence, for the
first time in many centuries, of independent Arab
states who needed an increasing number of educated
people to help in running th different institutions
of the state. The Palestinians, who lived in the
1UNRWA. TJNPWA/UNESCO Education Se 	 ces for Palestine
Refugees (Beirut: UNRWA, 1970), p.1.
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midst of the Arab World, benefited from this
educational drive and the subsequent expansion in
the educational facilities of the Arab World1.
Second, the eviction of the majority of the Pales-
tinians had led to a basic alteration in their
mileiu and norm of life, as the Palestinians were
settled in urban rather than rural environments2,
In this sense, the urbanization of the majority
of the Palestinian people contributed to shifting
their outlook and work opportunities and expecta-
tions from being basically rural-orientated to
being basically urban-orientated. Consequently,
the importance of education in the life of the
Palestinian individual increased, in as much as
it provided the indispensable base of his survival
'Ibrahim Abu-.Lughod. "Educating A Community in
Exile: The Palestinian Experience", in, Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. II, No. 3 (Beirut: The
Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait
University, 1973), p. 104.
2The majority of the Palestine refugee camps are
situated in urban invironments in and around the
following major cities:
In Lebanon: Beirut, Sidon, Pyre, Tripoli and
Beqa' a.
In Syria: Damascus, Horns, Hama, Deraa and
Aleppo.
In Transjordan: Amman, Zerqa and Irbid.
In the West-Bank: Nablus, Jericho, Jerusalem
• -
	 and Hebron.
In Gaza Strip: Gaza, Deir El-Balah, Khan Yunis
and Rafah.
For more information see: U.N. Doe. l5(A/2978),
annex. 1.2 and 1.3; Also see, U.N. Doc. l3(A/5513),
the Appendix.	 -	 -
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in his new urbanized environment 1 . Furthermore, the
urban environment in which they were placed provided
the Palestinians with the chance to make use of
educational facilities which were normally more
available and more advanced than those of the rural
2environment
The responsibility for educating the Palestine
refugees- in terms of finance and location - was
largely shared by some Arab states and UNRWA. The
degree of this responsibility depended on two
factors - the concentration of Palestinian popula-
tion3 , and the level of education.
In addition to UNRWA, the Arab states of Jordan,
Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
States, Egypt and Iraq assumed the major responsibi-
4lity for educating the Palestinians • The extent
of this responsibility was, generally speaking,
determined by three major factors: first, the degree
11t is true that the Palestinian drive towards
education was initially motivated by job opportunit-
ies. However, those among the Palestinians who went
early to other Arab countries and found job, because
they happened to be educated discovered that they
could penetrate and influence their respective
societies and thus serve their cause. This became
an important motive for later generations of
Palestinians in their pursuit of education.
2lbrahim Abu-Lughod, op. cit., p. 104.
3This does not apply to LJNRWA whose mandate covers the
Palestine refugees irrespective of their country of
residence.
4lbrahim Abu-Lughod, op.cit., p. 102.
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of willingness, and preparedness of the Arab States
concerned to participate in educating the Palestin-
iaris; second, the number of Palestinians residing
on the territory of each of the Arab States con-
cerned which indicated its share of the burden in
teaching the Palestinians (see Table I); finally,
the level of educational attainment sought by the
Palestinians. In the latter case, the Palestinian
refugees who were eligible for UNRWA educational
services were cared for, on the primary level,
solely by UNRWA. For higher levels of education,
the responsibility of UNRWA tended to decrease as
that of the Arab States concerned increased. In
this respect, a brief discussion of the educational
cycle of the Palestinians would reflect the degree
of responsibility shared by UNRWA and each of the
Arab States in educating the Palestinians during
the period l9Z9 - June 1967.
Before we proceed, it is important to point out
that a thorough and accurate analysis of the educa-
tion of the Palestinians remains handicapped by the
absence of reliable and comprehensive data. While
UNRWA records provide us with an accurate register,
the rest of the Arab States have either totally
neglected to publish such data or have only recently
done so, thus forcing the use of data beyond the
limits of our period of interest. As for Jordanian
data, a different problem is posed since the
Jordanian government figures do not distinguish
between the Palestinian and non-Palestinian origin
of the Jordanian school population. While this is
easy to trace in terms of the school population
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Table I
1Distribution of Palestinian Population: 1970
Country	 No. of Palestinians
Transjordan (East Bank) ......
	 900,000
We s t Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 67 0, 000
Gaza Strip ...................	 364,000
Lebanon . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 240, 000
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • , . 	 180, 000k
Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 	 1110, 000
Egypt	 . . . • • • • • .. . . . 5 . . . . . . . . 	 33,000
SaudiArabia.................	 20,000
The Gulf States ..............	 15,000
Iraq . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 111, 000
Li bya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 	 5,000
U.S.A....O... . . • 5 •000••SSSS •..	 7,000
LatinArnerica..,.,..,.....,..	 5,000
WestGermany.................	 15,000
Israel .......................	 340,000
Total	 2,948,000
'Nabeel Shaath. "High Level Palestinian Manpower", in,
Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 1, No. 2 (Beirut:
The Institute For Palestine Studies and Kuwait
University, 1972), p. 81.
The riumber of' Palestinians in Syria was put by
Nabeel Shaath, Ibid.,as being 155,000. However, this
number was revised and updated by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod,
op.cit., p. 97. Accordingly, the total number of the
Palestinians in this table reflects the increase in
the Palestinian population of Syria.
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of the West Bank, which is almost totally Palestin-
ian, it is, however, extremely difficult to attempt
an accurate assessment of the number of Palestinian
pupils on the East Bank (Transjordan).
Throughout the Arab World pre-university educa-
ion is divided into three cycles: six years of'
rimary education, three years of preparatory educa-
ion and three years of secondary education.
rimary Education
The majority of the Arab States in which the
alestinians reside provided for the primary educa-
ion of the Palestinian children. This provision,
y the Arab States, did not overlap with that of
NRWA, rather it was complementary to it. In this
ense, the Arab States concerned provided only
hose Palestinian children with primary education
ho were not eligible to benefit from UNRWA educa-
ional services.	 -
In terms of finance and space, Jordan was the
rincipal authority for educating Palestinian
hildren at the primary level, followed closely by
NRWA then Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, the Gulf States,
1	 ..gypt and Iraq . "This distribution essentially
eflects the geographic distribution of the
alestinians themselves as well as the financial
_equirements • to defray the costs of educating this
population" 2 . (See Table i).
1 lbrahim Abu-Lughod. op.cit., p. 102.
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UNRVA educational services were mainly centred
on providing primary, education, following the decis-
ion in 1950 by the UNRVA Director and the Advisory
Commission to authorize "six years of elementary
1
education for every refugee child" . Shortly after
UNRWA commenced its activities in 1950, there were
35,700 pupils in its schools 2 . In 1955, the number
of pupils at UNRVA schools jumped to 104,751, and to
123,883 in l96O.
	
In 1967, the number of refugee
pupils attending 'LJNRWA schools was l86,967.
This amazing growth, especially in the first
five years of UNRWA activities, was "neither a
steady process nor the result of detailed long-range
planning" 5 . It was rather in response to the
Palestine refugees t demand for education.
"Bit by bit, an integral system has taken
shape, offering a wide range of education
and training opportunities to match the
Palestine refugees t eagerness to learn"
This eagerness to learn rated very high among the
Palestine refugees t priorities. In appreciation of
the importance of education many Palestine refugees
1	 .	 .UNRWA. Information Paper No. 3, op.cit., p.5.
3U.N. Doe. 13(A/7213), p.68.
4lbid.
5UNRWA. UNRWA/UNESCO Education Services,op.cit., p. 1.
6__i d.
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spent the very little money which they managed to
raise not on improving their livelihood but rather
on providing their children with school needs.
"In some of the refugee camps, the refugees
themselves managed to sell the sacks,
wooden cases and tin cans in which food
and other supplies had come, to purchase
school equipment with the proceeds"1.
After two decades, this eagerness showed in the
statistics for the ratio of Palestinian pupils to
the total Palestinian population which proved to be
among the highest in the Arab Vorld.(See Table 2)
Table 2
Comparative Percentage of Pre-University Pupils
to the total Population in some Arab States:l969-l970
% of Primary % of Prep. &
pupils to the Sec.pupils to
Country	 total pop.0 the total pop. Total
Egypt	 11.3 %
	
3 %	 14.3 %
Syria	 13.6 %
	
3.8 %
	
17.4 %
Iraq	 11.1 %	 3.3 %	 14.4%
Palestinians	 111.4 %
	
.6 %	 20	 %
1UNRWA. A Brief History of UNRWA: l950-1962,op.cit.,
p . 15.
Based on the information provided in: Ibrahim Abu-
Lughod, op.cit., pp. 105-106.
The distribution of population by age does not vary
significantly in the Arab World.
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Preparatory and Sccondary Education
Unlike primary education, preparatory and secon-
dary education are not compulsory in the Arab World.
Accordingly, the rate of enrolment in these two
categories drops sharply both in the Arab World
generally as well as among the Palestinians. How-
ever, in comparison with most of the Arab States,
the Palestinians enjoy one of the highest ratio of
pupil to population enrolments in these two
categories in the Arab World. (See Table 2).
The responsibility, shared by the Arab States,
for educating the Palestine refugees at the pre-
paratory stage, reflected the same order as that of
the primary stage with one exception. This excep-
tion was UNRWA which, while providing refugee
children with six years of primary education, had
failed, for a variety of reasons, the most important
of which were financial and technical, to offer a
similar programme of preparatory education. Accord-
ingly, there had been an arrangement under which
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon assumed responsibility for
providing refugee children residing on their res-
pective territories with preparatory education, and
UNRWA paid a small subsidy to the educational
budgets of these three States.
Since secondary education is optional in the
Arab World, Palestinians wishing to complete this
stage of education were not entitled to any UNRWA
educational services or subsidies. The burden was,
therefore, completely shouldered by the Arab States
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with Palestinian communities through their national
system of education, and the Palestinians themselves
through financing their own children who failed to
enroll themselves in the national schools of the
Arab States for whatever reason. Jordan however
was the principal Arab State which assumed the
major burden of educating the Palestinians at the
secondary level, followed by Egypt (with its super-
vision of secondary education in Gaza), Syria
1Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq and the Gulf States
The Palestinian Academic Potential: University
Education
Until 19692, there had not been a study of the
Palestinian University population and graduates.
In 1969, the Institute For Palestine Studies spon-
sored and conducted a project with the aim of
assessing the Palestinian High Level Manpower. The
findings of this HIGH LEVEL MANPOWER ASSESSMENT
PROJECT (HU4A) 3 , tentative and inconclusive as they
might be, constitute the best available source of
statistics and data on Palestinian University
population and its trends until 1970.
1lbrahim Abu-Lughod, op.cit., p. 102.
2Although these are later results, yet they are
based on previous accomplishments which took place
during the period of our study.
3For more information on this Project see:
Nabeel Shaath, op.cit., pp. 80-95.
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The findings of the HLMA Project were based on
10,000 responses to HLMA questionnaires. The
sample results which cannot alone give "direct
conclusions.., as to the total numbers or quality
of Palestinian manpower" 1 , serve as an indicator of
"important trends among the educated Palestinian
population"2.
A comparison between the ratio of Palestinian
University students to the total Palestinian popula-
tion and that of the Arab States show that in 1969-
1970, the Palestinians, and the Lebanese enjoyed the
highest rates in the Arab World. (See Table 3)
Table 3
Comparative Percentage of University Students
to total population in some Arab States:1969-197
Egypt ............... 0.57%
Syria . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.57%
Iraq ................ 0,14 $
Lebanon . . , . . . . . . . . . . I . 1 %
Palestinians .,,.,... 1.1%
According to the findings of the HLMA Project,
there was a general tendency, among Palestinian
students, towards the study of Humanities and Social
1Nabeel Shaath, op.cit., p.82,
i d.
3Basecl on information provided in: Ibrahim Abu-
Lughod, op. cit., p. 109.
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Total
25.Zt%
25.6%
8.0%
2.0%
6i.o%
9.5%
12.0%
10.1%
4.5%
Humanities
Social Sciences
Education
Law
Natural Sciences
Engine e ring
Medical Sciences
Agriculture
19.7%
19.0%
9.8%
13.3%
61.8%
7.3%
12.3%
8.5%
7.8%
Sciences rather than the study of Science. This
tendency reflects the general pattern in the Arab
World. (See Table It) However, the Palestinians
showed a higher tendency than their fellow Arab
students, towards the study of Natural and Medical
Sciences, an equal tendency to study Engineering
and a lesser tendency to study Agriculture. (See
Table It) At the post-graduate level, HLMA findings
reflect an increase in the ratio of Palestinian
students who study scientific subjects. While
only 30% of Palestinian first degree students
study science, the ratio increases at the Masters
level to 46%, at the Doctoral level to 48% and at
the Post-Doctoral level to 93%. (See Table 5)
Table 14
Comparative Percentage Distribution of Student
Enrolment According to Field of Study.'1
Field of Study	 Arab Countries Palestinians
1Based on: Nabeel Shaath, op.cit., p. 84.
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Table 5
Percentage Distribution of Palestinian
Graduates into Arts and Sciences,'
Degree	 Arts	 Sciences
Bachelors	 70%	 30%
Masters	 46%
Doctoral	 16%	 84%
Post-Doctoral	 6.6%	 93.4%
HLMA findings also show that 80% of Palestinian
University students graduated from Arab countries
and the remaining 20% from other countries mainly
2the U.S.A. and Europe . As regards the distribution
of students in the Arab countries, Egypt ranked
first (with 34% of the total Palestinian students),
followed by Lebanon, Syria1, and Jordan3.
What professions are most popular among Palestin-
ian University graduates? HLMA findings show that
46.83% of the respondents work in the field of
education, 16.74% in engineering, 14.87% in manage-
ment and 10.09% in the medical profession 4 . Legal
and clerical professions rated 3% only, while other
occupations such as farming accounted for 2.5%
1Based on: Ibid.,p. 85.
2lbid.,p. 88.
1Until 1962, when Jordan took the lead over Syria
with the opening of the University of Jordan.
3Nabeel Shaath, op.cit., pp. 88-89.
4lbid.,p. 90.
5lbid.
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Total	 15. 11.3%
'Ibid.
The respondents to HLNA questionnaires included
many distinguished people in various fields. The
10,000 respondents included "27 ambassadors,
7 cabinet ministers and 16 top-ranking government
officials, as well as 30 judges. On a lower level
can be counted 100 full-professors, and 30 associate
and assistant professors, 154 senior researchers
and 327 graduate research-assistants. The list
also includes 59 consultants/experts, 100 general
managers of large business concerns, 369 other
managers, and 376 vice-president, assistant managers
and heads of departmentst. On the basis of these
figures, one can compute that out of a sample of
10.000 graduate Palestinians, 15.43% occupied very
distinguished posts in their respective fields of
work. (See Table 6)
Table 6
Percentages of Top-Ranking Palestinians According to
their Fields of Work based on the 10,000 HLMA Sample
Profession	 Percentage
Civil Service (including cabinet
ministers and ambassadors)
Academic Profession (full, associate
and assistant Professors)
Senior Researchers
Management (including general mangers,
consultants and vice-presidents)
0. 08%
1.3 %
4.81%
9.24%
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Finally, this analysis of the Palestinian educa-
tional and academic potential, which was based
primarily on UNRWA and UNESCO data and on HLMA
findings, suggests, somewhat broadly and inconclu-
sively, the following findings:
1. The Palestinian people enjoy a high degree of
positive-reaction and constructive-response.
The dismemberment of Palestine, the subsequent
absence of a political entity and the dispersion
of the Palestinian people, neither led to the
dissolution of the Palestinians into the Host-
States societies nor to their moral and
psychological despair. Rather they constituted
a motive for self-development, reconstruction
and fulfilment through education and hard work.
2. The Palestinians, despite the disadvantages of
being refugees, dispersed, and lacking a national
state with its services, planning and facilities,
have succeeded, with UNRWA and Arab assistance,
and above all with self-determination and
eagerness in becoming among the highest educated
peoples in the Arab World. This potential has
contributed to increasing the usefulness and
credibility of the Palestinians in their res-
pective Host-Communities.
3. The younger generations of Palestinians enjoy a
high degree of mobility. This is due to the
fact that, being highly educated, dispersed and
lacking a national state, the young generations
of Palestinians, motivated by economic reasons
and governed by work opportunities, transcended
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the political boundaries of the Arab World and
pioneered the idea of the movement of Arab
labour across the Arab World 1.
4. The Palestinians were able, through their
educational attainment and mobility, to infil-
trate many important and potentially influen-
tial fields in various Arab States, especially
the Host-States, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf-States. These fields cover, in addition
to the rank-and-file of the various govern-
mental departments and private enterprises,
political, managerial and academic fields.
This helped to enhance the influence of the
Palestinians in those States.
5. The Palestinian intelligentsia has been able
through its educational attainment, mobility
and hard work, to elevate its economic and
social status to the rank of the middle and
upper-middle classes.
6. The elevation of the economic and social status
of the Palestinian intelligentsia was bound to
affect its political thinking and mode of
struggle. In this context, the views of Johan
Galtung on the relationship between the "rank-
1Thg movement of the Palestinians in the refugee
camps is not restricted for those working or
wishing to work in the Arab countries, especially
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Libya.
For more information see Chapter 2, p. 55 . Also
see: U.N. Doc. 13(A/2171), pp. Li648.
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disequilibrium" and "revolution" are of special
importance 1 . According to Galtung t s hypothesis
about rank-disequilibrium 2 there are three
t social typest in any society which are most
likely to accumulate and express taggressiont*.
These are: "the elements equilibrated at the
top (the complete topdog)"; "the elements
equilibrated at the bottom (the complete under-
dog)"; and "the elements in rank-disequilibrium,
i.e., the elements with some positions high and
some position low" 3 . When this categorisation
is applied to the Palestinians, we notice that
the majority of the Palestinian refugees, who
were before 1948 either t topdogs T ,	 rank-
disequilibrated t , or t underdogs ! , became after
1948, mainly T underdogs t . Accordingly, there
was an element of built-in agressiveness in
their attitudes as they had, in sociological
terms, used their relatively good past status
as a reference point to their miserable present
as refugees or in other words suffered from
t relative deprivation t . However, as time passed,
and as the new generation of Palestine refugees
gained a relatively high educational and academic
1Johan Galtung."A Structural Theory of Aggression",
in, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. I(Oslo:
Peace Research Institute, 1964), pp. 95-119.
2lbid.,pp. 96 - 101.
*Galtung defines Iaggression as "drives towards
change, even against the will of others"(p.95).
Galtung, however, stresses that he uses the
term 'aggression' in the sense of 'self-
assertion', with the view that this t self-
assertion t "implies an effort to change social
relations, i.e. no longer to comply with the
existing conditions" (footnote No. I, p.114).
3lbid. ,p.97.
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status, and relatively few educational and
professional jobs to match their qualifications,
the Palestinian intellectuals were bound to
become an t intellectual proletariat t1 . Under
normal conditions, the crystallization of the
t intellectual proletariat t , as projected by
Galtung, results when the state makes " few
positions available so that the high educational
status will not be translated into the kind of
instrumentality that gives power. Regardless of
the economic situation, this t intellectual pro-
letariat t is a proletariat in the sense of not
having access to the machinery they know (or
think they know) how to turn. They are forced
into other positions, and these positions will
call for subsidiary capacities (accounting,
typing, low administration) and the disequilib-
rium is created" 2 . In the Palestinian case, the
emergence of the t intellectual proletariat t was
not the result of a state policy which made tfew
positions available t , but rather the result of
the absence of the state itself - a Palestinian
state. This made educated Palestinians a
commodity in the Arab and international market,
subject to the rules of supply and demand, and
more important, subject to the competitive dis-
advantage of seeking employment in countries in
which the Palestinians are not nationals, in the
face of a legitimate preference for employing
local nationals. Accordingly, the Palestinian
1lbid.,p. 108.
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'intellectual proletariat', in suffering from
this 'disequilibrated-rank', the existence of
which would normally serve "as a source of re-
volutions" 1 , was likely to attempt to sponsor
and lead a revolution which would aim at
establishing a Palestinian political entity,
or a Palestinian state, as a means of neutra-
lizing the negative impact resulting from the
absence of such a state. Moreover, this drive
towards creating a Palestinian national entity
or a Palestinian state was not in contradiction
with the nationalist aims of the Palestinian
people at large. On the contrary, it was in
conformity with such aims. Accordingly, the
Palestinian t intellectual proletariat' had the
strongest motives of personal fulfilment and
nationalist fulfilment for sponsoring and
leading the struggle against Israel.
The Palestinian Pan-Arab Attitude After 1948 :
Manifestations and Motives
The after-math of the 1948 - War witnessed basic
changes in the political, social and economic status
of' the Arab Palestinian people 2 . Such changes were
bound to affect the mode of life and political
attitudes of the Palestinians. In this respect, a
study of the impact of these changes on the tradi-
tional Palestinian Pan-Arab attitude 3is of particular
importance as it leads to a better understanding of
the Palestinian conception of Pan-Arabism and Arab
1lbid.,p . 109.
2See, Chapter 2.
3See, Chapter 2, pp. 55-63.
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unity in the post-1948 period. Such an understand-
ing serves as a guide for analyzing the philosophy
on which the Palestinians in the Host-States based
their political attitudes and justified their
political activities. Accordingly, the remaining
part of this chapter will be devoted to a thorough
examination of the Pan-Arab attitude of the Pales-
tinians in the Arab Host-States, its manifestations
and motives.
Manifestations
The Pan-Arab attitude of the Palestinians
during the period 1949-1963 can best be seen in
two major areas:
First: Palestinian political literature which
serves as an indicator of the general
current of political thinking among Pales-
tinian intellectuals during the period
concerned.
Second:Palestinian political activities which
deal with the nature, means and orienta-
tions of political activities of the
Palestinians in the Host-States.
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Palestinian Polifical Literature1
Palestinian political literature during the
period 19 !t9 - 1963 projected, by and large, a Pan-
Arab approach in its analysis of the various problems
confronting the Arab countries, including the
Palestine Problem". In dealing with the "Palestine
roblem", Palestinian political literature was more
This part will be dealing with four selected works
by Palestinian thinkers. The choice of these works
was arbitrary, but having read a good lot of the
literature in the field, I have selected those works
taking the following points into consideration:
1. These works were written by distinguished
Palestinian intellectuals who were not
affiliated to any political party or political
groupings.
2. These works undertake a general analysis of
the "Palestine Problem", and are not limited,
in their scope and analysis, to one particular
aspect of the "Palestine Problem".
3. These works provide, as closely as possible, a
true reflection of the developments in the
current of Palestinian political thinking
during the period 19!t9-1962, as these works
were published during the years 1950, 1953,
1955 and 1962.
These works were distinguished, at the time,
for the originality of their information and
analysis, and the courageous and often harsh,
though scientific, self-criticism which they
contain.
However, in a later part of this Chapter, a
broad analysis of partisan political thinking will
be undertaken through an analysis of the extra-national
political parties in the Arab Word, see, pp.lZi3-169.
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concerned about what should be done than about what
had happened. This reflects an early Palestinian
move towards practical realism rather than indulging
in the painful and sterile activity of seperating
the guilty from the innocent in causing the Arab
"catastrophe" in Palestine. One of the earliest
Palestinian political books which reflects both these
tendencies is Takiyyidin al_Nabahani t s book Inkaz
1Filastin (Rescuing Palestine) . This book was pub-
lished in January 1950,. almost immediately after the
Arab defeat in Palestine. Al-Nabahani devoted the
major part of his book to an analysis of the means
of "liberating" Palestine. The major theme running
through al-Nabahani's plan for the "liberation" of
Palestine stresses that the responsibility for
"liberating" Palestine is "not confined to one par-
ticular individual", but is rather the responsibility
of "all the Arab peoples" 2 . Al-Nabahani justified
his call for an all-Arab responsibility on the grounds
that the Zionist victory and the establishment of the
State of Israel posed an imminent t threat t to the
security of •"Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen" 3 . This t joint_threat t was
to be met, according to al-Nabahani, by a "joint Arab
response", and in so responding, the Arab States must
act as "one country"4.
Al-Nabahani was not the only Palestinian writer
to address himself to the Arab people at large. In
his two books Ba'd al-Nakbah ( After The
1Takiyyidin al-Nabahani. Inkaz Filastin (Rescuing
Palestine), (Damascus, Ibn Zaydoon Printhouse, 1950).
2lbid.,p. 169.(trans. L.K.)
3mici.,pp. 175.-176.(trans. L.K.)
4IbicI.,p. 177.
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1Catastrophe) , and Waty al-Mustakbal(Comprehending
The Future) 2 , Qadri Tuqan addressed himself, too ,
to the Arab people at large. In the introduction
to his book Batd al-Nakbah, Tuqan stated that:
"My sole aim is to convince the Arab reader
of this book that science and scientific
means are the only salvation for the Arabs;
that the Arabs will enjoy no entity of
their own unless they follow the path of
civilization and surrender their lead to
scientifically-oriented people who appreciate
the importance of science, organization and
scientific-methods"3.
In his book, Al-Nakbah Va Al_Binaa t Fil-Watan
l-Arabi (The Catastrophe and Construction in the
krab World)k, Dr. Valid Kamhawi adopts a similar
attitude to that of al-Nabahani when he argues that
"the defence of the Arab character of Palestine was
the first manifestation of the strong-bond of Pan-
Arabism in the twentieth century" 5 . Unlike al-Nabahani
and Tuqan, Kamhawi devotes the first volume of his
1Qadri Tuqan, Ba 1 d al-Nakbah (After the Catastrophe)
(Beirut: Dar al-urn Lilmalayeen, 1950).
2Qadri Thqan. Wa t y al-MustaLkbal (Comprehending the
Future) (Beirut: Dar al-urn Lilrnalayeen, 1953).
3lbid.,p. 3,(trans. L.K.)
4Walid Kamhawi. Al-Nakbah Wa al_Binaa t Fil-Watan al-
Arabu (The Catastrophe and Construction in the Arab
World), Vols.I and II, 2nd. ed., (Beirut: Dar Al-urn
Lilmalayeen, 1962).
5lbid.,p. 11t7. (trans. L.K.)
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work to the pre-1948 period in an attempt to reveal
the essence of the factors which had contributed to
the Arab t catastrophe t in Palestine. In attempting
his study, Kamhawi, being a strong advocate of Pan-
Arabisru, felt obliged to justify his choice of the
t catastrophe t in Palestine as a prelude to his
general study of the Arab World.
"The catastrophe in Palestine which hit a
small part of the homeland (the Arab World)
constitutes the best prelude to the study
of the catastrophes which had hit the
different parts of the Arab World over the
past hundreds of years. This does not
mean a negligence of other catastrophes
like those which hit Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco or Libya, and made these vast
countries parts of alien states.....
It rather means that, in the chain of Arab
catastrophes, the catastrophe in Palestine
constitutes a better case for analyzing
Arab catastrophes at large because its
impact transcended Palestine to most parts
of the Arab World".
In analyzing the factors behind the Arab 'catas-
trophe t in Palestine, Kamhawi attributes these
factors not only to the 	 such as
"British colonialism" or "the Zionist invaders", but
also to the inherent diseases in Arab society which,
by themselves, "were enough to bring about the catas-
trophe, without the added help of British colonialism
and the capable Zionist invaders" 2 . These inherent
1Ibid.,p. 35. (trans. L.K.)
2IbicI.,p. 70.(trans. L.K.)
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diseases which, according to Kamhawi, characterized
Arab society, of which the Arab Palestinians were
part, included such things as "traditionalism" ,
"absence of scientific organization", "ignorant and
selfish leadership", "lack of willingness to
sacrifice" 1 , and the "wrong values" and "miscon-
eptions" which the Arab individual had "inherited
eneration after generation"2.
While Kamhawi followed the path of pointing out
the weaknesses in the Arab World which had led to
;he Arab tcatastrophes in Palestine and other
harts of the Arab World, Qadri Thqan adopted the
pposite approach. He stressed the glory of Arab
istory and the greatness of Arab contributions to
rorid civilization as an attempt to restore the
onfidence of the Arab masses which had been
thattered by the defeat in Palestine, and also to
ncourage them to revive their past glories. In
;his respect, Tuqan argued for the need to rewrite
Lrab history in such a way as "to transform the
ieritage of the Arabs and their past glories into
i. source of power which would push the Arabs
orward" 3.
This difference in approaching the 'catastrophe
n Palestine' between Kamhawi and Puqan does not
Lerive from any basic difference in conviction
etween the two writers. It rather represents an
appreciation of the different circumstances which
1 lbid. (trans. L.K.)
2lbid., p. 289. (trans. L.K.)
3Qadri Tuqan. Ba'd al-Nakbah, op.cit., p. 19.
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existed in the Arab World when these two thinkers
published their works. Tuqan published his book in
January 1950 at a time when the Arab people were
still shattered by the t catastrophe in Palestinet,
while Kamhawi published his book s in August 1955,
that is, seven years after the Arab defeat in Pales-
;ine. Accordingly, one can assume that while Tuqan,
)fl the one hand, felt the need to inject more com
'idence into the Arab masses as a means of neutra-
izing the serious impact of the defeat on the morale
md psychology of the Arabs, Kamhawi, on the other
iand, must have felt the need, seven years after the
tefeat, to hit hard at the Arab people, as a means
f awakening them through shock treatment. Tuqan
;eems to have felt, five years after the tcatastrophet
;hat the confidence-kijection which he attempted in
us first book had failed. Consequently, in his
econd book Wa'y al-Mustakbal, which was published in
953, Thqan adopted a different treatment, hitting
tard at the Arab past and present state-of-affairs.
"The catastrophe in Palestine which hit
the Arab people as a whole was an inescap-
able result of the ways and means adopted
by the Arabs in .their struggle and in their
life. Such ways and means were not based on
science or need, but were rather an exten-
sion of the past and its standards and
values.... The situation in Palestine was
very gloomy, and although the threat to
the Arab countries in general and to
*The first edition of Kamhawi t s book was pubisihed in
August 1955, and the second edition in June 1962.
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Palestine in particular was immanent, yet,
what did the Arabs do? They did not take
account of the future or of their inherent
problems"1.
• None of the four works attempted to accuse or
criticize any particular person or state as being
the sole or major cause of the t catastrophe in
Palestine t . Although :the emphasis and priorities
in their analyses varied, yet all four works pro-
jected a Pan-Arab approach in the sense that their
analyses cut across the Arab World and dealt with
the problems inherent in Arab society at large.
This Pan-Arab approach in analyzing the weaknesses
suffered by Arab society was also evident in their
suggestions of ways and means of solving Arab
problems and reforming Arab society.
The three Palestinian writers agreed on the need
for reforming Arab society as the first step towards
curing the t diseases t in Arab society, and ultimately
leading to its total t liberation t . This call for a
reformation of Arab society was given different sub-
stantive forms with varying degrees of emphasis.
AlNabahani argued that the t liberation t of Palestine
through the sole use of force "will not safeguard
the Arab people from imperialism and Zionism",
unless a basic change in the Arab society took
place at the same time through "a complete and total
change in the way of thinking, beliefs, work, trans-
actions, internal and external relations, economics,
science, knowledge, and every other aspect of life"2,
1Qadri Thqan. Wa t y al-Mustakbal, op.cit., p.7.(trans.L.K.)
2Takiyyidin al-Nabahani, op.cit., p . 3 07.( trans. L.K.)
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Thqan, on the other hand, being a career educa-
tionalist and a scientist, called for "reform of
the Arab mode of thinking and way of life" through
education and science'. To this effect, Thqan
suggested a plan through which education and
science could be utilized as means towards reform-
ing Arab society. In the field of education,
Tuqan, who attributed the Arab defeat in Palestine
among other things,tothe absence of proper guidance
and schooling in the Arab World as a result of the
"colonial policy" which aimed at using the schools
in the Arab World as a means of "inhibiting the
gifted and halting any progress" 4 , suggested a
plan for reforming the educational system in the
Arab World as a means towards reforming Arab
aociety in general. This plan rested on three main
bases.
First, the use of . schools not only for teaching,
but also for guidance. Schools, according
to Tuqan, must be used- as a medium for
- - - producing the "enthusiastic citizen", the
"soldier", "the civil servant" and the
"administrator". Schools must also be
used as a medium for transmitting the"good"
aspects of Western civilization to the new
Arab generations3.
Second, the reform of the curricula of the schools
in the Arab World. Tuqan says that the
curricula of the Arab schools must have
'Qadri Thqan, Batd al-Nakbah, op.cit, p.21.(trans.L.K.)
2lbid.,p. 23. (trans. L.K.)
3lbid,p. 24.
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their "own philosophy which derives its
content and strength from Arab history and
the Arab present, and from the spirit of
this age which is characterized by rapid
development and mobility" 1 . -
Third, the promotion of the teaching profession
and according the teachers due respect and
financial support in appreciation of the
great responsibility which they bear in
educating future generations of Arabs2.
In his second book, Wa'y al-Mustakbal, Tuqan's
approach to the reform of Arab society centres on
the importance of science and the necessity of
adopting scientific means in order to liberate them-
selves from the "strains of the pastI, and as a
means of "development" and Iprogresst3.
Ka,nhawi t s ideas for reforming Arab society are
based on his belief that the "real catastrophe was
not in the loss of Palestine only", but also "in
the Arab World substituting the pooling of all its
resources and efforts on development projects in
every field and on the largest possible scale, with
a concentration on propagating the misfortunes of
the Arab refugees, calculating the amount of money
needed from Israel in the form of compensation, and
mobilizing all resources for a military adventure
'Qadri Tuqan, Ba t d al-Nakbah, op. cit., p.26. (trans ILK.)
2lbid.,pp. 31-31t.
3Qadri Tuqan, Wa T y al-Mustakbal, op.cit., pp. 5-9.
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against Israel" 1 . This reflects Kamhawi t s conviction,
as well as that of al-Nabahani and Tuqan, that the
t real t defeat of Israel would not come about through
an Arab military victory, but rather through an Arab
scientific, technological, industrial and social
leap forward enabling the Arabs to neutralize the
most 'powerfulweapon t in the Israeli arsenal, that
is Israeli industrial, technological and social
advance over the Arabs2.
The means by which to reform Arab society are
covered in the major part of the second volume of
Kamhawi t s book. Kamhawis ideas for reforming Arab
society involve social, economic, cultural, and
political aspects of Arab life. Kamhawi calls for
the abolition of sectarianism, class-stratification,
tribal-identification, and sex-discrimination as a
3tep towards social unity and coherence in Arab
society at large3.
On the economic level, the basic principle under-
ying Kamhawi 2 s analysis is that the Arab World is
ne economic unit whose wealth is 'complementary"4.
'he reformation of the Arab economy, as seen by
:amhawi, would come about through industrialization,
conomic planning, and a socialist economy based on
he four principles of "equality in opportunity" ,
personal freedom", "co-operation" and "self-realiza-
ion"
1Walid Kamhawi, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp.149-l50(trans.L.K.)
2.	 pIbid. ,pp. 300-300.
3Walid Kamhawi, op.cit., Vol. II., pp. 262-266.
4lbid, ,p.299.
5lbid.,pp. 288-299. (trans. L.K.).
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On the cultural level, Kamhawi attempts a dia-
gnosis of the diseases in Arab society before pre-
scribing the remedies. Arab society, according to
Kamhawi, suffers from illiteracy, absence of any
sense of the value of time, impulsive responses, a
sterile and backward educational system, injustice
and discrimination in the opportunities between the
rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, and the
male and the female 1 . Besides, Kamhawi stresses
that Arab thinking and culture (including the Arabic
language) are "traditional" and "stagnant" and should
be adapted and changed to meet the requirements of
'modern civilization' 2 . The cure to these diseases
would come about, according to Kamhawi, through the
abolition of illiteracy in the Arab World; the spread
of social consciousness through a stress on the value
of the human life as a productive one, and similarly,
on the value of time; the adoption of scientific
methods in Arab thinking, actions, and projects; the
modification and simplification of the Arabic language
in order to adapt it to the "changing spirit of our
age"; the freedom of thought, speech and expression
for everybody; and, finally, the reformation of the
Arab educational system and curricula in accordance
with "the spirit of modern civilization" and the
needs and priorities of Arab society3.
On the political level, Kamhawi spelled out three
basic principles which, according to him, constituted
1lbid., pp. 328 - 333.
2lbid., pp . 335 - 336.
3lbid., pp. 337 - 353. (trans. L.K.)
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the bases for reforming the Arab political system.
First, the inevitability and importance of Arab
unity as a means towards Arab strength and
self-fulfilment. Such unity must be
"unconditional" and must come into being
as a result of "popular strife and enthu-
siasm", and not as a result of an arrange-
ment between two or more governments 1 . In
pursuance of this goal of Arab unity
Kamhawi argues for the importance of en-
couraging Pan-Arab political movements and
professional associations. Such movements
and associations would "help in strengthen-
ing and promoting the goal of Arab unity2".
Second, Kamhawi stressed the need for democracy in
Arab domestic politics. In this respect ,
Kamhawi argues that it is "absolutely
necessary, for the acheivement of the goal
of true democracy,that the Arab individual
be taught that he is the only authority
capable of establishing a good and efficient
government machinery through the careful
practice of his right to select his repre-
sentatives"3.
Third, Arab foreign policy should be based on the
principle of non-alignment and neutrality
between the East and the West
1lbid.,pp. 376 & 381.
2lbid.,p. 378. (trans. L.K.)
3lbid.,p. 386. (trans. L.K.)
blbld.,pp, kll-418.
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Kamhawi was neither the first nor the only
Palestinian thinker to call for neutrality in Arab
foreign policy. A much earlier call for Arab
neutrality was voiced in 1950 by Takiyyidin al-
Nabahani. Two years before the rise of Nasser and
five years before the Bandung Conference was held,
Takiyyidin al-Nabahani preached and defended the
principle of Arab neutrality in his call for the
"termination of all sorts of treaties" between the
Arab World and the West, and the adoption of a
policy of "neutrality between the Soviet Bloc and
the Western Bloc"as this would put the Arabs "in a
good bargaining position at the time of crisis
between the East and the West". In addition, al-
Nabahani pioneered the call, also stressed by Tuqan
and Kamhawi, for the use of the vast oil resources
as an Arab weapon. In this context, al-Nabahani
demanded that "if the Western countries refuse to
respect the Arab will and if they persist in pro-
tecting Zionism..... the Arab leaders must, then,
terminate Western oil capitulations in the Arab
World"2.
The views of these Palestinian thinkers on the
way the Arabs should deal with Israel are of
particular importance because their analyses of' the
problems confronting the Arab World, and their
proposals for solving such problems were those of
Palestinians who had witnessed and lived through
the t catastrophe l in Palestine. Besides which,
1Takiyyidin al-Nabahani, op.cit., pp.199,202_20L1.
(trans. L.K.)
2lbid.,p. 20tt.(trans. L.K.)
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their views indicate the nature of the response of
the Palestinian intelligentsia, in the early and
late 1950's, to the 'challenge' posed to them by the
mere existence of the State of Israel, and as such
provide a test of the degree of realism and objecti-
vity in the Palestinian response.
The views of Takiyyidin al-Nabahani on the way
Arabs should meet the 'challenge' posed to them by
the existence of the State of Israel are reflected
in a set of suggestions:
a. "That the Palestine Problem - as a political
problem - must not be solved. Consequently,
Arabs must not allow any world power to solve
the Palestine Problem, irrespective of the
circumstance 5hI1
b. "That the remaining parts of Palestine must
remain in Arab hands and under Arab administra-
tion. Moreover, these parts must remain in a
state-of-war and the restoration of civilian
life must be minimal. These remaining parts
of Palestine would then serve as bases for
defence, and in due time as bases for attack
and liberation. Accordingly, all efforts
towards rehabilitation, development and
normalization, in the remaining parts of Pales-
tine, must be stopped, and all public resources
dedicated to these objectives must be immediately
transferred to promoting the military effort"2.
1lbid.,p.178 (trans. L.K.); Also see, Chapter Two
pp. 92 - 101.
2lbid.,pp. 178 - 179. (trans. L.K.)
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In calling for this, al-Nabahani did not limit
himself to the remaining parts of Palestine ,
but he also said that the adjacent parts to
Palestine of the territories of Transjordan ,
Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, must also be put in
a state of war, in order to serve as bases for
t defence $ and later as bases for t attack t . In
saying this, al-Nabahani specifically defined
the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the Syrian Golan
Heights, the Transjordanian Jordan Valley, and
South Lebanon, as being adjacent Arab territo-
ries which must be proclaimed military zones
and must be equipped accordingly1.
c. "That all the Palestine refugees must be con-
centrated in the remaining parts of Palestine...
as a first step towards forming a liberation
army whose spearhead would be the Palestine
2
refugees themselves" • In addition, al-Nabahani
demanded that "the refugee problem should be
dealt with, by the Arab governments, as the
problem of the Arab Palestinian nation rather
than as the problem of the Palestinian refugees3.
d. That the Arab States must declare "a general
mobilization of all resources for the benefit of
the military effort?lL. In this context , al-
Nabahani pointed out the importance of' teconomict,
1 lbid.,p. 180. (With the exception of South Lebanon,
these parts were occupied by Israel in the 1967 War).
2lbjd.,pp. 182-183. (trans. L.K.)
3lbid.,p. 182.(trans, L.K.)
Ibid.,p. 186. (trans. L.K.)
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t scientific t , and t industrial r projects to the
war effort. He specifically stressed the im-
portance of creating an Arab arms-industry1.
Al_Nabahani t s militant plan which, while stress-
ing the importance of pooling all resources for the
benefit of the military effort, acknowledged four
other important principles.
4.
First, the importance of industrialization, techno-
logy and science in the t Arab battle against
Israelt.
Second,that any future battle t against t Israel must be
an Arab battle in which, at least, all the
adjacent Arab States must participate.
Third, that the battle against Israel would not be
an easy one and would need preparation.
Fourth,that the mobilization of the Palestinians and
their resources was important to the future
Arab battle against Israel.
In his two books, Qadri Tuqan does not give any
plans or suggestions to the Arabs on how to deal
with Israel. He, nevertheless, expresses his belief,
which is also shared by Kamhawi 2 , that "the defeat
in Palestine had led to the Arab awakening"3.
2Valid Kamhawi, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 159.
3Qadri Tuqan. Ba r d al-Nakbah, op.cit., pp. 22-23.(trans. L. K.)
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Kamhawi's suggestions to the Arabs on how to
deal with Israel rested on his evaluation and assess.
-ment of the effectiveness of the three policy-options
normally debated in the Arab World. These are:
First, the policy of cold war and economic boycott:
This policy, Kamhawi argues, would not be
effective because, although it might "harass
Israel, and hinder its economic growth and
stability", yet, such a policy would never
lead to the "collapse" of the State of Israel.
Besides, the successful implementation of this
policy requires the Arab States' "consent and
agreement on one thing, hatred of Israel".
There is no guarantee, Kamhawi says, of the
continuation of Arab agreement and conformity
due, inter alia, to the fact that Arab
politics are "mainly motivated by personal
interests".
cond, the policy of war: Kamhawi argues that the
adoption by the Arab states of the policy of
war would lead to "total failure", because
"the Zionist invasion is not a military
invasion in as much as it is an invasion of
an alien civilization whose main weapons are
science, economics, politics and organization"2.
Accordingly, "our (the Arabs') struggle against
Israel must not be confined to the military
aspect, but rather to building ourselves up in
the economic, scientific and social fields"3.
'Valid Kamhawi, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 419.(trans. i.K.)
2.Ibid., p. L 2O. (trans. L.K.)
3lbid. (trans. L.K.)
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Third, the policy of peace: Karnhawi attacks this
policy-option and warns against its adoption
even "if Israel were to surrender half its
land and wealth" in exchange for peace. Such
peace, according to Kamhawi, would lead to
the Arabs losing "their primary motive for
unity, development, reformation and building
their own strength", while the Israelis would
have all the time"to develop themselves and
to prepare for a new offensive against the
1Arabs"
The alternative to all these policies lay,
.ccording to Kamhawi, in Arab unity and the emergence
a united Arab state "backed by an Arab civiliza-
ion". This would be "the ideal solution to all the
.rab problems", including that of the "Zionist
nvasion" 2 , because such a state would have all the
otential and resources of the Arab World at its
Lisposal, in addition to the political strength and
nfluence which this one Arab state would eventually
ru 5 t e r,
Al_Nabahani t s
 and Kamhawi's views on the
olicy to be adopted by the Arab States in dealing
rjth Israel reflect a deep and thorh understanding
f' the real sources of the problems and weaknesses
onfronting the Arab World. However, in suggesting
olutions, they both failed to appreciate the
political realities of the Arab World. Al-Nabahani,
Tuqan and Kamhawi, while correctly diagnosing the
need for the development, scientification and indus-
trialization of the Arab World, projected solutions
which were very demanding and idealistic. The three
of them based their solutions on the principle of
1lbid.,p. L12l.(trans. L.K.)
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Arab unity. For them, the achievement of the goal
of Arab unity was so important and obvious, that
they seemed to take it for granted. Althogh the
details of their plans for reforming Arab society
and for dealing with Israel might have been practi-
cable, yet, their belief in and devotion to the idea
of Pan-Arabism and Arab unity restricted the possi-
bility of implementing their ideas to the prior
achievement of Arab unity.
To conclude, Palestinian political literature,
iuring the period 1 949- 1 9 63, portrays the Pan-Arab
orientation of Palestinian political thinking. In
addition, it projects a Pan-Arab approach to the
analysis of the causes of the 'catastrophe' in
Palestine and to solutions offered to the tPalestine
Problem'. Moreover, Palestinian political literature,
luring the period concerned, did not attempt to deal
with any aspect of the t Palestine Problem t in
Lsolation, but rather in a Pan-Arab framework.
Palestinian Political Activities: 1949 - 1962
The political vaccum which the Palestinians
Bxperienced in the aftermath of the 1948-Var, which
was the result of the transformation of Palestine
and the subsequent absence of a Palestinian state,
neant that the conventional channels for political
ictivity normally provided by, or available in a
state, such as government, parliament, political and
professional associations, trade unions and social
clubs were, in the Palestinian case, non_existent.*
Except in the case of the Palestinians in Jordan.
See, Chapter 4.
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Accordingly, the Palestinians compensated for the
absence of these channels of political activity by
joining political parties in the Host-States as a
medium through which they could satisfy their poli-
tical needs and take part in political activities.
The great majority of the activist Palestinians
joined the extra-national political parties*,rather
than the local political parties. This was due to
the following factors:
1. With the exception of Jordan, the Palestinians
in the Arab states are not citizens1 . Accord-
ingly, if the Palestinians had joined the local
political parties in such states, this would
have amounted to direct Palestinian intervention
in the domestic affairs of those states, since
all such local political parties deal purely
with the domestic politics of their respective
states.
2. The Palestinians in the Arab Host-States, and
elsewhere in the Arab World, were suffering from
a lack of political identity, which they there-
fore sought to establish by joining extra-
national political parties. This happened in
two different ways. First, the Palestinians
joined and created pan-Arab political parties as
a means of promoting Pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabism,
as a general political framework and as a form
of broad identity accepted by both the Arab
These are the pan-Arab, the religious (Moslem), and
the communist parties.
'See Chapter Two, pp. 76-82.
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people and . the Arab states, provided a legiti-
mate framework for Palestinian participation and
enabled them to operate within and even to es-
tablIsh pan-Arab political parties. The spread
of such parties it was hoped would eventually
serve as a means of overshadowing the local
identities of the Arabs - Egyptian, Syrian,
Libyan and the like- to the benefit of the Pan-
Arab identity where all the Arab people are
considered Arabs rather than Egyptians, Syrians
or Libyans. If this were the case, the Pales-
tinians would not suffer from the absence of
their own political regime and would easily fit
in as Arabs. Moreover, the prevalence of pan-
Arab political parties would eventually promote
the cause of Arab unity, which the Palestinians
consider to be an important pre-requisite for
the "liberation of Palestine" 1 . Second, the
Palestinians joined and created extra-national
political parties which did not recognize
national identity, but instead religious
or class identity, such as the Moslem parties
and the Communist parties respectively. In so
doing, the Palestinians seemed to be motivated
by their lack of a political identity.
3.	 The scope and the nature of any solution to the
'Palestine Problem' transcends the local politics
of any Arab state as it touches on more than one
Arab state 2 . Consequently, the nature of the
'See, Chapter Three, pp. 125-lZ3.
2See, Chapter Two, Pp. 76-101 ; and Chapter Three,
pp. l25-l3.
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political activities of the Palestinians, which
ultimately aimed at the t liberation of Palestine',
could not, by definition, have been productive,
unless they cut across the boundaries of Arab
states. Hence, the Palestinians joined and
created extra-national political parties as a
medium for their political activities.
During the period l9Lt9_1962, the mainstream of
'alestinian political activities was channeled
:hrough extra-national political parties, with the
mphasis being on the Pan-Arab ones. Indeed, the
'alestinians had an active presence in aLmost every
xtra-national political party operating in the Arab
fond. These included the Arab Ba t th Socialist
'arty, the Syrian Nationalist Party (al-Qawmiyyun al-
;uriyyun) 1 , the Moslem Brotherhood Movement, and the
Lrab communist parties. Moreover, the Palestinians
reated, in the early 1950 t s, two extra-national
)OlitiCal parties: the Arab Nationalist Movement
al-QawmiYYun al-Arab) and the Islamic Liberation
'arty (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami). The presence and
;he influence of the Palestinians in all these parties
raried. It was selective rather than imposed on the
'alestinians, in the sense that the presence, and
onsequently the influence, of the Palestinians in
tny of these extra-national political parties was
overned, not by the willingness of the party to
tccept the Palestinians among its ranks, but rather
by the willingness of the Palestinians to join the
'The platform of the Syrian Nationalist Party calls
for the unity of the "Fertile Crescent" which covers
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. In
this sense, it was in contradiction with Pan-Arabism
which calls for the unity of all the Arab states.
This party played no significant role in Arab politics
during the period of our study.
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party - which might not necessarily have been the
case for local political parties. This Palestinian
willingness was dictated, among other things 1 , by
the evaluation by individual Palestinians of the
best means of serving their tcauset. Thus, some
Palestinians saw Islamic solidarity and the revival
of Islamic culture and civilization which had led
to past Arab glory to be the best way to rebuild
Arab strength and eventually to "liberate the home-
land". Hence, these Palestinians joined and created
extra-national religious (Islamic)parties. Other
Palestinians believed that communism would provide
the best means of effecting any basic change in the
various Arab States and hence joined the communist
parties in the various Arab states. Others, and by
far the majority of the Palestinians, believed that
Arab unity would provide the best means of building
up Arab strength in the economic, political and
military spheres, and eventually transform the weak
and disunited Arab states into a strong Arab state
capable at "1ierating Palestine".
The Palestinians and the Extra-National Religious
(Islamic) Parties:
The clear Palestinian preference for the Pan-
Arab political parties, though it had historic roots
and nationalist bases 2 , was also motivated by the
attitudes of the other extra-national political
parties towards the 'Palestine Problem'.
1 See, pp. lLtj-11t6.
2See Chapter Two pp. 52-63; and Chapter Three,pp.124-143.
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The attitude and the degree of Palestinian
support for the various extra-national political
parties (with the exception of the Pan-Arab ones)
was mainly dependent on the circumstances which,
during the early 1950 t s, accompanied and engulfed
Palestinian life in t exile t , and consequently their
political experience. In this context, as mentioned
earlier, some Palestinians reacted to the Arab defeat
in the l9 !t8-War by preaching the need to return to
the pure and original spirit of Islam as a means of
rebuilding Arab society and purifying it of the
"sins" and "immoralities" imported from the West.
Besides, this move towards Islam was also a reaction
to the role that the Western European countries, the
United States and the Soviet Union had played in the
creation of the State of Israel.
Until the end of 1952, the only Islamic party
operating in the Arab World was the Moslem Brother-
hood Movement (MBM) which originated in Egypt. Thus,
the bulk of the Palestinian members of the MBM were
drawn from among those residing in Egypt, studying
at the Egyptian universities, as well as from the
inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, which was under
Egyptian administration. The increasing popularity
of the Moslem Brotherhood Movement among the Pales-
tinians was noticeable during the period 191t9-1954.
During that period, the MBM was the strongest party
.1in the Gaza Strip . The MBM was also the strongest
lj interview with Zuhair el-Rayyes: Gaza, 14-11-1972;
also see, interviews with, Hamdi Husseini, Hayder
Abedi-Shafi, (for more information on these people
see, Chapter Five, p.246).
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party among thePalestinian students studying in
Egypt during the same period - 1949 - 19541. The
Palestinian members of the MBM played an active role
in the Egyptian struggle for the evacuation of the
British from Egypt. During the period 1950 - 1953,
many Palestinian members of the MBM, among them
Yasser Arafat*, joined the MBM commandos and took
part in many of the sabotage operations which were
carried out inside the British bases in the Suez
2Canal Zone • The popularity of the MBN among the
Palestinians in Egypt and the Gaza Strip was not
paralleled among the Palestinians in the other Arab
States, including the West Bank. This was mainly
due to the fact that, with the exception of the
Egyptian Communist Party, the MBM was the only extra-
national political party in Egypt. Furthermore, the
MBM had been founded and had its headquarters in
Egypt, and it was not surprising that the MBM should
enjoy its maximum power and support from there. More
important, however, was the attitude of the MBM
towards Palestine before and after 1948. The MBM had
consistently adopted the attitude that it was the
duty of all Moslems, wherever they were, to fight for
the "liberation of Palestine", Many members of the
MBM therefore volunteered, before and during 1948, to
fight in Palestine. Although the attitude of the
MBM was motivated by religion, on the grounds that
interview with Shawkat Zaid Kailani:Nablus,30-1l-
1972. S.W.Kailani: born in Nablus in 1929. Studied
in Egypt from 1946-1958. One of the founders of the
Union of Palestine Students and member of its
Executive Committee until 1957. Member of' the Palestine
National Congress of the PLO from 1964-1967.
Leader of Fatah Organization since its emergence in
1965. He is also President of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization.
2	 interview with Shawkat Zaid Kailani, op.cit.
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Palestine was a holy ?"loslem country, nevertheless,
this attitude had the obvious effect of attracting
Palestinian support. In spite of the existence of
the NBM, however a new extra-national religious party
was founded by some Palestinians.
In November 1952, the Islamic Liberation Party
(ILP) was founded in Jordan by a Palestinian
rakiyyidin al-Nabahani'. The platform of the ILP
alled for "the return to the Islamic way of life"
nd "the establishment of' an Islamic state" 2 . It
.lso called for "the struggle against imperialism,
In all its forms, as a means of liberating the Arab
iation from the imperialist political and cultural
lamination" 3 . The means of achieving these aims were
Laid down by the party platform in the form of three
3tages. The first stage was called "Dar al-Arkam" ,
luring which members of the Party were to meet weekly
'to study the Islamic culture and to comprehend the
rue spirit, of Islam" • The second stage was called
'the interaction with the people". During this stage,
!ach member, having passed the first stage, "started
;o preach the general principles of the Party among
;he people" 5 . The third and final stage was called
the acquisition of power". This stage begins when
he Party has grown to such an extent that its
epresentatives in Parliament have become the majority,
Al-Awdah Newspaper. Vol. 1, No. 5 (Amman, 27/11/1952),
p.'.
2Ibd (trans. L.K.)
3lbid.(Trans. L.L.)
1. (trans. L.K.)
5lbid. (trans. L.K.)
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and form the government of the country. The Party
would then be the political organization which would
supervise the governmentts implementation of the
principles and policies of the Party 1 . The spread
of the Islamic Liberation Party, although it was an
extra-national political party, was mainly confined
to Jordan. Besides, it was a short-lived party.
The reasons for this were two-fold: some were related
to the factors and circumstances behind the Pales-
tinian move, in the early 1950 1 s, towards extra-
national religious parties, and the rest were related
to the timing of the emergence of the Islamic Libera-
tion Party and its programme. These reasons, how-
ever, were not limited to the Islamic Liberation
Party, they also involved the Moslem Brotherhood
Movement.
Before 1948, the Palestinians did not have a
religious party of their own 2 . This was because the
Palestinian Pan-Arab attitude was based on nationa-
list rather than religious grounds 3 , because the
political struggle of the Arab Palestinians was
directed against Zionism as a political doctrine,
rather than against the Jews as such and Judaism as
a religion4. The political nature of this struggle
and that against the British Mandate as well meant
that religious differences among the Arab Palestin-
ians were of secondary importance. In the aftermath
'Ibid. (trans. L.K.)
2See, Chapter Two, pp. 485O.
3See, Chapter Two, pp. 52-63.
4See, Chapter Two, pp. 43-45.
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of the 19L18_War, some Palestinians joined the Moslem
Brotherhood Movement and others created the IslamIc
Liberation Party as mediurns through which they could
carry out their political struggle within an Islamic
framework. This current of political thinking was
doomed to failure, ox' more precisely, did not con-
stitute a viable framework for securing the consent
of the majority of the Palestinians. This was due
to three major factors. The t Palestine Problem t is
a political and nationalist problem'. It is, there-
fore, far from being a religious problem, though
it may be considered a political problem with a
religious basis 2 . However, Pan-Arabism, rather than
Islam, constitutes the broad political and nationa-
listic reference point for the Arab people and the
Arab states. Thus, Palestinian attempts to rally
Arab support could not have been successful through
an Islamic frame of political reference, since the
Arab Palestinians were always aware of the important
role of the Arab states in any future battle with
Israel, and in the	 of Palestine". It
was, therefore, inevitable that the early move by
some Palestinians into the extra-national religious
parties was bound to halt, and eventually to recede.
Finally, there is a circumstantial factor which was
not the result of certain political convictions in
which the majority of the Palestinians believed nor
was it tied to the nature of the t Palestine Problemt.
Instead it was the result, on the one hand, of the
1 See, Chapter Two, 90-101.
2For example Zionism.
3See, Chapter Three, pp. 125-143.
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Palestinian adoption of Nasser as the leader of the
Arab World, and as the only Arab leader capable of
leading an all-Arab struggle against Israel, and ,
on the other hand, of the conflict between Nasser
and the Moslem Brotherhood Movement. This state of
affairs between Nasser and the NBM meant that the
lestinians had to choose between Nasser and the
3M. The choice was an easy one for the Palestin-
ns to make, and the year 1951.1 witnessed a very
-iarp decline in the popularity of the MBM among the
iestinians, This was also reflected on other
tra-nationai religious parties 1 . Accordingly, the
rowth of the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP), which
s established in November 1952, was restricted to
ie short span of time which elapsed between November
52 and mid 195k. The attitude of Nasser towards
ie MBM thus led, among other things to the collapse
r the recently established ILP.
ie Palestinians and the Extra-National Communist
rties:
The move, in the early 1950 t s, by some Palestin-
axis towards the extra-national communist parties,
Liough it did not match that towards the extra-
ational religious parties, was also, partially, a
eaction to the outcome of the 19k8-War in Palestine.
Lie Palestinian Communist Party before 19k8 had
ailed for Arab acceptance of the Partition Plan,
and this had resulted, at the time, in a sharp re-
action among the Arab Palestinians against
1The impact of Nasser 1 s attitude on political parties
on the general attitude of the Palestinians will be
dealt with on pp. 162-169.
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the communist parties and the communists. The Arab
Palestinian communists were even labled as "colla-
1borators with the Zionists" . The outcome of the
1948-War however, when compared to the Partition
Plan, was very disadvantageous to the Arab Pales-
tinians, and it thus supported the arguments of the
Arab Palestinian communists, and strengthened the
shaky political position from which they had suffered
before 1948. However, some Palestinians believed
that had the Arab Palestinians accepted the attitude
of the Palestinian Communist Party in endorsing the
Partition Plan, then things would not have been as
bad for the Arabs as they turned out to be. Thus,
this Palestinian reaction led, in the early 1950's,
to a number of Palestinians joining the Arab
communist parties, or at least supporting them. In
Jordan, for example, a group of 22 persons - 16
Palestinians and 6 Transjordanians - applied to the
Jordanian Government, on May 9, 1954, for a license
to form a party under the name of the National Front.
"The majority of the applicants were drawn from among
2the communists or their supporters" . Although this
application was denied, "the Communists and their
supporters continued to preach their doctrine and to
operate under the umbrella of the National Front"3.
In the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Communist Party,
like its Jordanian counterpart, was also in con-
tinuous illegal underground operation. However, the
strength of the communist parties in both Jordan and
the Gaza Strip was never as substantial as that of
the other types of extra-national political parties-
interview with Hamdi Husseini; Gaza, 17/9/1972.
Nadi and Suleiman Nusa, op.cit., p.599.
(trans. L.K.)
3lbid(trans. L.K.)
- 154 -
1the religious and the Pan-Arab • In spite of this,
the Palestinian communists were able to play some
important roles in the Arab communist parties.
During the period 1950-1953, some of the Palestinian
communists residing in Egypt were able to start a
dialogue among the three conflicting Egyptian
ommunist groups and eventually to unite them under
he Egyptian Communist Party 2 . Although the Pales-
binian support for the cominunist parties was never
substantial, such support as there was fluctuated
Ln accordance with the political developments in the
.rab World. Before analyzing some of these politi-
a1 developments and their impact on Palestinian
3upport for the communists, however, the factors
)ehind the absence of substantial support for the
xtra-nationa1 communist parties should be pointed
)ut. Once more, the essence of the tPalestine
rob1em' as a nationalist prohlem, contributed very
riuch to the lack of substantial Palestinian support
or the communist parties, which were class, rather
Lhan nationalist oriented. Moreover, the awareness
unong the Arab Palestinians of the need for Arab
rnpport in any effort towards the 'liberation of
'alestine 3 , on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
bhe anti-communist attitude, at that time, of all
bhe Arab States, meant that the extra-national
ommunist parties were the wrong choice if the
a1estinians wanted to secure Arab support.
1	 .	 ..Interviews with Hamdi Husseini, Hayder Abdel-Shafi,
Farid Abu-Wardah, arid Walid Kamhawi.
2 Interview with Shawkat Zaid Kailani, op.cit.
3See, Chapter Three, pp. 125-11t3.
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Until 1958, Palestinian support for the extra-
national communist parties, insignificant as it was,
fluctuated very much in accordance with political
developments in the Arab World. It increased in the
aftermath of the l968-War, partly as a reaction to
the outcome of the war, and partly as a reaction to
bhe role which the Western European countries and
the U.S.A. played in the creation of the State of
Esrael 1 . This continued until 1953, when the new
gyptian regime banned all political parties. The
Lmpact of this ban was confined to the Palestinians
Lii Egypt and the Gaza Strip. After 1955, with the
)zech Arms Deal with Egypt and Soviet support for
gypt during and after the Suez War of 1956, the
ommunists, in the Arab World at large, gained
nomentum. This continued until the merger of Egypt
nd Syria into the United Arab Republic in February
1958. This merger seemed, at the time, to be the
climax of the struggle for Pan-Arabism and the first
step towards Arab unity. Thus, the nationalist Pan-
rab feeling among the Arabs seemed to sky rocket
Leaving all other doctrines behind, including
ommunism. The final blow to Communism in the Arab
or1d, and especially among the Palestinians, came
at the end of 1958, when the communists in Iraq
gained influence under the regime of Abdel Karim
assem, and massacred all the nationalist forces in
LAlthough the Soviet Union played a role in the
creation of the State of Israel, Arabs, at that time,
were either unaware of this role, or gave it secon-
dary importance to the role played by the West,whom
they considered to be their friend, and with whom
they officially sided during the Second World War,
and under whose mandate and supervision, the process
of creating the State of Israel was initiated and
completed.
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Iraq, including members of the Ba t th Party, the Arab
Nationalist Movement and the pro-Nasser elements.
These massacres, which invited Nasserts bitter attack
and strained his relations with the Soviet Union,had
an immense impact on the Arabs, and in particular
the Palestinians, and Palestinian support for the
extra-national communist parties diminished quite
considerably and has not revived. Moreover, the
banning, in 1957, by the Jordanian regime, of all
political parties, and its persistent liquidation of
the remnants of the Jordanian Communist Party, which
was predominantly Palestinian, greatly contributed
to the collapse of Palestinian support for the
communist parties, which came about by the end of
1958.
The Palestinians and the Extra-National Pan-Arab
Political Parties:
Given their Pan-Arab tradition, the majority of
the Palestinians who were quick to comprehend the
importance of the role which the Arab States and the
Arab people could play in the t liberation of Pales-
tine t , found the adoption of Pan-Arabism the most
logical and viable framework for their political
activities. The existence of the Arab Baith
Socialist Party, which was established in 1947, and
See, Chapter Three, pp. 125-143.
*1	 . .Originally, it was called the Arab Ba t th Party.
However, it came to be known as the Arab Batth
Socialist Party after its merger with the Arab
Socialist Party in 1954.
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which was the only Pan - Arab political party
operating in the Arab world in the aftermath of
the l9L8 - War, facilitated the expression of this
Palestinian conviction.
The Al-Ba t th Party came into existence in
19 1t7, that is, before the Ax'ab defeat in the 19 1t8-
War in Palestine had taken place, and before the
emergence of the State of Israel. The emergence
of the Al-Ba t th Party was therefore neither a
result of' the t Palestine Problem 1 , nor was its
ideology conditioned by it. However, the Palestine
Problem t had two major effects on the Arab Batth
Socialist Party. First, the occurance of the Arab
Itragedyfl in Palestine served as a live example
of the credibility and the correctness of the new
line of political thinking and analysis which was
initiated by the Al-Ba t th Party, and which con-
stituted a rejection of the state of affairs
prevailing in the Arab World at that time. This
rejection was mainly directed at the phony
independence of some Arab States who were still
tied to the colonial powers by all sorts of
treaties, and who had to pay for this phony
independence the high price of endorsing the
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division of the Arab world into different states"1.
Secondly, "the tragedy in Palestine showed what a
serious effect the lack of Arab unity could have. The
tragedy in Palestine thus enhanced the importance
of Arab unity among the Arab masses. This promoted
the spread of the A1Ba ! th Party, with its great
emphasis on Pan-Arabism and Arab unity, among the
Arab masses"2.
1An interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu Maizer:Jerusalem,
12/11/1972. (trans..L.K.) A.M. Abu-Maizer; Born in
Hebron in 1931. Joined Al-B&th Party while studying
for his Law Degree in Cairo in 1951. Graduated in
Law in 1954 and was elected a member of the Munici-
pal Council of Jerusalem in 1955. In 1956 he was
the Secretary of the Al_Ba t th Party branch in the
Jerusalem District. In 1957-1958 he went under-
ground because he was wanted by the Jordanian
security forces. Eventually he went to Syria
After the merger of Egypt and Syria in February
1958 he worked as editior of the "Al-Wanda" News-
paper. During the period 1960-1962 he was editor-
in-chief of the Party t s daily newspaper in Lebanon
"Al-Sahafah". During the period mid 1963-1965, and
after Al-Ba t th came to power in Syria through a
military coup, he became the editor-in-chief of the
Party t s official newspaper in Syria Al_Batth"
During the same period, he was the Chairman of the
Syrian delegation of the Congress of Arab Journal-
ists and he was elected Assistant Secretary-General.
He was also a member of the Syrian delegation to
the Conference of Non-aligned States held in 1964
in Cairo. Since 1963 he has participated in all
the regional and national congresses of Al-Batth
Party. In 19611, he was a member of the committee
which drafted the temporary constitution of Syria.
In 1965 a general amnesty for political criminals
was declared by the Jordanian regime and to re-
turned to Jerusalem. In December 1973, he was
deported from the Vest Bank by the Israeli
authorities. Shortly afterwards, he was elected
a member of the Executive Committee of the PLO.
interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer.(Trans.L.K.)
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In this context, the 'Palestine Problem t had an
indirect, though positive, impact on the Al.Batth
Party. The Palestinians themselves had a more
direct impact on the Al-Ba'th Party. The Palestin-
ians, in their search for a political catalyst and
shelter, found one (among others) in the Al-Batth
Party which, as a newly emerging party, was pure of
the "sins" committed by the other older political
parties and Arab regimes which had witnessed and
participated, whether directly or indirectly, in the
flaking of the Arab t tragedy t in Palestine. Moreover,
the emergence of Al-Ba t th Party "as the spearhead of
the new rejection-front of the existing political
1Drder in the Arab World" was received positively by
the Palestinians. This was in conformity with the
Palestinian outlook - both the Palestinians t tra-
litional Pan-Arab attitude 2 and their condemnation
and rejection of the political, social and economic
)rder in the Arab World at the time of the
Ucatastrophe3.
The political vacuum which the Palestinians ex-
perienced in the aftermath of the l9L8 - War was
partially filled by their early move into the Al-
Ba t th Party. The Party, until 1952, provided, in
terms of its ideology and orientation, the only
organized popular Pan-Arab channel through which
the Palestinians could freely, without any legal or
other obstacles such as those imposed by some Host-
States 4, express themselves and take part in
1lbid. (trans. L. K. )
2See Chapter Two, pp. 52-63.
3See, pp . 125-143.
4See, Chapter Two, pp. 76-82.
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political activities.
By the end of 1952, a new extra-national Pan-Arab
political party was formed by some Palestinian and
Arab intellectuals under the name of Harakat al-
Qawmiyyin al-Arab (The Arab Nationalist Movement),
with a Palestinian - George Habash - as its Secre-
tary General • The motto of the Arab Nationalist
Movement (ANM) was "Unity, Liberation and Revenge",
and needless to say its platform stressed the ideals
of Arab unity and the t liberation t of Palestine as
exhibited in the motto. The ideology and the strategy
of the ANN was not as coherent as that of A1-Ba1th
Party, and it also lacked a broad programme of
action. The approach of the founders of the ANN in
formulating the strategy of the Party was "selective":
"they chose the best attribute of the A1_Ba t th Party,
i.e., politics; the best attribute of the communists,
i.e., organization; the best attribute of the armed
trugg1e, i.e., militancy, and they made out of all
bhese the strategy of the Arab Nationalist Movement.
[n doing so, the founders of the Arab Nationalist
4ovement did not introduce basic solutions to the
)roblems confronting the Arab World, including the
1Palestine Problemt "
An interview with Ghassan Kanafani: Beirut,19/5/1972.
(trans.L.K.). Ghassan Kanafani: Born in Acre in Pale-
stine. Joined the ANM in 1954.. Worked as teacher in
Kuwait and was in charge of the Party newspaper Al-
Fajr. Between 1961-1964, the Party assigned him to
work for its official newspaper in Beirut- Al-
Hurriyyah. From 1964-1967, the Party assigned him
to supervise a Nasserite newspaper in Beirut called
Al-Muharrer. After the formation of the PFLP, he
became editor -in-chief of its magazine Al-Hadaf
and its spoksman. He was assasinated in Beirut in
July, 1972.
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The founding of the ANM in 1952 at a time when
another Pan-Arab party, namely the Al-Ba t th , was
operating raised many questions as to the wisdom of
having more than one Pan-Arab party, leading to the
fragmentation of the Pan-Arab forces in the Arab
World. In answer to such questions, the ANN leaders
argued that the Palestine Problem t was not the
central and most important issue in the Al-Batth
thinking and strategy, and that the ANN, with its
primary daily preoccupation with the tPalestine
Problem thus provided "the right approach to the
.rab struggle for liberation and unity" 1 . Moreover,
bhe founders of the ANN stressed that, "unlike the
Il_Ba I th Party, the organizational aspect of the
:ANM) Party heirarchy enjoyed a primary importance"2.
LS a result, the ANN was "more capable of attracting
'alestinian support than the other political parties"3.
Fowever, the "selective" nature of ANN strategy
esu1ted in many radical changes in its political
olour-from a nationalist Pan-Arab anti-socialist
arty from 1952 to 1958, to a nationalist Pan-Arab
ocialist party from 1958 to 1967, and to a Marxist-
eninist party since 1967.
he Palestinians, Nasser and The Arab Ba t th Socialist
arty , A Brief Case Study
This section will be devoted to a study of the
ttitude of Nasser towards political parties, the
attitude of the Palestinians to Nasser, and the
'Ibid. (trans. L.K.)
2Ibd (trans. L.K.)
3lbid. (trans. L.K.)
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triangular relationship. This study will be conduc-
ted through a brief case-study of the relationship
between the Palestinians and the Ba t th Party, the
Palestinians and Nasser, and Nasser and the Batth
Party.
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, which officially
ame into being on April 4, l9 I 7 in Damascus, was
the first organized translation of Pan-Arabism into
1the form of a political party . The Party motto
unity, freedom and 	 The Party-
onstitution spelled out the nature and the aims of
the Al-Ba t th Party as being "an all-Arab nationalist
party" with branches in every Arab country, which
alled for the unity of Arab land into "one mdi-
irisible political and economic unit", and "the unity
Df the Arab nation into one cultural unit"3.
The period 1 949- 1 95 8 witnessed the zenith of the
3pread of Al-Ba'th Party membership among the Pales-
tinian masses. Indeed, the Palestinians had a pro-
f'ound impact, both positively and negatively, on the
rowth and influence of the Al-Ba 2 th Party. On many
ccassions they were able to move the entire Party
policy in one direction or the other. The earliest
nd one of the most important initiatives in this
iirection took place in 1953. During that year, the
rirst contact between the new Egyptian regime and
the Al_Ba r th Party took place. No such contact had
been made before although "the Al-Bath Party had
taken a great interest in the Egyptian coup because
1	 .Interviews with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer; also see,
an interview with lyad Alami: Nablus, 10 October 1972.
2__ i d.
interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer.(trans,L.K.)
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of its declared six principles, which had indicated
that the Egyptian coup was no ordinary coup like
that, for example, of Husni El_Zaim Z s coup in 19119
in Syria, but rather one with the potential of a
revolution. Moreover, the Al-Ba'th took a deep
interest in the Arab-face of the Egyptian coup as
rojected by Nasser in his book "the Philosophy of
he Revolution" 1 . The initiative in arranging for
he first meeting between the Al-Ba'th leadership
nd the new Egyptian leaders was taken by the
ommand of the Cairo Branch of the Al-Ba'th Party.
t that time, the Cairo Branch of the Al-Ba'th Party
as composed of students who came mainly from Pales-
me, Syria and Jordan, with only two or three
gyptian students 2 . The Command of the Cairo
ranch was composed of five persons - three Palestin-
ans*, one Transjordanian and one Syrian; the leader
f the Command being one of the Palestinians • The
eeting took place in 1953, when Mohammad Naguib was
till serving as the figurehead of the new Egyptian
egime. At the meeting, which took place of the
eadquarters of the Al-Gamhuriyyah Newspaper in
ileiman Pasha Street in Cairo, the Egyptian Regime
as represented by three of its senior members. They
ere: Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Salah Salem.
ie A1-Ba'th Party was also represented by three of its
mior leaders. They were: Michel Aflaq (Secretary
nera1 of the Party - a Syrian), Munif Razzaz (a
ansjordanian), and Abdallah Rimawi (A Palestinian)I1.
interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer.(trans.LK.).
They were Hassan El-Wazayfi, Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer
and lyad Alami.
UHe was Hassan El-Wazayfi.
interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer; also see,
an interview with lyad Alami.
11lbid.
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This meeting marked the beginning of a long relation-
ship between Nasser and the Al-Ba t th Party, a rela.-
tionship which was destined to play an important role
in shaping political developments in the Arab World.
Following this meeting, there were frequent visits by
Ba t thi leaders to Egypt, and constant contact with
Lie Egyptian leaders through which "the unity of
truggle between Al-Ba'th Party and the Egyptian
evolution" was maintained1 . This "unity of struggle"
as manifested in the various battles which the
gyptian Revolution fought against the Baghdad Pact;
he Western Arms embargo; the nationalization of the
uez Canal Company; the Suez War of 1956; The
isenhower Doctrine; and the fight against colonia-
.ism and imperialism2 . "The successes which were
tchieved by the unity of struggle between the Egypt-
..an Revolution and the progressive popular movements
n the Arab World, which were spearheaded by the Al-
3a t th Party, played a major role in making the
Leadership of the Egyptian Revolution aware of the
Lmportance of the unity of its struggle with the
Dther Arab popular movements. Subsequently, the
Pan-Arab orientation of the Egyptian Revolution
gained momentum and manifested itself in the many
battles which the Egyptian Revolution fought against
Arab reactionism and feudalism, and against various
imperialist plans such as the Baghdad Pact and the
EisenhLower Doctrine. Moreover, the participation of
the Arab masses and their massive support of Egypt
during the 1956 War promoted the Arab character of
Egypt as well as Nasser t s belief in the importance
1lbid.(trans. L. K. )
2.Ibid.
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of the unity of the Arab struggle against imperia-
1lism"
The Suez War of 1956 was a turning point in Arab
politics. The Israeli attack on Egypt and its
occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip
provided, for the first time since 1 9 49, "a practical
example of' Israeli expansionist tendencies and of
their colonial ambitions which transecended their
Doundaries as laid down by the Armistice agreements.
rhis helped to boost the Arab struggle against Israel.
rhe Suez War proved that Israeli ambitions were not
onfined to Mandatory Palestine alone, but extended
10 parts of the Arab states neighbouring Palestine"2.
thus, the Suez War gave substance to the earlier
Palestinian call for an all-Arab struggle against
[srael on the grounds that its existence "constitutes
i threat to the neighbouring Arab states", and that
my Arab move in that direction was one of self-
lefence and self-preservation3.
The success of Nasser in tackling the Suez War
md its outcome made him, not only the undisputed
iero of the Palestinians, but also of the Arabs in
eneral. The aftermath of the Suez War was there-
'ore bound to leave its mark on the political
ievelopments in the Arab World, and on the political
mttitudes and affiliations of the Palestinians. For
Ihe first time since 1949, the Palestinians had a
interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer.(trans.L.K.)
2 interview with Salah Beitar: Beirut, 9/6/1972.
(trans. L.K.) Salah Beitar: He was one of the founders
of the Arab Ba r th Socialist Party. Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Syria in 1957, and Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs of the U.A.R. during the
period 1958-1959. He was Prime Minister of Syria
between 1963-1965.
3See, Chapter Three, pp. 125-143.
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stronger alternative than the Pan-Arab or the extra-
national political parties at large, to which they
could turn. Nasser was that alternative. In giving
their support to any political party, the Pales-
tinians were mainly motivated by the capability of
this or that party to serve their 'cause 1 and to
eventually help in 'liberating Palestine'. Such an
assessment was based on many factors which included
Ihe ideology and political orientation of the party,
its size and capabilities, and its prospects of
raining power and consequently of mobilizing, once
Ln power, tools of state in the direction of
r ilberating Palestine'. Until the rise in the
)opularity of Nasser after 1956, Al-Ba'th had pro-
rjded the best alternative for the Palestinians.
.fter 1956, however, Nasser provided a better choice
or the Palestinians. This was due to a variety of
actors. First, after 1956, Nasser's concern about
he 'Palestine Problem', as a result of the Israeli
.ttack on Egypt, became evident. Secondly, Nasser
as the only Arab leader to have fought a war with
srael since the l9k8-1949 War. Thirdly, unlike
he Al-Ba'th Party, or any other extra-national
arty, Nasser was already in power. Fourthly, Nasser
as the ruler of the largest Arab State, whose
eading role in any future 'battle' with Israel was
ever denied by any Arab, including the Palestinians.
t was realistic therefore that the aftermath of the
956 War should witness a basic shift in Pales-
tinian political support towards Nasser. Thus,
the attitude of Nasser towards any political party
or issue was of significant importance. It was
bound to condition and to affect the attitude of the
majority of Palestinians towards such a party of issue.
-167-
The negative attitude of Nasser towards political
parties was clear from the early days of the Egyp-
tian t Revolution 1 . Until 1956, Nasserts negative
attitude towards political parties had no signifi .
-cant bearing outside Egypt because his role as the
leader of the Arab world had not yet crystalized, or
more precisely, had not yet been recognized.
Until 1958, that is, until the merger of Egypt
and Syria into the United Arab Republic, (u.A.R.),
there was no basic contradiction between Nasser and
the A1-Ba'th Party, since both adopted similar
political stands on the basic political issues con-
fronting the Arab world at that time; such issues
were independence and the struggle against imperia-
lism and colonialism in all their forms, aswell as
the call for Pan-Arabism and Arab unity. Moreover,
the authority of each did not overlap in any area
since the Al-Ba t th did not operate among the
Egyptians. Furthermore, until 1958, the Al_Batth
did not form the ruling party in any Arab State.
kccordingly, during the period 1956-1958, relations
between Nasser and the Al-Ba'th Party were good, or
at least were not strained. Hence, the Palestinians
were able to combine both, membership of the Al-
J3a 1 th Party, and support for Nasser. It was, there-
fore, this period stretching from 1 949- 1 95 8 , which
witnessed no serious obstacles to the spread of the
A1-Bath Party amongst the Palestinian masses.
However, the period 1956-1958, which witnessed the
emergence of Nasser as the leader of the Arab World,
also witnessed a decrease in the number of Pales-
tinians willing to join any political party, includ-
ing the A1-Ba t th . They preferred to support
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Nasser instead1 . This, however, did not affect, by
and large, the attitude of the Palestinians who were
already members of the AlBa t th Party2.
In conducting their political activities, and in
rendering their political support, the Palestinians
ere motivated by their own nationalistic cause of
iberating Palestine. Although one can safely say
hat, in so doing, the majority of the Palestinians
rnbarked on the Pan-Arab approach, yet, there were
oves by other Palestinians towards the extra-national
eligious and communist approaches. Indeed, there
ere shifts in the Palestinians t attitude during the
950's, but they were within the Pan-Arab approach
rid not away from it. The Palestinian move towards
asser after 1956 was, in fact, the most important
evelopment in Palestinian affairs during the late
950's and early 1960's. However, the majority of
he Palestinians did not thereby compromise the Pan-
rab approach, but rather changed the means of
truggle within the Pan-Arab approach. In other
ords, instead of conducting their struggle through
opular Pan-Arab political parties, the Palestinians
ather preferred to conduct their struggle through
asser, whose regime was identified after 1956 by
he majority of the Palestinians with the'liberation
1' Palestinet.
1lnterviews with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer and lyad
Alami.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN:
A Case Study, 1949 - 1967
how peaceful Jordan was when I was
a little boy. A smiling country, con-
tent to be left alone, its people
worked hard, worshipped God, obeyed
the laws, and asked for nothing more
than a life that should end with a
blessed place in Paradise", 1-
(King Hussein of Jordan)
The roots of the Palestinian-Transjordanian rela-
tions during the period 1949-1967 can be found in
the circumstances which had led to the unification
)f the West Bank and Transjordan, under the Hashemite
Cingdom of Jordan, during the formative period of
L948-1950. As we shall see, this relationship was
haracterized by a mutual mistrust2.
'he Formative Period: the Unification of the West
'ank and Transjordan, 1948 - 1950.
In the period stretching from October 1, 1948 to
pril 13, 1950 a variety of events took place which
ed to the unification of the West Bank and Trans-
ordan into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
1H.M. King Hussein of Jordan. Uneasy Lies the Head:
An Autobiography ( London : Heinemann, 1962 ),
pp. 2-3.
Madi and SuleimanMusa. The History of Jordan
in the Twentieth Century (Amman, 1959), p.550.
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No detailed account has been given about the
process of this unity. However, according to the
available information*, the first public move to-
wards unity came on October 1, 1948 during a con-
ference held in the Philadelphia Hotel in Amman
under the chairmanship of a Palestinian journalist
from Jaffa called Sheikh Suleiman Taji Farouki)
The Amman Conference was held with the "blessings"
of the Transjordanian Government and the Palestinian
2Ahrar (Liberal)	 Party . Two months later, on
December 1, 1948, a conference was held in Jericho
(the West Bank) to discuss the unification of the
West Bank and Transjordari. The Jericho Conference,
which was "master-minded" and "organized" by the
rransjordanian Government with the active support of
the Ahrar (Liberal) Party, was attended by approxi-
nately 1000 delegates3.
Unless otherwise specified, this information is
based on the following interviews:
- An interview with Arif El-Arif: Jerusalem,
12 November 1972.
- An interview with Mustafa El-Taher : Nablus,
20 October 1972
- An interview with Naim Tuqan: Nablus ,
19 September 1972.
- An interview with Hikmat Masri : Nablus,
23 November 1972
- An interview with Walid Karrthawi: Nablus,
19 December 1972.
Interviews with Mustafa El-Taher and Naim Thqan;also
see, Munib Madi and Suleiman Nusa, op.cit, p.535.
See Chapter Two, pp. 48-50.
2lnterviews with Naim Tuqan and Mustafa E1-Taher(both
Tuqan and El-Taher were present at the Jericho con-
ference. El-Taher attended only in his capacity as a
journalist and as war correspondent for Reuter).
3Arif El-Arif. The Tragedy In Palestine, op.cit.,
Vol. IV, p. 877.
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The majority of these delegates were "forced"
to attend the Conference "irrespective of their
wishes". The Military Governors of the West Bank
received explicit instructions from the Transjor-
danian Government "to arrange for as many Pales-
tinian village-mayors (Mukhtars) and local notables
as possible to attend the Jericho Conference, and
1to force those who decline".	 The Transjordanian
Government instructions provided, too, for free
2transport to Jericho for all the delegates.	 The
Conference was presided over by Sheikh Mohammad
All Jaabari, Mayor of Hebron, and was supervised
by Umar Pasha Matar, the then Transjordanian General
Military Governor of the West Bank.
On the eve of the same day, December 1, l9l8,
the delegates to the Jericho Conference voted in
favour of a resolution which called, among other
things, for "the unity between Palestine and Trans-
jordan as a step towards a total Arab unity". The
Resolution also stressed "the unity of the whole
of Palestine", and "the necessity of speeding up
the repatriation or compensation of the Palestine
refugees". The Conference declared that it
"acknowledges His Majesty King Abdullah as the King
of the whole of Palestine"3.
interview with Arif El-Arif. (El-Arif was the
Military Governor of Ramallah in December l9Zi8. He
received such instructions and refused to implement
them. Subsequently, he resigned from his post);
also see, an interview with Mustafa El-Taher.
(trans L.K.).
2lbid
Sheikh Jaabari was the only Palestinian city mayor
to attend.
3Ministry of National Guidance of U.A.R.(ed).Documents
And Papers On the Palestine Question: 637-1949(Cairo:
State Information Service,1969),Doc.No.227,p.965.
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On January 1, 1949 another conference was held
in Nablus. The membership of this conference was
confined to the notables of Nablus, and was presid-
ed over by the Mayor of Nablus, Suleiman Tuqan.
Unlike the Jericho Conference, the Nablus Conference
did not claim the right to represent all the Pales-
tinians, but merely the inhabitants of the District
of Nablus'. The idea behind the Nablus Conference
was "to counteract the impact of the Jericho Con-
ference which was designed to give King Abdullah a
freehand in the West Bank through its pre-fabricated
and unconditional endorsement of the unity between
the West Bank and Transjordan. Accordingly, we had
to speed up the holding of the Nablus Conference in
order to put conditions for the unity, and also to
overshadow the shameful pre-fabricated resolutions
of the Jericho Conference"2.
The Nablus Conference expressed explicitly,
through both the speeches of its members and its
resolutions, that although it approved of the
unification, its acknowledgement of King Abdullah as
King of Transjordan and "Palestine" was conditional
upon "the undertaking by King Abdullah to work for
Nablus is the biggest city in the West Bank. It
is famous for the political activism of its
inhabitants.
1	 *Interviews with Naim Thqan and Hikmat Masri. (both
were among the participants in Nablus Conference).
2	 .	 .An interview with Hikmat Masri (trans. L.K.)also
see, interviews with Naim Tuqan and Mustafa El-
Taher.
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the liberation of the occupied parts of Palestine".
When the Conferees presented their resolution of
"conditional acknowledgement" to King Abdullah, he
refused it on the grounds that "Kings do not accept
2
conditions" • The conferees did not attempt to
withdraw their "conditional acknowledgement" nor did
they make a big issue out of it because, one of the
conferees said, "although we were aware of the im-
portance of the conditional acknowledgement, we did
not want to put obstacles on the road to unity
through insisting on certain conditions which, if
accepted, might simply remain on paper and never be
put into practice"3.
The aftermath of the Jericho Conference had
occasioned a split in the attitude of the Palestin-
ians. Three schools of thought emerged. The first
school expressed its support of the Conference and
its resolutions on the grounds that the remaining
parts of Palestine under Arab control, "can not
stand, alone, on their own feet", and that the best
solution to the immediate difficult problems con-
fronting the Palestinians in the West Bank lay in
unity with Transjordank. The second school of
thought expressed its resentment on the grounds that
the representative capacity of the Jericho Conference
was too small to decide "the destiny of the country".
Besides, the Palestinian people, at that time
'An interview with Naim Thqan (trans. L.K.) also see,
interviews with Hikmat Masri and Mustafa El-Taher.
2	 .	 .	 .Interviews with Naim Tuqan and Hikmat Masri.
3An interview with Naim Tuqan.(trans. L.K.)
Arif El-Arif. The Tragedy In Palestine. op.cit.,
Vol. IV, p. 878.
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dispersed, humiliated and completely lost, were in
no position to express their opinion "freely and
frankly" 1 . According to this school, although
unification was "indispensable", and provided the
"best solution to the problems of the Arab-controll-
ed parts of Palestine", yet, "such a step did not
come from the people as a whole"2.
"The representative capacity of the Jericho
Conference was so narrow to the extent
that it might not have represented even
the people of Jericho themselves"3.
The third school of thought stressed that "Palestine
is for the Palestinians", and that no one should
attempt to decide its destiny through "pre-fabirca-
ted" conferences like the Jericho Conference.
According to this school, the destiny of Palestine
should be decided through a referendum, in which
every Palestinian, wherever he might be, could
participate. Such a referendum was to be conducted
under the supervision of a committee to be selected
by the Council of the Arab League, and on which
every Arab State, including the Palestinians, should
be represented.
In spite of these differences, there was a
general feeling among the Palestinians of the non-
viability of the West Bank as an independent state5.
i d.
2Walid Kamhawi, op.cit., pp. l31-132.(trans.L.K.)
3An interview with Naim Puqan.(trans. LSK.)
kArif El-Arif, op.cit., p.878.
5lnterviews with Arif El-Arif, Mustafa El-.Taher,
Naim Thqan, Hikmat Masri and Valid Kamhawi.
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This appreciaiioi of the need for unity did not
indicate a Palestinian preference for unification
with Transjordan. In contradistinction, before the
withdrawal of the Egyptian army from Hebron, there
was a Palestinian preference for unification with
Egypt, rather than Transjordan 1 . The roots of this
ttitude lay in the poor relations which had existed
etween King Abdullah and the Palestinians before
rid in the aftermath of the 1911.8 War. The Palestin-
2ans viewed King Abdullah as a "British puppet"
esides, the Palestinians had a strong belief that
ing Abdullah would not hesitate to take any measure
hich would enable him to annex any Palestinian
erritory to his Kingdom3.
Accordingly, they accused King Abdullah of send-
rig his army to Palestine not to t fight the Zionists,
i.it rather to gain a foothold in Palestine as a step
owards annexing whatever territory in Palestine he
ight manage to control 4 . In this context, many
alestinians often refered to the responsibility of
he Transjordanian regime for "surrendering" some
alestinian territories to the Israeli forces with-
ut a fight despite the fact that such territories
krif El-Arif: Unpublished Documents; also see,
Walid Kamhawi, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 131-132.
Interviews with Mustafa El-Taher, Valid Kamhawi and
Hamdi Husseini: Gaza, 17 Sept. 1972.
3lbid.
4lbid., also see, Nicola Eddurr. Hakaza Daat Wa
1-lakaza Ta'ud: Saut al-Naft Wa al-Madf'a Fi Tahrir
Filastin (How It Was Lost And How It Would Be Regained:
The Role of Oil and Arms in the Liberation of Palestine),
2nd ed., (Beirut: Dar al-Hawadeth, 1964),pp, 103-119.
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were under Arab control. A reference is often made
by many Palestinian to Sir John Bagot Glubb t s book
A Soldier With The Arabs ,,l, which confirms the
early Palestinian suspicion of the Transjordanian
Regime and the role played by that regime in worsen-
ing Arab losses in Palestine. In his book, Glubb
exposes the T'ansjordanian Government's deal with
the British not to attack the parts of Palestine
allocated to the Jews . according to the 1947 U.N.
Partition Plan, and to occupy only the parts
allocated to the Arabs, with the aim of annexing
them to Transjordan 2 . Furthermore, Palestinians
often refer to King Abdu1lahs abandonment of the
Arab held towns of Lod and Ramleh, and his generous
concessions to the Israelis during the Rhodes
Armistice Talks, which led to the loss of the
fertile Muthallath (Triangle) Area to the Israelis.
The Palestinian reaction to what they called " the
treason of King Abdullah " was immediate and violent.
"The Director of the Arab Broadcasting
Service in Ramallah, Mr. Azmi Nashashibi,
described with affection and pain, the
scene on that scornful day-the flight
of the inhabitants of Lod and Ramleh
who were condemning and damning King
Abdullah. King Abdullah reacted by
ordering that Mr. Nashashibi be
cashiered as Brigadier and be sacked
from his job as Director of the Broad-
casting Service"3.
Bagot Glubb. A Soldier With The Arabs (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pp. 63-67.
2lbid.,Also see, Hazza Majali, op.cit., p.64.
3Mohammad Nimr Al-Hawwari
	 p. cit., p. 258.( trans .L.K.)
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The attitude of the Jordanian Regime in the
Rhodes Armistice Talks, strained still further the
relations between the Palestinians and the Hashemite
Regime in Jordan. In this context, Hikmat Masri
told the writer that in 1950, the Palestinian MPs.
raised the issue of Al-Muthallath in Parliament.
"The Jordanian Parliament discussed the
Muthallath problem in camera. Tawfiq Abul-
Huda** confessed that he was responsible
and that he had no other choice but to
agree to surrender the area to the Israelis.
Abul-Huda confessed too, that King Abdullah
had contacts and meetings with the Israeli
leaders in Shunah	 and in other places ,
which resulted in the signing of the Rhodes
Agreement. As a matter of fact, King
Abdullah wanted the Palestinians to take
part in the Rhodes Talks, but Abul-Huda
refused and told the King that they (the
Palestinians) were disruptive and would
cause the failure of the Talks if they were
allowed to participate. However, if the
Palestinians were allowed to take part in
the talks, things might have not been as
catastrophic as they turned out to be.
Hikmat Masri: Born in Nablus in 1907. He was MP
for Nablus from 1950-1957; Minister of Agriculture
1953-1954; Speaker of The Parliament: 1952-1953,56-57;
President of The Palestinian National Congress
1964-1967.
UTawfig Abul-Huda: He was the Prime Minister of
Transjordan during the 1948-War, and during the
Rhodes Armistice Talks. He committed suicide in
1956.
small town in Transjordan. It was the winter
resort of King Abdullah.
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This is why we, the Palestinians and the
Palestinian MPs, were always seeking
and fighting those who were behind the
Rhodes Agreement, whether it was Abul-Huda
or anybody else, in order to punish them
for what they did"1.
It was, therefore, against this background of
Palestinian mistrust, hatred and bitterness towards
bhe Transjordanian Regime, and the determination of
bhe Transjordanian Regime to annex whatever territo-
ry in Palestine it had under its control, that the
inification of Transjordan and the West Bank took
place. From the viewpoint of the Transjordanian
regime, the unification of the West Bank and Trans-
jordan constituted the achievement of a long sought
ifter goal 2 . The question which remains to be
nswered centres on the justifications and arguments
behind the agreement of the West Bank inhabitants to
this unity, taking into account their attitude to-
qards the Transjordanian Regime.
Interviews with many of the Palestinian leaders
qho were either directly involved or had witnessed
this unification, have provided an overview of the
arguments of the Vest Bank inhabitants for consent-
ing to unite the West Bank and Transjordan. These
arguments run as follows:
interview with Hikmat Masri (trans. L.K.); also
see, Hazza Majali, op.cit., pp. 90-93.
2Memoirs of King Abdullah, op.cit., pp. 20k-282; also
see, John Bagot Glubb, op.cit., pp. 62-76; George
Lenczowski. The Middle East In World Affairs, 3rd.
ed. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962),
pp. 452-453.
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First, with the commencement of hostilities in
Palestine and following the termination of
the British Mandate, there was a total
collapse in Arab Palestine. This collapse
was mainly due to the non-existence of an
Arab Palestinian government or central
authority, similar to the Jewish Agency,
which would fill the political and adminis-
trative vacuum caused by the withdrawal of
the British Mandate 1 . This situation, in
the Arab-held territories of Palestine, did
not alter after the termination of the hosti-
lities, and it was therefore, inevitable
that the Transjordanian Government, as the
military authority in the West Bank, would
fill the administrative vacuum. In its
capacity as the unchallenged authority in
the West Bank (due to the non-existence of
a Palestinian alternative), the Trans-
Jordanian Government embarked on a policy
through which it could achieve its goal of
annexing the West Bank to Transjordan "as
an opening phase of the Greater Syria plan"2.
Second, the West Bank was militarily vulnerable and
it had no means of defending itself against
any "possible Israeli	 The in-
habitants of the West Bank thought that
their security problem could only be solved
through the annexation of the West Bank by
1lnterviews with Arif El-Arif, Naim Thqari, Hikmat
Masri, Mustafa El-Taher and Valid Kamhawi.
2George Lenczowski, çp.cit., pp. 152_453.
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/another Arab country whose army could help in
defending the.West Bank. In this context,
Transjordan was the only alternative.
"I used to believe that the unification of
the West Bank and Transjordan constituted
the best way to save the remaining parts
of Palestine under the Transjordanian
control. This was due to the fact that
Transjordan had an army, government,
administration and enjoyed the protection
of Britain under the terms of the Anglo-
Transj ordanian Treaty"1.
ird, the Transjordanian Government offered senior
governmental and administrative posts to some
leading Palestinians as a means towards gain-
ing their support for the unification of' the
West Bank and Transjordan 2 . In this context,
a leading role in formulating this unity was
played by some Palestinian leaders who could
see that the future power in the West Bank
would be the Transjordanian regime, and that
the promotion of their personal interests
and influence necessitated their cooperation
with the Transjordanian regime. The incidents
which had led to and accompanied the Jericho
and Nablus Conferences indicate the importance
of the role played by some Palestinian leaders
in formulating the policy of unifying the West
Bank and Transjordan3.
interview with Hikmat Masri.(trans. L.K.)
2lnterviews with Walid Kamhawi and Mustafa El-Taher.
3lnterviews with Hikmat Masri, Naim Tuqan and Mustafa
El-.Taher,
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Fourth, there was a massive need in the West Bank for -
food and shelter. This massive need was ex-
ploited by the Transjordanian regime as a
means of "exerting pressure" and practicing
"favouritism" in such a way as to give its
supporters among the Palestinians easy access
to cheap food and shelter, thus increasing
the influence of its supporters among the
Palestinians, and consequently promoting the
influence of the Transjordanian regime itself1.
11th, in the aftermath of the Arab defeat and the
dismemberment of Palestine, the Palestinian
masses were in a state of shock. They were
"dominated by a sense of loss and bewildered
by the uncertainty of their present or
future" 2 . This state-of-affairs resulted in
the paralysis of political interest among
the Palestinian masses, as their concern
centred mainly on securing food and shelter,
and consequently they could not afford the
luxury of indulging in political questions
like unification with Transjordan3 . This
had the effect of giving the Transjordanian
regime, with the help of some Palestinian
leaders a free hand in carrying out the
implementation of unity.
ixth, under the circumstances of the West Bank
whereby Palestinians could neither protect
1lnterviews with Mustafa El-Taher, Walid Kamhawi and
Naim Tuqan.
2 interview with Walid Kamhawi.(trans. L.K.)
3lnterviews with Naim Thqan, Arif El-Arif, Hikmat !4asri,
Walid Kamhawi and Mustafa El-Taher.
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themselves, nor establish a viable state of
their own, and in an environment in which
the continued existence of the Transjordan-
Ian presence in the West Bank was inevitable,
it was better for the Palestinians to be
partners with the Transjordanians, than to
be administered by them 1 . However, many
Palestinians believed that, in spite of all
the circumstances, such unity should not be
"unconditional" and that the Transjordanian
Regime should undertake, in return for this
unification, "to mobilize all its resources
for liberating the occupied parts of Pales-
tine" 2 . Hence, King Abdullah was for this
reason acknowledged, by the Palestinians,
as the King of "whole of Palestine"3.
On April 21k, 1950, the unification of the West
Bank and Transjordan under the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, was officially declared. This unification
was condemned by the Arab States as a violation of
the Arab League t s decision of April 13, 1950, which
stressed that the entry of the Arab armies into
Palestine was "a temporary arrangernentt which did
not bear the right to "occupation or partition of
paiestinetk. Subsequently, Arab recognition of the
unity between the West Bank and Transjordan has
never been officially extended1.
interview with Valid Kamhawi.
2lnterviews with Naim Tuqan, Hikmat Nasri and Mustafa
El-Taher.
± d.
With the exception of Iraq which was under Hashemite
rule
4Ministry of National Guidance of TJ.A.R.(ed.),op.cit.
Doc.No.258, p.1075; Also see, George Lenczowski,
op.cit., pp. 452-k53.
*Vith the exception of Iraq.
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To conclude,, the unity between the West Bank and
Transjordan did not come about as a result of a
popular Palestinian striving for unity with Trans-
jordan in particular, but rather as a convenient
solution to the satisfaction of King Abdullahts
dream of ruling "Greater Syria" 1 , and at the same
time as an "inescapable" outlet for the much bewild-
ered, insecure, hungry and homeless Palestinians.
It is this situation which consitutes the very
important base for understanding the Palestinian
attitude towards the Jordanian regime during the
period of this study.
The Palestinians in the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, whether refugees or not, thought of them-.
selves as equal partners with the Transjordanians.
Fhey did not consider that holding a Jordanian pass-
port or participating in the Jordanian government
.nd Parliament were acts of Transjordanian generosity,
)ut rather as rights which they (The Palestinians)
icquired in their capacity as partners to the Trans-
jordanians in a unity which gave birth to the
lashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While this was not re-
iprocated by the Hashemite regime, the Palestinians
Lid not develop an inferiority complex nor did they
'eel obliged to act and to behave in such a manner
rhich would reflect gratitude, because they felt
hat the Transjordanian regime needed them as much
.s they needed it. Besides they felt that the Trans-
jordanian regime t exploited' their. state of confusion,
need and loss to i force t them into tunconditional'
unity. Accordingly, when the confusion ended and the
'Memoirs of King Abdullah, p.cit., pp. 20k-282.
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need was fulfilled, the Palestinians started a re-
appraisal of the circumstances which had accompanied
the process of unification. This reappraisal, com-
bined with the background of strain and Palestinian
mistrust of King Abdullah resulted in a Palestinian
apprehension of the possible impact of this
inconditional' unity of the 'Palestine Problem' as
whole'. Accordingly, when the opportunity arose
i late 1950's, the Palestinians were quick to
idicate to the Jordanian regime that the circum-
Lances which had led to the 'unconditional' unifi-
Ltion were special and limited in time and that the
lestinians did not, therefore, consider the
)rdanian regime as the sole representative of the
1estinian people or a principal actor in the
Uestine problem on a permanent basis. It is
'ecisely this Palestinian reappraisal which had
d, in late 1950, to the Palestinian rioting against
ie Jordanian regime. The rioting took place because
Lng Abdullah "who wanted to solve the Palestine
fugee problem unilaterally on the grounds that he
presented Palestine and the Palestinians, felt that
ie Arab States were planning to discuss the issue
E the Palestine refugees and to declare a joint-plan
' action for dealing with it. The King immediately
'dered the governors of the various territories in
)rdan to convince the refugees, or at least the
fugee leaders to inform the Arab League by cable
)t to interfere with their (the Palestine refugees)
affairs. This telegram said:*
1 See Chapter II, pp. 92-101.
MAccording to Arif El-Arif who saw it.
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We, the Palestine refugees, have already
given a mandate to His Majesty King
Abdullah to seek whatever solutions he
might find suitable for solving the
Palestine Problem. We regret the inter-
ference of the Arab League in such solutionst.
That was in late 1950. The Palestine refugees
refused to send such a telegram. They refused in
spite of the threats and intimidation by the autho-
rities. In Ibrid* there were demonstartions, by
the Palestine refugees, calling for the downfall of
any person who attempted to weaken their cause.
rhis situation forced the King to a1andon his plan.
Jowever, he sacked the Governor of Ibrid, Bahjat
Pasha Tabbara, because he did not punish the
refugees who had demonstrated against him (King
bdu11ah)1.
Fhe Trial Period: The Practice of' the Unity, 1950-1967
Upon the proclamation of the unification of the
West Bank and Transjordan under the Hashemite King-
lom of Jordan, the Jordanian regime embarked on a
three-pronged policy which covered the entire period,
L 950-19 67. This policy consisted of:
'irst: Normalizing the life in the West Bank
through the restoration of civilian life
and the provision of food and the necessi-
ties of life, This policy was meant to
town in northern Transjordan.
1Arif El-Arif, op.cit., vol. V, pp. 1113-111k.
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attract the support of the Palestinians,
and to show them that the immediate outcome
of unity had led to improved living
conditions1.
Second: Liquidating the remnants of the Palestinian
political groups and paramilitary organiza-
tions. As part of this drive, the Jordanian
regime started, immediately after unifica-
tion, to "hunt" the supporters of Haj Amin
Husseini 2 , and the Jordanian forces "attacked"
the headquarters of the Palestinian para-
military organisation Al-Jihad Al-Mukaddas
(The Holy Struggle) in Beir Zait, and
confiscated their arms, disbanded and banned
them3 . The Jordanian regime also adopted a
policy of "tough punishment" and "suppression"
against politically-active elements among the
Palestinians. Such a policy was meant to
serve as an indicator to the Palestinians of
the intention of the regime not to tolerate
any uncontrolled political activities.
Accordingly, when in July 1950, a demonstra-
tion against the regime broke out in Nablus,
"the regime labelled the demonstrators as
Communists. They were arrested and taken,
in the heat of July, to Amman by foot (the
distance between Amman and Nablus is 120 km).
As the prisoners were walking to Amman, the
soldiers kept on beating them. One of the
prisoners, Mr. Wahid Zaid Kailani, died on
the road to Amman?I k .	-
1lnterviews with Mustafa El-Taher and Valid Kamhawi,
2See, pp. 50-52.
3lnterviews with Mustafa El-Taher and Valid Kamhawi.
An interview with Walid Kamhawi; also see, interviews
with Mustafa El-Taher and Naim Tuqan.
- 187 -
Third: Adopting a policy of undeclared constitutional;
economic, moral and political discrimination
against the Palestinians*. The adoption of
this policy of undeclared discrimination
against the Palestinians in Jordan was the
result of various factors which involved both
the Palestinians and the Transjordanians, and
the relationship that each of them had with
the Jordanian regime. These factors were:
a) The 2 Palestine	 Problem2 had contributed
to the emergence of a politically-conscious
people out of the Palestinians. It thereby
created an atmosphere of' political alertness
and sensitivity amongst the Palestinians to
any political step taken by the Jordanian
regime in relation to the Palestine Problem.
b) There was mistrust, by the Palestinians, of
the Jordanian regime, especially of the
founder of the regime, King Abdullah, who
was accused by the Palestinians of giving
great concessions to the Israelis at the
expense of the Palestinians during and after
the 1948-War1 . Thus, the Palestinians in
Jordan regarded the Jordanian regime as,
at worst, the perpetrator of their "cata-
strophe" in Palestine, and at best, as an
alien regime which did not represent the
By definition, the discrimination against the Pales-
tinians in Jordan implies that there was no such dis-
crimination against the Trans-jordanians who constitute
the other part of the population of Jordan. However,
this Chapter, in harmony with the main theme of this
research, deals with the situation of the Palestinians
in Jordan, and not with a comparative analysis of the
attitude of the Jordanian regime towards the Trans-
jordanians and the Palestinians in Jordan.
'See, Chapter Four, pp . 177-179.
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hopes and aspirations of Palestinian
Arabs.
Palestine Arabs had no loyalty to King
Abdullah, and neither emotional nor
ideological attachment to the House of
1Hashim"
The Transjordanians, on the other hand,
gained a political entity of their own,
for the first time in history, through the
Hashemite regime. Accordignly, they owed
their existence, as a state, to this
regime. Thus, the Transjordanians develop-
ed an attitude of loyalty to the Hashemite
regime, and they conceived of this regime
as a symbol of their existence, and as the
embodiment of their aspirations2.
c) The very recent and artificial creation of
Transjordaiin 1921, which had always exis-
ted as a "fief under Syrian, Egyptian or
Ottoman rule" 3 , and the subsequent non-
existence of an autonomous Transjordanian
tradition, had resulted in its lacking any
"magnetic symbolism for the Palestinians".
1Benjamin Shawdran. Jordan: A State of Tension (New
York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press,
1959), p. 300.
2Hazza Majali. My Memoirs (Amman, 1960) pp.52-55.
(Najali was the Prime Minister of Jordan in 1955
and 1959-1960. He was assassinated in August 1960,
and the Palestinians were accused of his assassination).
3Daniel Lerner. The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernising the Middle East (New York: The Free
Press), p. 30L.
Ibid.
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Transjordan, which until 19148, was "untouched
by social change" 1 , with for example, an enrollment
rate of 28% of its school-age children, as compared
to 52% of the Palestine Arabs, remained culturally
"a vassal of the surrounding Arab countries" 2 , and
yet it was destined to shelter the majority of the
Arab Palestinians, who among the Arab people were
"second to none in degree of modernity"3.
"During the Mandatory Regime the Arabs of
Palestine had become aware of their poii-
tical power, and they had advanced econo-
mically, attaining a fairly high standard
of living, and they had good prospects for
future development. In education too,
they had progressed, and they were actively
engaged in a struggle for independence.
Suddenly they found themselves annexed to
a population inferior to them politically
and educationally, and to a country econo-
mically backward and without prospects for
4growth"
When the unification of the West Ban-k and
Transjordan took place, the Palestinians, who were
more advanced politically, economically and educa-
tionally, believed that they would be able " to
contain the Transjordanians" 5 . The Transjordanians
1lbid.,p. 305.
2	 d.
3lbid.,p. 306: also see, U.N. Doc. 16(A/1905), p.1;
C. Issawi, "Labour Relations and Organisation", in
R. Patai(ed.) The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan(Human
Relations Area Files, 1956), p. 1429.
4Banjamin Shawdran, op.cit.,p. 300.
5An interview with Valid Kamhawi.
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also felt that the Palestinians, who became the
(numerical) majority in the state, would eventually
contain them and control the State as well. In
fact, the only thing which prevented this from
taking place was the policy of the Jordanian regime,
which "favoured the Transjordanians and gave them
he upper hand in running the State" 1 . Thus, the
ransjordanians linked the persistence of their
.nfluence and hegemony with the existence of the
'egime itself; hence, the Transjordanians' loyalty,
tnd the Palestinians opposition, to the Jordanian
'egime.
onstitutional Discrimination
The Jordanian regime ! s policy of constitutional
1iscrimination was presented in the guise of con-
stitutional equality. In 1950, the Palestinians
E1ccounted for more than two-thirds of the total
opulation of Jordan2 . The Constitution, however,
ranted the Transjordanians equal representation in
bhe Parliament. The justification implicit in the
Lrgument of the Jordanian regime was that, the
Uvision of the State was not based on the Trans-
jordanian-Palestinian composition of the State, but
'ather on the East Bank and the Vest Bank, as two
qual units, which should, as such, be entitled to
lbid; also see, an interview with Hikmat Masri.
2Daniel Lerner, o p .cit., p.302i. (In 1953, the popu-
lation of Jordan was 1,337,000 of which the Pales-
tinians, both refugees and the original inhabitants
of the Vest Bank, accounted for 86 L ,000 and the
Transjordanians accounted for 506,000;see, The Amman
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Jordanian
Economy, 195k: A Special Economic Bulletin,p.7; for
more information see, Nunib Nadi and Suleiman Musa,
op.cit.,p. kk9.
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equal constitutional rights. If the validity of such
an argument is accepted, this equality should have
meant that the Palestinians residing in the East Bank
were entitled to share the East Bank portion of the
representation. In other words, the Palestinians
residing in the East Bank were in fact constitution-
ily entitled to choose a proportion of the 50% of
he total members of Parliament allocated to the
ast Bank, since this allocation was not based on a
ransjordanian-Palestinian basis, but rather on East-
est Bank basis. In spite of the fact that the
alestinians residing in the East Bank constituted
round 50% of the total population of the East Bank',
here was hardly any such sharing during the period
950-1967, and consequently no Palestinians were
leted to represent any East Bank constituencies2.
conomic Discrimination
During the period 1950-1967, the Jordanian
egime adopted a policy of economic discrimination
.gainst the Vest Bank. This policy covered such
spects as communication, transport, industry, health
nd education. The analysis of this policy of
conomic discrimination will centre on certain exam-
les which could be supported by comparative data.
Deniel Lerner, op.cit., p. 3011.
The same argument does not apply to the Vest Bank,
because the number of Transjordanians residing in
the Vest Bank was always insignificant. No figures
were released by the Jordanian Government. However,
apart from the Transjordanians who used to work as
government employees in the Vest Bank, and whose
residence in the Vest Bank was, therefore, temporary,
the number of Transjordanians residing permanently
in the Vest Bank was believed to have been insigni-
ficant. According to the estimates of many Vest
Bankers, it did not exceed a few thousand.
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In the field of communication, Transjordan,
before its unification with the West Bank, had no
broadcasting Service of its own. After the unifi-
cation on April 24, 1950, the broadcasting service
in Jerusalem became the official broadcasting
service of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. On July
1, 1956, the broadcasting service of Amman was in-
augurated, and commenced to broadcast for one hour
in the morning and two hours in the evening 1 . Even-.
tually, in 1959, the broadcasting service of Amman
was developed into the main broadcasting service,
with 20 hours service, and a power of 100 kw; while
the Jerusalem Broadcasting Service was reduced to
a 6 hours service with its original, pre-1950, power
of 20 kv2.
The destiny of Jerusalem Airport was similar
to that of Jerusalem Broadcasting Service. Until
1962, Jerusalem Airport used to handle 120,000 pas-
sengers and 5,000 aeroplanes every year - as compared
to the 41,000 passengers and 2,800 aeroplanes every
year using Amman Airport 3 . In 1964, 30 foreign (non-
Jordanian) flights used to land weekly at Jerusalem
irport - as compared to 11 at Amman Airporthl. In
spite of this, the efforts of the Jordanian regime
were directed at developing and expanding Amman Air-
port and at building a new international airport at
Amman, with no similar plans for Jerusalem Airport
where there was only maintenance work 5 . This policy
1Jordan Government Yearbook, l9n2, p. 59.
2lbid., pp. 59-60.
3lbid., p. 262.
4Jordan Government Yearbook, 1964, p.175.
5jordan Government Yearbook, 1962, pp.262-267.
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reached its climax during the period 1965 - 1967 ,
when the Jerusalem Airport was more or less closed
on the grounds that, inter alia, it was not suit-
able for receiving large modern aeroplanes.
In the field of transport , and during the
period 1951 - 1961, the Jordanian Government opened
a total of' l 26 kilometers of new asphalt roads in
the East Bank - as compared with 6 kilometers of
new asphalt roads on the West Bank during the same
period1 . During the period 1961 - 1971, a total
of 363 kilometers of new asphalt roads were opened
on the East Bank - as compared to 36 kilometers in
the West Bank during the same period2.
In the field of industry, the Jordanian regime
adopted a policy of discrimination against the West
Bank as a territory - though not against the Pales-
tinians as individuals. In this regards , any
person, whether a Palestinian or a Transjordanian,
who wanted to build a factory in the East Bank was
allowed to do so and was given all the help and
encouragement of the State; while any person who
wanted to build such a factory on the West Bank
was either not given permission by the authorities,
or if given such permission, was not given the
governmental help and encouragement accorded to
'Ministry of Culture and Information. Jordan in
Fifty Years : 1921 - 1971 ( Amman , 1972 ) ,
pp. Li. 66 - 467.
2lbid., 467 - 2i68.
-194 -
1the factories operating on the East Bank • As a
result of this policy, all the major industries
in Jordan, with the exception of the olive - oil
industry, • are located on the East Bank. Moreover,
the Jordanian regime did not attempt to undertake
any serious exploitation of the natural resources
of the Vest Bank. While, on the one hand being
quick to develop the phosphates discovered in Al-
2Rusayfah on the East Bank , the Jordanian Govern-
ment made no serious effort to mine the huge natural
resources of the Dead Sea on the Vest Bank, although
the value of the minerals in the Dead Sea were esti-
mated, in 1951t, as being £200 thousand millions3.
There was also discrimination against the Vest
Bank in the fields of health and educations In
ablus, which is the biggest city on the West Bank
there was, until June 1967, only one government
wspital, which was built during Ottoman rule. In
.9611, there were 18 government hospitals on the
ast Bank, most of them built after 1950, while on
Interviews with Mustafa El-Taher and Valid Kamhawi.
During my research tour of the West Bank, many
Palestinians there raised this issue of industrial
discrimination. During my research tour to Amman,
I discussed this issue with some Jordanian officials.
Some of them denied the existence of such a policy,
while others confirmed its existence and justified
it on the grounds that the policy of the State aims
at making the East Bank the industrial base and the
West Bank the agricultural base of the States
economy, thus, each Bank would complement the other.
Some of those officials also raised the point that
in the event of a war between Israel and Jordan,
the West Bank is militarily vulnerable and it is,
therefore, better for Jordan to have all its
industries on the East Bank.
2Amman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Econorny
of Jordan, 1954: A Special Economic Bulletin(Amman,
1954), pp. 39-40.
3Ibid.,pp. 25-26.
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West Bank, there were only 10 government hospitals,
most of them built either before or during the
British Mandate. This must be seen in relation to
the population of the various cities and towns in
the East and West Banks. In 1963, for example,
Nablus, with a population of 50,936 people had only
ne government hospital with a capacity of 1 1i0 beds,
hue the towns of Salt, Maan, Karak and Aqaba on
he East Bank, with a total population of z4,765
eople1 , that is, less than the population of Nablus
lone, had five hospitals with a total capacity of
13 beds2.
In the field of education, the Jordanian regime
)racticed its policy of discrimination against the
lest Bank in two major forms. One was the policy
)f territorial equality by which, for example, the
)istrict of Nablus with a population of 333,191
people 3was given the same share of government scho-
Larships as the District of Baiqa with a population
Df65,O37k.
Second was the concentration of most of the
government-sponsored institutes of higher education
in Jordan on the East Bank. Three out of the five
Teachers Training Colleges sponsored by the govern-
ment are on the East Bank 5 as are two out of the
1The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of
Statistics. First Census of Population and Housing,
18 November 196L, Interim Reports Nos. 1-9.
2Jordan Government Yearbook l96t, pp.2l, Lt3-245.
3me Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of
Statistics. op.cit.
Fa1astin Dpily Newspaper, Jerusalem(31 July 1960)pipl•
5Jordan Government Yearbook, 1962, p.209.
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three government-sponsored colleges of industrial
vocational training 1 . During the period 1952-1966,
the Jordanian Government established 13 divisions
of commercial training all over Jordan; 5 on the
West Bank and 8 on the East Bnk 2 . The five commer-
cial training divisions of the West Bank remained as
parts of the secondary-school programme, while 6 out
of the 8 commercial training divisions in the East
Bank were developed into 'independent institutes of
commercial studies'3.
In the field of agricultural studies, the only
institute on the West Bank, Khaddouri College of
Agriculture, was established in 1930, long before
the unification of the West Bank and Transjordan.
In contrast, on the East Bank, the Jordanian Govern-
ment has established two schools of agricultural
studies, one in 19 it and the other in 19 5
In the field of university education, Jordan
did not have a national university until 1962. And
while the East Bank did not have any well-established
institutes of higher education which would constitute
a suitable nucleus for establishing a university,
the West Bank did. The West Bank had such nuclei in
Ib1d., p. 214.
Jordan in Fifty Years: 1921-1971, op.cit., pp.149-150.
3Ibid.
41f we accept the arguments of some Jordanian offi-
cials with regard to the industrial policy of the
Jordanian Regime which aims at making the West Bank
the agricultural-base of the State, as compared to
the East Bank as the industrial-base of the State,
then it would have seemed logical for the Jordanian
Government to have made a much more serious effort
to promote agricultural studies and institutions in
the West Bank.
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the form of Beir Zait College, which was established
in 1924, and which had offered first-year university
education since 1957, and second-year university
education since 1962; in addition there was Al-Najah
National College which was established in 1918, and
Khaddouri College of Agriculture which was establish-
ed in 1930. In spite of the existence of all these
well-established institutes on the West Bank, the
Jordanian regime chose to start from scratch and to
build the proposed university on the East Bank.
Moreover, the Jordanian government did not attempt
to build any of the university departments on the
West Bank, although Khaddouri College of Agricul-
ture could easily have been developed into a
department of agriculture, and Beir Zait College
into a department of sciences. During the period
1963-1967, the Jordanian Government denied Beir Zait
College permission to transform itself into a
university, even though the funds needed for such a
plan would not have been taken from the government,
since contributions were readily available 1 . A
similar attitude was taken by the Jordanian Govern-
ment when the General Union of Arab Physicians, in
its annual conference held in Kuwait in 1964,
decided to support and finance the establishment of
a school of medicine in Jerusalem 2 . Noreover, when
the University of Jordan was established in Amman
LA private conversation with the late Musa Nasser,
President of Beir Zait College, and former minister
and NP, (July 1971).
2	 .	 .	 .An interview with Walid Kamhawi. (Kamhawi was the
Head of the Jordanian delegation to that Conference.
He was jailed upon his return to Jordan from the
Kuwait Conference because he had not recommended
Amman, instead of Jerusalem).
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in 1962, its Board of Trustees, which comprised 10
persons, had 7 Transjordanians and only 3 Palestin-
ians as its members which the Chairman chosen from
among the Transjordanian members1.
In retrospect, in talking about individual cases
f discrimination, one might find a good reason to
ustify each case. However, if we look at it collec-
ively, we notice that there is a cause for believing
hat there is a trend, and that the talk about dis-
rimination against Palestinians in Jordan might be
ustifiable.
[oral Discrimination
The issue of moral discrimination against the
alestinians in Jordan centres on the policy of the
rordanian regime with regard to the Palestinian
haracter of the Vest Bank as a Palestinian territory,
Lnd on the identity of the Palestinians in Jordan as
art of the Palestinian people.
From the early days of the unification of the
fest Bank and Transjordan, the Jordanian regime adopted
i. policy which, though undeclared, was scrupulously
,racticed and observed by the authorities, with the
im of prohibiting the mentioning of the very word
Palestine 1 , whether in the form of territory as
applied to the Vest Bank, or in the form of identity
as applied to the Palestinians in Jordan. The first
implementation of this policy took place shortly
after the unification of the Vest Bank and Transjordan
1Jordan Government Yearbook, 1962, p. 222.
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when the Jordanian regime substituted the word
'West Bank' for that of'Palestine'. No mention of
Palestine was made when, after the unification, the
new state was called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Moreover, the Jordanian regime adopted a hard-line
attitude against any attempts to assert the Pales-
;inian character of the West Bank, or the Pales-
;inian identity of its inhabitants, or even their
'alestinian origin. Nobody was allowed, for example,
;o use the words 'Palestinian' or 'Palestine' in the
Jordanian Press when referring to the Palestinians
Ln Jordan or the West Bank respectively. Whenever
such a reference was made, the Jordanian censor
ould substitute the words 'West Bankers' or 'West
3ank' 1 . All the professional organizations, unions,
uid social or cultural associations in the West Bank
ere forbidden to have a name which would indicate
bhe Palestinian character or origin of the body con-
erned, but rather a Jordanian name or any other
iame was to be used provided that it did not mention
bhe words 1 Palestjne' or tPalestinian'.
A serious effort was made by the Jordanian regime
bo cut the Palestinians off from their history and
ieritage. In schools, the Palestinians were not
baught the history of Palestine, but rather the
iistory of Transjordan and the ruling Hashemite
E'amily. The 'Palestine Problem t was taught in the
Jordanian schools as being an issue in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, but no allusion was made to the
Palestinian role and place in the 'Palestine Problem',
interview with Mustafa El-Taher. (El-Taher was
the editor-in-chief of Al-Awdah Newspaper which was
published in Amman until 1956, when it was closed
down permanently by the Jordanian authorities).
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in the past, present or future. It was as though
the problem should have been of no concern to the
Palestinians in Jordan.
The destruction of the Palestinian folkloric
heritage went hand in hand with the abolition of
he Palestinian name and the mention of Palestinian
istory. The Jordanian regime sponsored and sup-
orted the creation of Jordanian folkioric groups
hich portrayed, through their songs and dances,
he folklore of every tovn in Transjordan - from
qaba in the south to Irbid in the north. The
egime even sponsored and supported the creation
f a Circassian folkioric group which portrayed the
olkioric heritage of the Circassian minority in
ordan. A Palestinian folkioric group was never
llowed to exist in Jordan1.
olitical Discrimination
The analysis of the issue of political discri-
ination against the Palestinians in Jordan will
e conducted through an examination of the partici-
ation of the Palestinians in Jordanian governments
uring the period l9 1t9 - 1967.
From May 19Lt9 - June 1967, 32 governments were
ormed and there were 39 government reshuffles in
ordan ( see Table 7 ). In all these government
formations and reshuffles, a total of 12 Z1 ministers
(Transjordanian and Palestinian) occupied 355
ministerial posts (see Tables 8 and 9).
Palestinian Folklore was revived after the establish-
ment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but
never in Jordan.
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During the same period, an almost equal number of
Transjordanian and Palestinian individuals served as
ministers in the Jordanian governments. A total of
59 Transjordanian ministers (see Table 8), and 6
Palestinian ministers (see Table 9), occupied minis-
ter.ial posts.
While it appears that there was more Palestinian
rticipation in Jordanian governments, yet, the dis-
ibution and rotation of Transjordanian and Pales-
nian ministers among ministerial posts reflects the
posite. During the period May 1949 - June 1967,
Transjordanian ministers occupied 178 ministerial
sts, while 65 Palestinian ministers occupied 171
nisterial posts. These figures, when computed,show
at every Transjordanian minister occupied an
erage of 3.02 ministerial posts, while every
lestinian minister occupied an average of 2.63
nisterial posts during the total period.(see Table
). These figures must be seen in relation to the
mposition of the population in Jordan which is
most two-thirds Palestinian and one-third Trans-
rdanian.
Table 101
mparative Analysis of the Rotation of the Transjor-.
nian and Palestinian Ministers in Jordan: 1949-1976
-	 No. of	 No. of Average
Ministers Posts	 Ratio
Transjordanian Ministers
	 59	 178	 3.02:1
Palestinian Ministers	 65	 171	 2.63:1
1Based on the information provided in Tables 8 & 9.
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This means that the numerical minority, the
Transjordanians, were granted a greater role in
running the Jordanian Government than the majority,
that is, the Palestinians.
An analysis of the composition of the various
Jordanian governments in terms of the Transjordanian
r Palestinian origin of the participants, would
shed still more light on the degree of inequality
between the Transjordanians and the Palestinians at
overnmental level.
In 27 out of 32 (84.3%) of the governments
Cormed in Jordan during the period 1949-1967, Pales-
tinian ministers accounted for less than 50% of the
total government members. In 3 out of 32 (9.4%) of
the governments formed, Palestinians accounted for
Bxactly 50%; and in only two out of 32 (6.3%) of
the governments formed, did the Palestinians account
for more than 50% (see Table ii).
An analysis dealing solely with government
reshuffles in Jordan during the period 1949 - 1967
reflects a similar tendency to that observed in the
formation of governments. During the period Nay
1949 - June 1967, there were 39 government reshuffles
in Jordan. Palestinians accounted for less than
50% of the total government members in 34 out of the
39 government reshuffles (87.1%); exactly 50% of the
total government members in 4 out of the 39 govern-
ment reshuffles (10.3%); and more than 50% of the
total government members in only one out of the
39 government reshuffles (2.6%) (see Table 11).
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Table 11
Comparative Analysis of the Percentages of the Number
of Palestinians in Government Formations and
Reshuffles in Jordan: 1911.9 - 1967
Less than exactly more than
22
	 50%
overnment Formations 	 84.3%	 9,4%	 6.3%
overnment Reshuffles 	 87.1%	 10.3%
	
2.6%
A general understanding of the degree of
quality between the Palestinians and the Trans-
ordanians on the governmental level is clearly
eflected through a combined analysis of both
overnment formations and government reshuffles.
During the period 191#9 - 1967, there were 71.
overnment formations and reshuffles, in 61 out of
he 71, the Palestinians accounted for less than
0% of the total government members; seven times
ut of the 71, the Palestinians accounted for
xactly 50%; only three times the Palestinians
ccount for more than 50%, the respective percen-
ages were 85.9%, 9.9% and 4.2% (see Tables 12
nd 13).
Table 12
Comparative Analysis and Percentages of the Number
Palestinian Ministers in Government Formations and
Reshuff'les in Jordan: 1949 - 1967
No. of
Govern.	 Less	 more
Formations than ratio % 50% ratio % than ratio %
and Re-
	 so%	 50%
shuffles
71	 61 61/71 85.9
	 7	 7/71 9.9%	 3	 3/71 4.
1Based on Tables 7, 8 and 9.
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Table 131
Summary of the Percentages of the Number of Pales-
tinian Ministers in Government Formations and Re-
shuffles in Jordan: 1949 - 1967
Less than 50% of the total members of
overnment	 85.9%
50% or more of the total members of
overnment	 14.1%
Finally, the inequality in the treatment of the
alestinians on the governmental level was not limit-
d to the ministerial posts, but also covered the
)ost of the Prime Minister. During the period 1949-
L967, Jordan had twelve Prime Ministers who formed
32 governments. Eleven out of these twelve Prime
4inisters were Transjordanian and one was Pales-
Linian. The eleven Transjordanian Prime Ministers
rormed 31 governments, and the Palestinian Prime
4inister formed only one government (see Table lii).
[n the percentage terms, this means that only 8.3%
)f the Jordanian Prime Ministers were Palestinians
.nd 3l% of the governments formed in Jordan during
bhe period 1949-1967 were formed by Palestinians.
Ehe duration of the period in office of each of the
Table ltt
. Comparative Analysis of the, Transjordanian and
Palestinian Prime Ministers of Jordan :1949-1967
The Prime Minister 	 No. of'	 % No.of Govs.	 %
PMs	 formed
Transjordanian	 11	 91.7	 31	 96.9
Palestinian	 1	 8.3	 1	 3.1
1Based on Tables 7, 8 and 9.
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Prime Ministers- would shed more light on the degree
of inequality between the Palestinian and the Trans-
jordanian Prime Ministers of Jordan. While the
shortest duration in office of any Transjordanian
Prime Minister was 5 months and 13 days, the dura-
tion in office of the only Palestinian Prime Minister
was a mere eight days (see Table 15).
Table 151
& Detailed Account of the Prime Ministers of Jordan
19149 - 1967
o.	 Name	 Identity No.of Gov. Total Duration
formed	 in office
1. Tawfik Abul- Trans-
Huda	 jordanian	 6	 32 months
2. Said Mufti	 14	 15 months & 14 days
3. Samir Rifa t ie	 It	 23 months & 14 days
4. Fawzi El-Mulki	 "	 1	 12 months
5. Hazza Majali	 "	 2	 16 months
6. Ibrahim
Hashem	 "	 3	 17 months & 12 days
7. Suleiman
Nabulsi	 "	 1	 5 months & 13 days
8. Hussein F.
Rhalidi	 Palestinian 1	 8 days
9. Bahjat	 Trans-
Talhouni	 jordanian	 2	 26 months
10. Wasfi El-Tall	 "	 It	 22 months
11. Hussein Ben
Nasser	 3	 16 months
12. Sa!ad Juma t h	 1	 3 months & 7 days
'Based on Table 7.
Formed more governments in the period after 1967.
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The Trial Period : The Palestinian Official
Opposition 1 , 1950 - 1967.
Before the unification of the West Bank and
Transjordan, official and popular opposition to the
Transjordanian regime were non-existent 2 . The
development of an articulate opposition to the
Jordanian regime began almost immediately after the
Palestinians took their seats in the Jordanian
Parliament.
The attitude of the Palestinian members of the
Jordanian Parliament towards the various Jordanian
governments and the policies pursued by such govern-
ments provides the best-documented and, in point of fact,
the only area of Jordanian politics for the study
of the Palestinian official opposition.
In 1950, the Palestinian members of the Jordanian
Parliament raised the issue of the Z loss of the Al-
Muthallath (Triangle) Area to the Israelis in the
Rhodes Talks 23 , and demanded an investigation into
4the people responsible for this loss • This debate
marked the beginning of the Palestinian Parliamen-
tary opposition to the Jordanian regime.
1Official Opposition stands for opposition on the
governmental level which was conducted through the
machinery of the State, which in this case is the
Parliament - as compared with popular opposition
which involves opposition conducted from outside the
machinery of the State, whether in the form of dis-
organized popular upheavals or party-organized
upheavals. The latter will be dealt with on pp.240-245.
2Daniel Lerner, op.cit., p.305; also see, Hazza Majali,
op.cit., p. 42.
3See, pp. 177-179.
An interview with Hikmat Masri,
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"The Palestinian deputies, supported by
the Press 1 , attacked Abdullah and his
policies. Press censorship was reim-
posed, some political leaders were
exiled, others were arrested and tried"2.
On May 3, 1951, King Abdullah dissolved the one-
year-old Parliament after the Opposition, which was
predominently Palestinian 3 , made it clear that it
would vote against the adoption of the 1951-1952
budget proposed by the government of Samir Rifae.
At that time, "the underlying issue was British
friendship and alliance, which the king told the
opposition leaders he could not give up" 4 . The
Palestinians, since the beginning, had been keen on
liberalising and modernising the politics and the
political machinary of Jordan. In pursuing this
goal, the "comparatively advanced Palestinians"
must have thought that they would eventually be
capable, through the process of liberalisation and
modernisation, of gaining effective control of the
politics of Jordan, especially since they also
enjoyed numerical superiority over the Transjordan-
ians. Accordingly, the Palestinian members of
parliament started by demanding that the government
should be "responsible to the Parliament instead of
to the King"5.
1The Press in Jordan was, at that time, a private
sector, and was predominantly owned by Palestinians.
2	 .Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., p. 308.
3lbid.; also see, Munib Madi and Suleisman !lusa,
op.cit., p. 550.
4Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., p. 308.
5lbid.,p. 309.
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"It wa inevitable that with the addition of
the comparatively advanced Palestinians to
his Kingdom, pressure would be brought on
Abdullah to liberalize the government.
Abdullah in fact had anticipated this, and
during the election campaign (of 1949) had
promised a constitutional change which
would make the cabinet responsible to the
House of Deputies instead of the King"1.
"Now (the second parliamentary election
of 1951) the issue was the royal preroga-
tive. In order to prevent it from becoming
a major campaign issue, Abdullah suddenly
promised that after the elections, which
were to be held on both sides of the Jordan
and which were scheduled for August 29, an
amendment to the constitution would be in-
troduced making the government responsible
2to Parliament instead of to the King ".
On July 20, 1951, King Abdullah, while entering
;he Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, was shot dead by
Palestinian. The death of King Abdullah brought
Ibid. ,pp. 298 - 299.
Ibid.,pp. 208-209. (On January 8, 1952, King Talal
approved the new constitution of Jordan. According
to Article 51 of the new constitution, " The Prime
Minister together with the Ministers are collectively
responsible before the House of Deputies for matters
of the general policy of the state. In addition,
each Minister is responsible before the House of
Deputies for matters affecting his ministry".
Article 53 stated that every Jordanian Government
must obtain a vote of confidence from the House of
Deputies if it is to survive), Ibid.,p. 314.
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the issue of succession to the surface. A fierce
struggle between Abdullah's two sons, Talal and
Naif, and their supporters broke out. Abdu1lahs
oldest son and Crown Prince Talal, who was constantly
ill, was known for his anti-British attitude, and
for his intention to eliminate the British presence
Lu Jordan1 . As a result of this struggle, Jordan
qas broadly split into two factions: "Abdullahs
)ld pro-British followers, concentrated on Jordans
astern Bank, supported Naif; anti-British elements
)n the Western side of the river backed Talal"2.
The accession of Talal to the throne, with the
.ctive support of Britain and Iraq, was meant to
woid "antagonising all the anti-British elements",
inside and outside Jordan • It was also designed
iot to precipitate "the dismemberment of Jordan"
&-hich would have been a danger had Naif been pro-
laimed King instead3.
On August 11, 1952, the Jordanian Parliament,
ipon the recommendation of the Government, passed a
inanimous decision whereby King Talal, due to his
chronic illness, was dethroned, and his son, Crown
Prince Hussein, was declared King of Jordan. A
Regency Council composed of one Palestinian and two
Fransjordanians 4 , was formed to exercise the royal
prerogative until the new King reached the age of
eighteen.
1Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., pp. 302-303.
2lbid.,p. 310.
3mid.,p. 313.
Z1•Those were Ibrahim Hashem - Chairman(Transjordanian),
Abdul-Rahman Irshaidat ('rransjordanian), and
Suleiman Tuqan (Palestinian).
- 213 -
Shortly after it was sworn in, the Regency
Council had to face a political row which was in-
stigated by a Palestinian member of Parliament,
Qadri Tuqan. Tuqan published an article in the
daily newspaper Falastin, under the title " The
1.Crisis of Identity" in which he argued that "Jordan
is suffering from a crisis of identity which no
other country in the world had experienced, due to
Jordan's total dependence on foreign aid for its
existence" 2 . According to Tuqan, the solution to
the problem of "the crisis of Jordanian identity"
would come through "the unification of Jordan with
another Arab state" 3 . Thqan did not specify which
state, although he gave an indication that such a
state could be either Iraq or Syria 4 . Alternatively,
Thqan suggested that close economic, political and
military co-operation, with a major stress on
economic co-operation, between Jordan and its
"sisterly Arab states', could provide a solution
to 'the crisis of Jordanian identity', as such co-
operation would enable Jordan "to utilize the most
efficient and modern methods to exploit the poten-
tials of the country and its natural resources with
the help of Arab capital" 5 . This, according to
Tuqan, would enable Jordan to develop its economy
and to get rid of foreign aid, thus enhancing the
viability of Jordan as an independent state
article was re-published by Thqan in his book
Wa'y al-Mustakbal (Comprehending the Future),
op.cit., pp. 70-77.
2lbid., p. 71.
3Ibid. p.76.
4lbid
5mid., pp. 76-77 . ( Trans. L.K.)
6lbid., p. 77.
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Tuqan!s article became the central issue in the
daily newspapers in Jordan, and also in the Jordan-
ian Parliament when " the majority of the West Bank
members of the Jordanian Parliament" argued the
necessity of the unification of Jordan with another
Arab State, such as Iraq, "whose national wealth
would meet the needs of the unified stat to be"1,
moreover, this call received enthusiatic support
among the inhabitants of the West Bank "who were
afraid of further Israeli expansion at their
2
expense"
The attitude of the Jordanian Government to-
wards this call was tough and uncompromising. In
a closed session of the Jordanian Parliament ,
Premier Abul-Huda "warned all those who advocate
the need for the unification of Jordan with another
Arab country" 3 . He also warned that " the Parlia-
mentary immunity will serve the Jordanian Members
of Parliament no good because", according to Abul-
Huda, "the Defence Law empowers the Prime Minister
to imprison anybody".
"Premier Abul-Huda warned in a radio
broadcast against attempts that were
being made, at home and abroad, to
undermine the kingdom; there was no
doubt that he meant Iraq, for the
1Hazza Majali, op.cit., pp. 122-l23.(trans. L.K.)
2lbid., p. 123. (trans. L.K.)
3Ibid. (trans. L.K.)
4lbid. (trans. L.K.)
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previous December a majority of Par-
liament, meeting in Amman, had indicated
that they favoured a Jordan-Iraq merger.
On January 13, in a special secret
session of Parliament, the Premier
succeeded in getting the deputies to
shelve their proposals".
On November 11, 1952, Premier Abul-Huda, for the
first time in the history of Jordan, asked the Par-
liament for a vote of confidence in his government.
The opposition in that Jordanian Parliament, which
was "exclusively Palestinian" 2 , took the opportunity
to express its opposition to Premier Abul-Huda and
to his government 3 . One of the Palestinian members
of parliament, Abdullah Nawas, attacked the Prime
Minister personaiiyhl. Some Transjordanian members
of parliament spoke in defence of the Prime Minister,
and one of them, Sharari al-Bakhit, went a step
further by attacking the Palestinians at large when
he described them as "cowards who could not defend
'Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit. ,p. 3111.
2Haza Majali, op.cit.,p. 125.
3me real motive behind the Palestinian opposition
to Abul-Huda was the fact that "be was the Prime
Minister during the 19118 War, and that it was
during his Premiership that the Rhodes Agreement,
which was very disadvantageous to the Palestinians,
was signed". See an interview with Hikmat Masri;
for more information see, pp.177-179.
Al-Awdah Newspaper, Vol. 1, No. 3 (13 November
1952), p. 1; also see, Hazza Majali, op.cit., p.125;
An interview with Hikmat Masri ( Masri. was the
Speaker of Parliament during that session).
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themselves" 1 . The Palestinian members of parliament
immediately withdrew in protest, and " it became
apparent that the Parliament would be divided into
East Bank and West Bank" 2 . To prevent this from
taking place, two Transjordanian members of parlia-
ment 3
 joined their dissenting Palestinian colleagues.
All the dissenting members of parliament formed
a parliamentary opposition bloc which demanded,
inter alia, the resignation of Abul-Huda; that the
vote of confidence in any government be a simple
rather than two-thirds majority vote; the abolition
of the emergency laws and the release or trial of
political detainees; the preservation of the rights
of the Palestine refugees and the reform of the
civil service 4 . Following the publication of these
demands, there were demonstrations throughout the
West Bank in support of the Opposition and its
demands 5 . The government ordered the army to quell
the demonstrations on the West Bank • The attitude
of the members of the Regency Council reflected the
general split in the Kingdom. The Palestinian
member of the Regency Council, Suleiman Tuqan,
supported the Opposition, the Transjordanian member,
interview with Hikmat Masri; also see, A1-Awdah
Newspaper, op.cit., Hazza Majali, op.cit.,p.l25.
2	 .Hazza Majali, op.cit., 125.
3They were Wahid al-Uran and Hazza Majali.
4Hazza Majali, op.cit.,p.126.
5Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., p.318; also see Hazza
Najali, op.cit., p.127.
6Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., p.318.
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Abdul-Rahman Irshaidat, supported the Government,
while the Chairman, Ibrahim llashem, remained neutral1.
On May 5, 1953, King Hussein was sworn in as the
new King of Jordan. On the same day, a new govern-
ment was formed by Fawzi aJ-Mulki. This government,
&hich incorporated in its programme all the demands
Df the Opposition, was received with enthusiastic
support on the West Bank and by the Palestinian
nembers of Parliament2.
In April 1954, for the first time in the history
Df Jordan, the Palestinian members of parliament
sponsored and passed, with the help of a few Trans-
jordanian members of parliament, a resolution thank-
ing the Soviet Delegate to the United Nations for
iis support of the Arab cause 3 . Shortly after that,
n May 2, 1954 , al-Mulki was asked to submit his
resignation.
On May 4, 1954, a new government was formed by
Premier Tawfiq Abul-Huda. This caused apprehension
among the Palestinian masses and the Palestinian
nembers of parliament. They feared that Abul-Huda
night scrap the liberal policies and laws which were
passed by the previous government and return to the
policy of suppression. The parliamentary opposition,
which was predominantly Palestinian, decided to vote
against the government of Abul-Huda in a vote of
confidence, in spite of the attempts of the Trans-
jordanian members of the Opposition to persuade the
1Hazza Majali, op.cit., p. 128.
3Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit., p.595.
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Opposition to adopt a neutral attitude in the form
of an abstention'. Consequently, a few hours before
the vote of confidence was to take place the govern-
ment dissolved the Parliament.
"Our brothers, especially our brothers
from the West Bank insisted on their
opinion (to vote against the government
of Abul-Huda). We had to agree. A few
hours later, we learned of the govern-
ment decision to dissolve the Parliament"2.
The government of Abul-Huda held elections for a
iew Parliament. There were demonstrations in Amman
nd all the major cities of the West Bank on five
onsecutive days (October 16- 21) in protest against
overnment intervention in the elections, which had
L1SO led to the withdrawal of some Opposition can-
Iidates in protest 3 . On October 21, the army was
Lsked by the government to quell the serious rioting
.n the major cities of the West Bank. In the clashes
etween the army and the demonstrators, 1k people
rere killed and 127 were injuredlt.
On May 30, 1955, a new government was formed in
ordan under the premiership of Said Mufti. During
he period in office of this government the talks on
ordan t s participation in the Baghdad Pact were
Hazza Majali, op.cit., pp. 144-145.
2lbid.,p. 145. (trans. L.K.)
3Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., p. 323; also see,Hazza Majali, op.cit., p. 148.
Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., pp. 323-32
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initiated. The Transjordanians favoured joining the
1Pact . However, when the talks reached an advanced
stage, with the arrival of Sir Gerald Templer, all
the Palestinian ministers in the Mufti Government
resigned in protest. This led to the collapse of
2the Mufti Government . On December 15, 1955, a new
government was formed by Hazza Majali, a Transjor-
danian advocate of the Baghdad Pact, with the aim
of negotiating the entry of Jordan into the Pact.
"After al-Majali completed his cabinet-
not without difficulty in obtaining
western bank members - he stated openly
that he had undertaken the formation of
the government for the purpose of bring-
ing Jordan in the Baghdad Pact"3.
One day after the formation of al-Majali Govern-
ment, on December 16, 1955, demonstrations broke out
in West Bank cities and in Amman 4 . Demonstrations
continued for three consecutive days, in spite of
Primier Majali's declaration that he had postponed
the negotiations for Jordan's entry into the Baghdad
Pact. Although the government of Majali dissolved
Parliament and resigned, rioting went on. In
Jerusalem, demonstrators stormed the French and
Turkish consultate buildings, and attacked the
kmerican consulate, which resulted in four demons-
trators being killed and 27 injured. "It was
Hazza Majali, op.cit., pp. 323-324.
Madi and Suleiinan Musa, op.cit., pp.616-617;
also see Hazza Majali, op.cit. pp. 170-171.
3Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., p.327,
4Ibid.
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estimated that during the five days of rioting, ten
1persons were killed and 100 wounded"
On December 21, 1955, a new caretaker government
was formed by Ibrahim Hashem for the purpose of
holding new parliamentary elections. Campaigning
or the elections began in earnest, and the Opposi-
;ion met in Jerusalem and formed a National Commi-
;tee. The goals of the Committee were: to keep
rordan out of the Baghdad Pact; the cancellation of
;he Anglo-Jordanian Treaty; the ousting of General
1ubb and all the British officers from the Jordan-
an army: the inclusion of Jordan in the Arab fold
tnd adherence to the Syrian - Egyptian - Saudi
Liliance.
These goals, as laid down by the National
ommittee, prompted the Jordanian regime to re-
waluate the wisdom of holding elections on the
ases of such issues. The regime . found a constitu-
ional escape from this dilemma when it was dis-
overed that the royal decree to dissolve the
'arliament lacked the signature of the Minister of
bhe Interior. The Government of Ibrahim Hashem
ndorsed the ruling of the Supreme Council for the
Enterpretation of the Constitution, that the dis-
o1ution of Parliament was illegal. The decision
bo call off the elections led to immediate demon-
3trations and rioting in all the major cities of
the West Bank and in Amman. In Jerusalem the
American consulate was attacked and the headquarters
of the American Technical Aid were stormed and
burned. The rioting, which lasted from January 7
to January 11, 1956, led to the resignation of the
1lbid ., p. 328.
2lbid., pp. 328-329.
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two-week old government of Ibrahim Hashem, and the
formation, on January 9, 1956, of a new government
under the Premiership of Samir Rifaé. Al Rifa'e
immediately announced the intention of his govern-
ment to keep Jordan out of the Baghdad Pact, and
at the same time declared a curfew and enforced
iartial law throughout Jordan in an attempt to put
in end to the rioting which had spread to all parts
f the country.
"There were many violent demonstrations
calling for the dissolution of the
Parliament. Many citizens were killed.
Martial-law and a curfew were enforced.
The army searched many cities, villages
and refugee camps for arms. Many people
were detained and others were exiled to
desert prisonst1.
The only significant development during the rule
f the Rifa t e Government was the dismissal, by King
Jussein, on March 1, 1956, of General John Bagot
lubb, Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion (the
Fordanian Army). The dismissal of Glubb was, among
ther things,	 of the inevitable consequences...
)f the pressures of Egypt and Saudi Arabia on a
Fordan dominated by the discontent and agitation of
;he Palestine Arabs" 2 . Moreover, the presence of
Jlubb had become "a troublesome factor in the
country" due to the fact that he publically advocated
"a withdrawal in the event of attack to the East
1	 .Hazza Majali, op.cit., p. 175. (trans. L.K.)
2Benjamin Shawdran, op. cit., p.J32.
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Bank, pending the arrival of reinforcements to
counter-attack. This meant Jewish occupation of the
Palestinian territory which Jordan held, a going back
to the original frontier" 1 . In advocating such a
strategy, "Glubb, knowing that a million Arab had
already been thrown out of their homeland by Israel,
ould not apparently realise that if Israel ever set
oot on Jordanian soil, especially on the rich West
lank, we Jordanians might never tread that soil
Lgaln
Shortly after Glubb's dismissal, a new govern-
ient was formed, on May 22, 1956, under the pre-
iership of Said Mufti. By the end of June, it
ecame evident that the Parliament would not grant
;he Mufti Government a vote of confidence. Parlia-
ient was dissolved and Mufti resigned on June 30th.
On July 1, 1956, Ibrahim Hashem formed a care-
;aker government with the sole purpose of holding
arliamentary elections. On October 21, 1956, the
lections were held and the outcome favoured the
progressive' parties. The Nationalist Socialist
arty3 won eleven seats and thereby became the most
owerful single party in the House. The leader of
;he Nationalist Socialist Party, Suleiman Nabulsi,
ras asked to form the new Jordanian government.
labulsi formed a government which was labelled, at
;hat time, as being 	 and "progressive" as
it contained ministers from the Nationalist Socia-
list Party, the Ba'th Party, the National Front
1His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. Uneasy Lies
the Head, op.cit., p. 112.
2Ibid., pp. 112-113.
3For more information see, pp. 237-238.
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(Communists and. Communist supporters), in addition
to other independent individuals1.
During the rule of Nabulsi Government, the
tripartite attack on Egypt, which commenced on
October 29,1956, took place. On November 20 , the
Jordanian Parliament recommended to the government
that the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty be abrogated. A few
lays later Premier Nabulsi informed the Parliament
that his government would proceed with the act of
abrogation and also with the establishment of diplo-
natic relations with the Soviet Union. The response
y the Nabulsi Government to these two long-standing
Palestinian demands brought in sharp reaction from
the Jordanian King. On February 2, 1957, the Royal
ourt released the contents of a letter sent by King
Elussein to Premier Nabulsi. King Hussein sums up
the intention behind his letter by saying:
"1 sat down and wrote to the Prime
Minister, pointing out in the strongest
possible language the dangers of
Communism as I saw them and flatly
insisting that Jordan must take a
2different stand"
rhis letter was ignored by the Palestinian press in
Jordan, and no mention of its content was made3.
1Nunib Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit., p.663; also
see, Benjamin Shawdran, op.cit., p.341.
Majesty King Hussein of Jordan, op.cit., p.132,
(The content of the letter can be found in the same
source, p.133).
3mis is based on the observations of the writer, who
in consulting Palestinian newspapers published in
Jordan during that period, could not find any mention
of the contents of this letter.
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As scheduled, the 'negotiations started in Amman
on February 3, and although, in due course, King
Hussein launched another violent attach against
communism, an agreement was reached on February 12,
to cancel the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. The abroga-
tion of the Treaty was received with great jubila-
ron by the Palestinians. The attitude of most
'ansjordanians with regard to the abrogation of the
eaty is reflected in the following statement:
"Thus, our special relationship with
Britain, which had started as early
as 1921, had ended. It is but fair
to say that that relationship was
beneficial to both countries, and
could be classified as having been
successful. In this context, one
should paint out that the Pales-
tinian Problem had poisoned that
relationship"1.
On March 20, 1957, a Palestinian member of par-
.2iament from Nablus, Fayeq Anabtawi , declared in
arliament that a majority of the members of parlia-
ent would request King Hussein to convene the
arliament in an emergency session "to discuss a
raft resolution for the federal unification of
ordan with Egypt and Syrian" 3 . Earlier, Anabtawi
Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit., p. 660.
2He was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee
of the Jordanian Parliament at that time.
3Ad-Difa' Newspaper, Vol. XXIII, No. 6414 (Jerusalem,
21 March 1957), p. 2. (trans. L.K.).
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had presented the Foreign Relations Committee of
the Jordanian Parliament with a project for the
federal unification of Jordan with Egypt and Syria,
but the Committee had decided to postpone the
presentation of the project to Parliament until the
abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty had been
completed. Anabtawi had concluded his declaration
to Parliament by stressing that "all the Jordanian
achievements were in preparation for its federal
unification with Egypt and Syria, which constitutes
the only guarantee for Arab supremacy in the Middle
1East" • This call was henceforward adopted by
both the Nabulsi Government, as part of its govern-
ment programme, and by the "progressive" parties
in Jordan2.
On April 8, 1957, the army, whose commanders
supported the Government, surrounded the capital,
Amman. On April 9, the Government decided to re-
tire a number of civil servants and the Director of
Public Security, and to replace the Head of Amman
Police, as well as making other important promo-
tions and changes 3 . On April 10, King Hussein asked,
through the Chief of the Royal Court, for the
resignation of Nabulsi Government. The government
resigned on the same day. Shortly after the re-
ignation of Nabulsi Government, a delegation
representing the different beduin tribes in Trans-
jordan4
 met King Hussein and expressed their
'Ibid. (trans. L.K.)
2Ad_Difa l Newspaper, Vol. XXIII, No. 6434 (i4 April
1957), p.4.
3Ad-Difa' Newspaper, Vol. XXIII, No.6432 ( 11 April
1957), p.1.
4Those included the following tribes: Bani Sakhr,
Bani Hamidah, and Bani Ayyad and the tribes of the
Baiqa District.
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"unlimited and strong support and loyalty to the
1Hashemite throne" . The Palestinian reaction to
the resignation of Nabulsi Government reflected
shock and apprehension that this resignation might
mark a return to "suppression of	 The
progressivett political parties, which were largely
dominated by the Palestinians 3 , supported the out-
going government, and collectively passed a resolu-
tion to that effect which was published almost
immediately after the Nabulsi Government was asked
to resign, and was also conveyed to the King . In
Jerusalem, there were disturbances in the broad-
casting station5 . Although everything was quiet in
the East Bank, there were demonstrations throughout
the West Bank in protest against King Hussein's
request for the resignation of Nabulsi Government
On April i6, 1957, five days after Nabulsi
rendered his resignation, a new government was
formed by Hussein Fakhri Khalidi which included
three ex-prime ministers, with Nabulsi as Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Transport. After the forma-
tion of the Khalidi Government, a delegation repre-
senting the Transjordanian tribe of Huwaytat and the
'Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit.,p. 66o.
(trans. L.K.)
2Ad-D±fa'Newspaper, Vol. XXIII, No. 643/i ( iZ April1957) , p. 4.
3Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, 
.2Pcft.,pp.597_6o3.
for more information see pp.238_24jT
4Ad-Difa' Newspaper, Vol. XXIII, No. 632 (ii April1957) and No. 6Lt33 (12 April 1957).
5Ad-Difa' Newspaper, Vol. XXIII, No, 6136 (16 April1957),pp. 1-2.
- 227 -
Trnnsjordanian cities of Ma'an and Aqaba met King
Hussein and "expressed to him their loyalty, grati-
tude and appreciation of his wise policy and heroic
stands during this critical period" 1 . The attitude
of the Palestinians was different. On the eve of
April 22, 1957, more than 200 delegates representing
Lii "progressive" political parties and various
Lationalist leaders convened what has been known
ince as the National Conference in the city of
lablus on the West Bank. Among the delegates, there
rere 23 members of parliament, that is, a majority
2f the total members of the Jordanian Parliament
'he conference was under the chairmanship of a
'alestinian member of parliament from Nablus, Hikmat
lasri, who was also Speaker of the Parliament. The
easons behind the convening of the National Con-
'erence were the apprehensions of the conferees that
'the formation of the Khalidi Government might be a
ransitional phase in preparation for a return, by
Lhe Jordanian regime, to a policy of internal
suppression and non-cooperation with the progressive
rab regimes in Egypt and Syria. Besides which, the
rogressive political parties and the nationalist
Leaders feared a plan by the regime to curb their
ictivities" 3 . The Conference elected an executive
ommittee composed of sixteen members 4 , eleven
E'alestinians and five Transjordanians, to supervise
LAd_Difa 'Newspaper, Vol.XXIII, No. 6437 (17 April
1957), pp. 1 and 4. (trans. L.K.)
2Munjb Madi and Sftleiman Musa, op.cit., p.675.
interview with Hikmat Masri. (trans. L.K.)
They were Said el-Azza, Suleiman Hadidi, Fayek Warrad,
Jawdat al-Muhaysen, George Habash, Fayek Anabtawi,
Abdel-Kader el-Saleh, Abdel-Kader Yaghmur, Salah
Anabtawi, Qadri Tuqan, Adel el_Shaka t a, Abdel-Rhman
Shukair, Shafiq Irshaidat, Bahjat Abu-Gharbiyyeh,
Issa Mudainat, Nagib al-Ahmad.
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the implementation of the resolutions of the National
Conference 1 . The resolutions of the National Con-
ference called, inter alia, for the resignation of the
Khalidi Government and the formation of a new govern-
ment based on the Nationalist Socialist, Al_Ba t th and
the National Front Parties; the categorical rejection
f the Eisenhower Doctrine; the expulsion of the
rnerican Ambassador and the American Military Attaché;
rd a general strike on April 2k in support of these
emands. The Conference elected a committee to convey
ts resolutions to Premier Khalidi. The committee
omprised of six members, who were all Palestinians2,
eaded by Mr. Hikmat Masri3.
"The resolutions of the National Conference
were so extreme that I had to hide some
of them from Premier Khalidi. The pro-
gressive political parties were appre-
hensive that the formation of Khalidi
Government might be the first step on
the road to the banning of all political
parties and the loss of political freedom
in the country. Accordingly, the majority
of the members of parliament were against
the KhalicIj Government and demanded its
resignation and the reinstatement of the
Nabulsi Government. Premier Khalidi asked
me for a declaration of support from the
Nationalist Socialist Party. He asked me
personally, as Speaker of the Parliament
1Ad-Difa t Newspapers, Vol.XXIIII, No. 64k3 (2k April
1957),p.l.
2They were Hikmat Masri, Anwar Khatib, Dawood Husseini,
Fayek Anabtawi, George Habash, and Bahjat Abu-Gharbiyyeh.
3Ad-Difa ' Newspaper, Vol.XXIIII, No.6kk3 (24 April
1957), p.1.
*Hikt Masri.
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and member of the Nationalist Socialist
Party, to write that declaration. There
was a strong opposition within the
Nationalist Socialist Party to the issuing
of such a declaration".
Next morning on April 2, 1957, in response to
;he call of the National Conference, there was a
eneral strike and demonstrations in most parts of
lordan. On the West Bank, the strike was total and
the demonstrations were more violent than those in
;he East Bank 2 . The strike and the demonstrations
rompted the resignation of Premier Khalidi who
efused to order the army to quell the demonstrations3,
On April 25, 1957, a new government, under the
remiership of Ibrahim Hashem, was formed. On the
ame day, the government declared a state of martial
aw, dissolved and banned all the political parties
.n Jordan, and placed Amman and Irbid4 and three
ther major cities on the West Bank, Nablus,
rerusalem and Ramallah, under a curfew5.
Parliament, however, was not dissolved. On
ctober 16, 1957, Parliament was convened in order
;o give a vote of confidence in the government of
:brahim Hashem. "The Parliament House was surrounded
An interview with Hikmat Masri. (trans. L.K.)
4Ad-Difa ' Newspaper, Vol. XXIIII, No. 644 1i. (25 April
1957). p. i.
3An interview with Hikmat Masri.
The cities of Amman and Irbid on the East Bank have
large concentrations of Palestinians.
5Ad-Difa	 Newspaper, Vol. XXIII,No. 6LL4 (25 April
1957) p.1.
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with tanks and troops. The government wanted to
intimidate us into giving our vote of confidence.
Indeed, we had to give it to the government. Next
morning, we resigned from the Parliament" 1 . Six
members of parliament resigned - three from the East
Bank2 and three from the West Bank 3 . On December 3,
57, the Jordanian Parliament voted to expel three
f its Palestinian membershl. On December 17 one
ransjordanian and three other Palestinian members
f' parliament were expelled 5 . On January 28, 1958,
Lie Jordanian Parliament expelled another one of its
alestinian members 6 , and on May 13,1958, the last
a the chain of expulsions took place when another
alestinian member of Parliament was expelled 7 . In
otal, three Transjordanian members of parliament
esigned and one was expelled, and three Palestinian
embers of parliament resigned and eight were
xpelled.
On May 18,1958, Premier Ibrahim Hashem resigned
rid a new government was formed by Samir Rifare.
The resignation of the Hashem Government marked
Lie end of one era and the beginning of another in
An interview with Hikmat Masri. (trans. L.K.)
rhey were Abdul-Halim Al-Nimr, Saleh Mua'sher, and
Abdel-Kadar Tash.
rhey were Hikmat Masri, Valid Shakáa, and Naim
bde1-Hadi.
4They were Fayek Varrad, Yacoub Zayyadin, and
Abdullah Rimawi.
5They were Yusef el-Bandak, Kamal Nasser and Said el-
Azzah (Palestinians), and Shafiq Irshaidat(Transjordanian).
6He was Abdel-Khaleq Yaghmour.
7He was Ahmed el-Da'ur.
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Jordanian politics and in the attitude of the
Palestinians in Jordan towards the Jordanian regime.
While the Palestinians in Jordan maintained their
suspicion of and opposition to the Jordanian regime,
they, nevertheless, adopted, from 1958 onwards, a
passive attitude towards it. The majority of the
Palestinians in Jordan grew less interested in
?xercising their political rights through the in-
15tltutlons of the State , and interest in what
iappened in Amman declined 2 . This apparant apathy
iasked a rift which was soon manifested in the
stablishment of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
ion and the emergence of the Fatah Organization.
:t was in these organizations that many of the
alestinians in Jordan invested their political
,c tivism.
he Trial Period: The Palestinian Popular3Opposition,
950 - 1967
The opposition of the Palestinians in Jordan to
ae Jordanian regime was not confined to the Pales-
inian parliamentary opposition. On the contrary,
ie Palestinian parliamentary- opposition was a
flection of the Palestinian popular opposition.
The Palestinian popular opposition was manifested
two areas - the political parties and the demands
the Palestinians in Jordan which until 1967, were
interview with Hikmat Masri.
2lnterviews with Hikmat Masri and Valid Kamhawi.
3Outside the framework of the government institutions
and machinery.
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manifested in petitions published in the press, or
sent directly to government officials and to the
King, and through demonstrations and rioting. These
two areas of Palestinian popular opposition often
overlapped, and it is difficult and unrealistic, to
draw a clear dividing line between them.
The pattern of analysis in this section will be
devoted to analysing the political parties in Jordan
and the role of the Palestinians in these parties.
This will constitute a prelude to an analysis of the
nature of the Palestinian popular demands to the
Jordanian regime during the period concerned, and
the responses of the regime to such demands.
Political Parties in Jordan: 19149_19571
Before the unification of the Vest Bank and
Eransjordan, the latter had no ideologically based
political parties 2 . All the political parties in
Jordan were local and were operating from within the
olitical system and not outside it 3 . The unification
)f the Vest Bank and Transjordan altered this picture
LA11 political parties were banned in Jordan in April
1957, for information see pp. 229-230.
Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit., p. 597.
(According to the information provided by Abdel-
Mohsen Abu-Maizer and lyad Alami, op.cit., there was
a small organization of the Al_Ba ! th Party in Trans-
Jordan. However, this infant organization played no
role in the political life of Transjordan until after
the unification, when the Palestinians promoted the
strength of the A1-Ba'th Party in Jordan to the status
of the most powerful popular party which reached its
zenith in 1957. For more information see, Kamel Abu-
Jaber. The Arab Ba 2 th Socialist Party: History,
Ideology, and 0ranization(New York: Syracuse Univer-
sity Press, 1966), pp. 16-17.
3Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit., p.597.
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.radically, The Palestinians introduced and promoted
three other types of political parties into the
political scene in Jordan. Those were: the pan-Arab
parties, the religious (Pan-Islamic) parties, and
the communist parties. In this sense, the Pales-
tinians introduced the extra-national political
parties, some of which, like the al-Ba 1 th Party,
had had only a very weak presence in Transjordan
until then - as far as active and important actors
in the political life of Jordan during the period
are concerned. Moreover, the Palestinians did not
channel the activities of their political parties
from within the political system in Jordan, but
rather outside it, with the implicit, and sometimes
explicit, aim of overthrowing the Jordanian regime.
During the period 1952 - April 1957, nine politi-
cal parties were operating in Jordan, at one time or
another. Some of these parties were banned by law
(like the Communist Party), and some others (like
the Al-Ba t th Party) were not licensed at all. These
political parties could be divided into two major
types - the local parties and the extra-national
parties.
The Local Political Parties
This type of political party did not advocate
any particular ideology and did not have a popular
base organised in the form of a party organisation.
They were mainly a grouping of some political
leaders and notables who enjoyed a certain amount of
political influence and local support due either to
their status as the leaders of' their community, or
to an accummulation of political influence derived
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from the relatively long periods during which they
served as ministers or prime ministers. The policies
of such parties always conformed with those of the
regime, and any conflict amongst them did not re-
flect a difference in policies or programmes, but
rather the conflicting interests of the leaderships
f those parties, since the entire existence of
ach of these parties revolved around the person or
ersons who founded the party, rather than around a
)arty programme.
The local political parties in Jordan were
xclusive1y Transjordanian, in so far as the Chairman
)f each party and the majority of their executives
-ere Transjordanian. There was some Palestinian
)articipation in most of these parties, but such
)articlpatiorl was of a token nature and served
either as a symbol of Transjordanian-Palestinian
inity, or the personal interests of those Palestinian
embers involved.
During the period 1952-April 1957, Jordan had
our local parties. Those were:
L. Al-Ittihad Al-Watani (National Union) Party: it
was established in Amman and licensed to operate
on November 17, 1952. Its executive committee
was composed of seven persons who were all Trans-
jordanians 1 . The Party executive committee was
headed by the frequent ministers and faithful
1They were Falah Madadha, Hasan al-Yusef, Mohammad
al_Sa Z ad, Suleiman Al-Khalil, Abdullah al-Kulaib,
Fahmi al-All, Subhi Zaid Kailani. For more informa-
tion see, Munib Nadi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit.,
p . 597.
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supporter of the regime, Falah Madadha. The
Party platform called for the promotion of the
independence of Jordan, the consolidation of' its
freedom, and the raising of its social, cultural
and economic standards. This Party however, had
"no significant impact on the political life of
1Jordan"
. Al-Ummah (Nation) :'tY founded in Amman on
July 7, 195k. It was headed by the frequent
prime minister, Samir Rifa 2 e. Its executive
committee was composed of 15 persons 2 , of' which
nine were Transjordanians, and six were Pales-
tinians. The Party platform called for the
liberation of the entire Arab world from colonia-
lism, the restoration of Arab rights in Palestine,
the promotion of personal freedoms as guaranteed
by the Constitution and economic independence3.
Three months later, two Palestinian members of
the Party Executive Committee resignedk. A month
after that, on November 1k, 195k, the Executive
Committee decided to dissolve the Party on the
grounds that "it was unable to fulfill its duties
towards the people"5.
1Munjb Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit., p. 598.(trans. L.K.)
2They were Samir Rifa t e, Abdel-Mandi Shamayleh,
Kamel Tjraikat, Abdel-Rahman Siksek, Wahid TJran,
Musa Kayyali, Asa 2 d Kamal, Ismail Bilbaisi, Anwar
Nashashibi, Bishara Ghusaib, Said Ala'-Eddin,
Subhi Zaid Kailani, Akef Fayez, iJmar Matar, and
Fawzi Jarrar.
3Munib Madi and Suleinian Musa, op.cit., p.601.
kTh were Kamel Uraikat and Abdel-Rahman Siksek.
5Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, op.cit., p.601.(trans.L.K.)
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3. Al-Watani Al-Ishtiraki (Nationalist Socialist)
Party: founded in Amman on July 7, l95L. The
Party originated in the Jordanian Parliament-
thirteen members of parliament who belonged to
the Opposition decided to form a middle-of-the
road political party. This Party was closest
among the local parties of Transjordan to the
extra-national political parties of the West
Bank. There was a noticeable Palestinian parti-
cipation in the Nationalist Socialist Party.
The Palestinians accounted for half of the six-
teen members of' its executive committee. The
first Secretary-General of the Party was a Trans-
jordanian, Hazza Majali1 , who was shortly succeed-
ed by another Transjordanian, Suleiman Nabulsi2.
The platform of the Nationalist Socialist
Party stressed a belief in the constitution of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the monar-
chical regime, that the people of Jordan were
part of the Arab nation, the need to liberate
the people from poverty, illiteracy, illness and
fear, the need to guarantee basic freedoms, and
the need to liberate the Arab world from foreign
influence 3 . Moreover, the Nationalist Socialist
Party adopted Arab unity as a primary goal, with
the unification of Jordan and Iraq as the first
step. The choice of Iraq was justified, by the
Nationalist Socialist Party, on the grounds that
Iraq, as a wealthy country, would be able to
1Majali resigned in October l95.
Hazza Majali, op.cit., pp. 1113-146.
3Munib Madi and Suleiman Musa, p.cit., p. 600.
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shoulder the burden of impoverished Jordan, that
the ruling families in both countries were the
same Hashemite family, and that the well-trained
Iraqi and Jordanian armies, when unified, would
constitute a very strong army1.
Al-Arabi Ad-Dusturi (Arab Constitutional) Party:
founded and licensed in Amman on April 2, 1956.
Its only executive committee consisted of twenty-
two members of which eight were Palestinians.
The platform of the party included the general
political slogans of that time which called for
Arab unity, the liberation of the Arab world
from colonialism and imperialism, and the resto-
2
ration of the Arab rights in Palestine • However,
"it was known that members of this Party were
the supporters of Premier Tawfiq Abul-Huda"3.
This Party was dissolved with the rest of the
political parties in Jordan in April 1957, when
the government issued a law dissolving and bann-
ing political parties.
L'he extra-National Political Parties
After the unification of the West Bank and Trans-
ordan, Jordanian politics witnessed the emergence of
xtra-nationa1 political parties as active elements
Ln the domestic politics of Jordan. Jordan had three
ypes of extra-national political parties. These
were the pan-Arab, the religious (Islamic), and the
'Ibid. see also, Hazza Najali, op.cit., pp. 143-144.
2lbid.,p. 602.
3lbid. (trans. L.K.)
4For more information see, Chapter Three, pp. 143-169.
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communist parties.
With the exception of one pan-Arab party - Al-
Ba'th, and one religious (Islamic) party - the
Moslem Brotherhood Movement, the remaining extra-
national political parties operating in Jordan during
the period 1950-1957 were introduced and dominated
by the Palestinians. Those were, the Arab Nationalist
Movement, the Islamic Liberation Party (both were
founded by Palestinians), and the Jordanian Communist
Party. In the case of the Moslem Brotherhood Move-
ment, although there were many Palestinians in its
leadership in Jordan, the Transjordanians were able
to dominate it. This was mainly due to the fact
that, with the existence of alternatives, like the
pan-Arab and the communist parties, the Moslem
Brotherhood Movement was less appealing to the Pales-
tinians in Jordan than, for example, to the Palestin-.
ians in Egypt who did not have similar alternatives1.
In the case of the Arab Ba t th Socialist Party, on
the other hand, in spite of the fact that, until
1952, the Transjordanians dominated the leadership
md the rank-and-file of the Party 2 , the Palestinians
soon outnumbered the Transjordanians and effectively
lominated the A1-Bath Party in Jordan, the head-
luarters of which was in the city of Ramallah in the
rest Bank3.
The Palestinians in Jordan used the extra-
national political parties as a medium through which
to organise their efforts and to voice their demands
and opposition to the Jordanian regime. In this
1 See Chapter Three pp. lLl.8_150.
2lnterviews with Abdel-Muhsen Abu-Maizer and lyad Alami.
3lbid.
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respect, the Palestinian official and popular opposi-
tion were inseparable as the political parties were
not only able, from time to time, to initiate and to
lead demonstrations and rioting in the street, but
at the same time to voice demands through their
deputies in Parliament. Accordingly, while no
5pecific mention of political parties will be made in
the next few pages of this chapter, which will deal
-ith demands of the Palestinians in Jordan. It should
e borne in mind that the extra-national political
arties in Jordan had always adopted these demands
md fought for them both in the parliament and in
Lhe street.
rhe Palestinian Popular Demands: Nature and Responses
During the period 1950-1967, the Palestinians in
Jordan voiced certain demands which had both military
md political bearings. The means used by the Pales-
binians to voice their demands varied from petitions
md appeals presented directly to the government and
bhe King, and through the press, to demonstrations
md rioting, and finally through the passive attitude
)f non-participation by the majority of Palestinian
iationalist leaders in Jordan in the government and
in the parliamentary and municipal elections1.
The earliest demand voiced by the Palestinians
in Jordan was for military training and the arming
of the front-line villages 2 . This demand was
strongly voiced after every Israeli attack on the
front-line villages3 . The Palestinians also demanded
'This started mainly in 1958; see, an interview with
Hikmat Masri,
2Ad-Difa Newspapers,Vol.XXI,NO.5529(23 April 19511-)p.l;
Ad .Difa t Newspaper, Vol.XXI, No.5605 (23 July l95L)p.l;
Al-Jihad Newspaper(Jerusalem)Vol.II,No.350(18 September
1954), p.2; Ad_Difa ! Newspaper, Vol.XXI, No.5638
(3 September 1954), p.2.
3lbid.
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that a Z refugeeariny ?
 be formed in Jordan. In 1954,
the then Jordanian Minister of Defence, Anwar
Nuseibeh, argued against the formation of such an
army on the grounds that "the refugees in Jordan are
citizens", and that "their status as refugees serves
only a political purpose which aims at preserving
their rights in Palestine", according to the United
ations resolution 194(III)l. The Palestinians ,
however, demanded that schools in Jordan should
provide students with military training as part . of
their curricula. This demand received a limited
response from the Jordanian government 2 . Less sig-
riificant was the demand by the Palestinians that all
front-line villages be equipped with medical centres
to care for the wounded people. This demand was
also a consequence of the frequent Israeli attacks
on the front-line villages of the Vest Bank3.
On the political front, the Palestinians in
Jordan demanded, most of all, that their status as
refugees be protected from any attempts, whether by
LINRWA, or by any other organization or state, to
solve the Palestine refugee problem4 . Other demands
voiced by the Palestinians had immense political
bearings on the foreign policy of Jordan, such as
the demand on April 1, 1954, by 43 Palestinian not-
ables from Jerusalem and Ramallah, asking the
1Ad_Difa ! Newspaper, Vol.XXI, No.5 605 (23 July 1954),
p. 1. (trans. L.K.)
3Ad_Difa Z Newspaper, Vol.XX, No.5519(12 April 1954),P.2.
4Ad-Difa'Newspaper, Vol.XX, No.5513(5 April 1954),p.4;
Al-Awdah Newspaper,Vol. l,No.13 November 1952),p.3;
A1-Awdah Newspaper, Vol.1, No.8 (18 December 1952),p.l.
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government to establish diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries "as
a sign of appreciation for the pro-Arab stands taken
by these countries in the United Nations" 1 . In
other instances, the Palestinians in Jordan demanded
that Jordan be merged with another Arab country such
as Syria or Iraq2 , and that the Arab armies, includ-
ing the Jordanian army, be united together under a
unified Arab command3,
In response to these and other demands made by
the Palestinians, the Jordanian regime adopted
policies which were designed to neutralise or to
counteract such demands, rather than to fulfill them
wholly or in part. In this context, during the early
years of the unification of Transjordan and the West
Bank, the Jordanian regime adopted - in addition to
its policies of suppression,"tough punishment" 4 and
liscrimination5 , a policy which was designed to
reate a new enemy for the Palestinians in Jordan.
rhe new enemyl was meant to serve as a means of
Jiverting attention away from the policies of the
Jordanian regime. The circumstantial evidence
Buggests that the Jordanian regime chose to capitalize
)fl the already established Palestinian suspection
nd mistrust towards iThTRWA, by introducing UNRWA as
bhe enemy of the Palestinians in Jordan. In so
loing, the Jordanian regime introduced itself as the
1Ad_Difa l Newspaper, Vol. XXI, No.55311. (2 April 1954)
pp. 1 & 4. (trans. L.K.).
2Ad-Difa'Newspaper,Vol.XXIII, No. 6414(21 March 1957)
p. 2.
3Al-Awdal1 Newspaper, Vol. I, No.5 (27 November 1952)
j. 1 & 4.
4See, pp . 186-188.
id.
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protector of the. Palestinians from that enemy-UNRWA.
The Jordanian regime blamed UNRWA for any misfortunes
or shortages about which the Palestine refugees in
Jordan used to complain1 . In one instance, for
example, the Jordanian Minister of Health, Mustafa
Khalifa, accused UNRVA of putting obstacles in the
)ad to the opening of a tuberculosis hospital in
blus, and that the Jordanian Government was losing
e annual rent of that hospital as a result of
2RWA's attitude • In addition, the Jordanian govern-
ants would support the Palestine refugees in Jordan
i any of their complaints or rejections of UNRWA
licies. In some instances, such as, the refusal of
ie Palestine refugees in Jordan, to allow UNRWA
hold a census of the refugees, such an attitude
s unjustifiable because the holding of such a
?nsus would not have effected the status of the
1estine refugees or the Palestine Problem as
tch3.
The Jordanian regime adopted other policies as
reaction to the Palestinian political attitudes
id demands. Such policies included electoral
raud aimed at promoting the chances of pro-govern-
nt elements, which resulted, on numerous
casions, in demonstrations and rioting in protest
4the electoral fraud was often undisguised • In
U-Jihad Newspaper (Jerusalem) Vol. II, No. 423
23 December 1954), p. 4.
3An interview with Yusef Rida: Nablus, 2 October,l972.
Yusef Rida: Born in Tarshiha in Palestine in 1923.
Had worked with UNRWA since 1953. A senior UNRWA
employee and Area Officer in many parts of Jordan
since 1957.
4Ad-Difa' Newspaper, Vol. XXI, No.5 677( 19 October,1954)
p. 1.	 -
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other instances, the Jordanian regime adopted a
policy of buying-off Palestinian demands. In this
context, the Palestinian demand for military train-
ing and the arming of the front-line villages was
usually accepted by the Jordanian government and
preliminary token steps were initiated on a limited
3cale and for a short duration in order to defuse
ublic agitation. In 1951t, for example, under the
Dressure of the Palestinian demands the government
agreed to incorporate military training into the
urricula of the high schools in Jordan. The govern-
nent decided that this programme would begin with
the training of 180 students - that was, however,
the beginning and the end of the government programme1.
Fhe promotion of certain local Palestinian leaders,
who were loyal to the Jordanian regime, was another
tactic which the Jordanian regime adopted in its
efforts to control and to curb Palestinian political
lissatisfaction. Accordingly, whenever it wanted to
adopt an unpopular policy or to take harsh measures
against the people, the Jordanian regime would put
some of its Palestinian supporters in charge of the
implementation of such policies.
To conclude, this case study was conducted with
the aim of exposing the situation under which the
Palestinians in Jordan lived between l9!19 and 1967.
Fhe Palestinians in Jordan were often regarded as
being in the most favourable position when compared
to their Palestinian brethren in the other Host-
States, who did not hold the citizenship of their
1
Ad_Difa t Newspaper, Vol. XXI, No. 5605 ( 23 July
195k), p.1.
- 2kk -
respective Host-States, and vho,consequently, enjoyed
very few rights and often no privileges. This
chapter demonstrates that the Palestinians in Jordan,
though citizens, were, nevertheless, suppressed and
discriminated against all the time. The following
chapter will expose, on the same lines, the situa-
tion of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which
was a Palestinian territory administered by Egypt.
These two case-studies should provide in terms of
their information and conclusions, an important
contribution to the analysis of the factors which
led to the emergence of the Palestinian identity,
which will be dealt with in Chapter Six.
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Chapter Five
The Palestinians In The Gaza Strip:
A Case Study, 1949_19671
"If the nine hundred thousand Palestinian
Arab refugees are a bomb, the two hundred
thousand of them who are languishing in
the Gaza Strip are this bomb's explosive
warhead"2
Arnold J. Toynbee
Very little has been written or published on the
Gaza Strip . Moreover, no data or official statistics
were released by the Egyptian Government about the
Gaza Strip except for their official decrees. Besides,
the collections of local newspaper, Al-Tahrir
(Liberation) and Akhbar Falastin(Palestine News)
were destroyed during the 1956 and 1967 Wars.
Accordingly, and unless otherwise specified, the in-
formation in this chapter is based on the following
interviews:
1. An interview with Munir el-Rayyes: Gaza, 14 Nove-
mber, 1972. Munir el-Rayyes: Born in Gaza in 1915.
Studied in Palestine and Lebanon. Member of the
city council of Gaza from 1945-1955. Mayor of
Gaza from 1955-1965.
2. An interview with Zuhair el-Rayyes: Gaza, 14 Nove-
mber, 1972.Zuhair el-Rayyes: Born in Nazereth in
1933. Graduated in Law from the University of
Cairo in 1954. A senior journalist and founder of
the Tahrir daily newspaper in Gaza. Member of the
Executive Committee of the Palestinian Arab Natio-
nalist Union which was established in Gaza in 1959.
Member of the Legislative Council of the Gaza Strip
from 1961-1964. Founder of "Akhbar Falestin" daily
newspaper in Gaza in 1963. Member of the First
Palestinian National Congress held in Jerusalem in
1964, and Assistant Secretary-General of the Union
of Arab Journalists until 1967.
3. An interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi: Gaza, 15
November 1972. Hayder Abdel-Shafi: Born in Gaza in
1919. Graduated in medicine from the American
University of Beirut in 1943. Member of the Execu-
tive Council of the Gaza Strip from 1957-1960, when
he resigned. Chairman of the Second Legislative
Council of the Gaza Strip from 1962-1964. Member
of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization from 1964-1965 when he resigned.
4. An interview with Farid Abu Wardah: Gaza, 15 Nov.1972.
5. An interview with Hamdi Husseini: Gaza, 17 Sept. 1972
2Arnold J. Toynbee. East to West: A Journey Round The
World (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.207
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The status of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of
the 1948 - War was different from that of the West
Bank. Unlike the Transjordanian regime, the Egyp-
tians made no attempt to annex the Gaza Strip, and
equally, the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, though
welcoming the Egyptian presence on their territory',
did not ask that the Gaza Strip be unified with
Egypt2 . They felt rather that "the parts of Pales-
tine under Arab control must not be divided and
annexed to other Arab States", and that "whatever
territory of Palestine the Arabs had under their
control must be kept as a Palestinian territory,
and that "the Palestinian character of such terri-
tories must be preserved as a means towards keeping
the name of Palestine alive"3.
The Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip during
the period 1949-1967 was a result of the Egyptian
military participation in the 1948 - War in Pales-
tine. When the war in Palestine came to a halt,
and the armistice was signed in 1949, the Egyptian
army was in control of a part of southern Palestine
which came to be known as the Gaza Strip.
• The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip welcomed the
Egyptian presence for several reasons 4 . The Pales-
tinians in the Gaza Strip were aware of their
vulnerability to any Israeli attack. Accordingly,
1lnterviews with Munir el-Rayyes, Zuhair el-Rayyes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Farid Abu-Wardah and Hamdi Husseini.
interview with Munir el-Rayyes.(trans. L.K.) Also
see, on interview with Hamdi Husseini.
4lnterviews with Hamdi Husseini, Munir el-Rayyes,
Zuhair el-Rayyes, Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Farid Abu-
Wardah.
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they welcomed the Egyptian military presence in the
Gaza Strip as a protective measure against any
attempt by Israel to occupy the Strip 1 . Moreover,
the confusion and the collapse which followed the
19148 defeat, and the chaos which accompanied the
influx of thousands of Palestinian refugees into
ie Gaza Strip was made more difficult with the
bsence of a local administrative machinery to re-
lace the British Mandate. In this respect, the
gyptian administrative presence provided the only
lternative. In addition, the Gaza Strip, with its
and location2 , could hardly qualify as a
iable state. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the
•aza Strip, both refugees and non-refugees, believed
hat the outcome of the 19148 - War would be a
;emporary thing, and that the situation in Palestine
rould shortly be restored to its pre-l98 order3.
'he Egyptian administrative presence on the Gaza
trip would therefore be a temporary arrangement.
'ina11y, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, "who
1ways expressed their strong belief in Pan-Arabism
md Arab unity" 14 , welcomed the Egyptian presence on
the Strip as a manifestation of the Pan-Arab bond,
nd as an Arab committment to help in defending the
aza Strip and, eventually, in liberating the
occupied parts of Palestine!5
1lbid.
2See, Chapter Two, pp.68-69.
3lnterviews with Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Munir el-
Rayye s.
4An interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi (trans. L.K.);
also see, interviews with Munir el-Rayyes, Zuhair
el-Rayyes, Farid Abu-Wardah and Haindi Husseini.
51b i d.
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The remaini•ng part of this chapter will be de-
voted to an analysis of the Palestinian-Egyptian
relations in the Gaza Strip in two major areas:
first, the Egyptian administrative changes in the
Gaza Strip and the development of the institutions
of Palestinian self-government in the Gaza Strip
luring the period 1949 - 1967; second, the political
attitudes and activities of the Palestinians in the
aza Strip during the period 1949 - 1967, which will
also cover political parties and para-military
activities.
&dministrative changes in the Gaza Strip:19tt9-1967
The analysis of the administrative changes in
the Gaza Strip which were introduced by the Egyptian
overnment during the period 1949-1967 will be
iivided into four periods. The first period starts
in 1949 and ends in 1952 with the Egyptian military
take-over of 23 July, 1952. The second period starts
in 1953 and ends in 1956 with the Israeli occupation
Df the Gaza Strip in October 1956. The third period
starts in Narch 1957, when Israel withdrew from the
aza Strip and ends in 1964 with the establishment
)f the Palestine Liberation Organization. The
ourth period starts in 1964 and ends in 1967 when
[srael occupied the Gaza Strip.
['he First Period : 1949 - 1952
During the period 1949-1952, the monarchical
regime in Egypt did not fulfill the needs of the
Gaza Strip, nor did it give the problems confronting
- 249 -
its inhabitants the necessary attention'. No
administrative reforms, other than the introduction
of the Egyptian Military Government, were made.
Although the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip did
not demand that a Palestinian state be proclaimed
on the Strip 2 , the Egyptians, nevertheless, made no
attempt to establish any institutions of Palestinian
self-government on the Strip 3 . All the senior posts
controlling education, judiciary, finance and in-
ternal affairs in the Gaza Strip were occupied by
Egyptians 4 . During this period, the Egyptian
administration in the Gaza Strip was "corrupt" ,
"inefficient" and "suppressive" 5 , and in so being,
it was "a reflection of the corrupt, inefficient and
suppressive monarchical regime in Egypt". Under the
circumstances, it was inevitable that the inhabitants
of the Gaza Strip developed an tunderdog Z feeling,
and that a slave-master image of the relationship
between the Palestinians and the Egyptians in the
aza Strip was established and confirmed '. This
state - of - affairs invited and received Pales-
tiniaii disapproval or resentment. Although this
L.Interviewswith Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Hamdi Husseini,
Farid Abu-Wardah and Zuhair el-Rayyes.
2Ibid. (see chapter six, pp.275-278 for information
on the all-Palestine Government which will not be
discussed in this chapter because it was neither
created by the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, nor
meant to be limited to the Gaza Strip. It was also
a product of the Arab Cold War at that time).
3lnterviews with Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Farid Abu-wardah
and Hamdi Husseini.
4lbid.
5lbid.
6lbid (trans. L.K.).
7lbid.
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resentment never reached the level of asking the
Egyptians to leave the Strip, nor even wishing them
to do so 1 , yet, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
made their disapproval or objectian to certain poli-
cies or actions known to the Egyptian administration
.2in the Strip . Such Palestinian attitudes, which
Qere expressed with the aim of effecting a change in
ertain policies or measures adopted by the Egyptian
dministration in the Strip, were seen by the
gyptian officials in the Strip as acts directed
against the Egyptians at large, and as a reflection
)f the Palestinian hatred of the Egyptians and as a
ign of resentment at their presence in the Strip3.
'hese impressions, it seems, were always conveyed by
;he Egyptian officials in the Strip to the Egyptian
overnment, which resulted in creating a feeling in
airo that the Egyptian presence in the Gaza Strip
unwelcomed by the Palestinians 4 . This reflected
.tself in a state of Egyptian uneasiness towards the
raza Strip, and consequently lack of' willingness to
Levote enough time to solve the problems confronting
.ts inhabitants 5 . During this period, nevertheless,
here was always a strong Palestinian belief" that
:srael poses a joint danger to all Arabs, and that
Interviews with Munir el-Rayyes, Hayder Abdel-Shafi,
Zuhair el-Rayyes, Farid Abu-Wardah and Hamdi Husseini.
'Interviews with Hamdi Husseini, Hayder Abdel-Shafi,
and Farid Abu-Vardah.
Such policies and measures will be analyzed as we
proceed.
3lbid.
1 An interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi.
5lnterviews with Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Farid Abu-Wardah
and Hamdi Husseini.
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Arab cooperation is essential for achieving the joint
1goals" . However, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
hoped that a change in the Egyptian regime might
bring improvements in the Egyptian administration of
the Strip2.
rhe Second Period : 1952 - 1956
The change in the Egyptian regime which the
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip hoped would come about
took place on July 23, 1952. The Palestinians in
the Gaza Strip welcomed the Egyptian Revolution.
Although the new Egyptian regime had numerous dome-
stic problems to solve, there was, nevertheless, an
early change in the attitude of the new Egyptian
regime towards the Gaza Strip. This change was
mainly manifested in the new interest which the
Egyptian regime expressed in matters related to the
Strip and the problems confronting its inhabitants3.
This new Egyptian interest was shortly translated
into deeds when, on December 12, 1953, a constitution
for the Gaza Strip was decreed by the Egyptian Govern-
ment. In addition to guaranteeing the basic princi-
ples of equality and freedom, the constitution
provided for the establishment of executive, legis-
lative and judicial authorities in the Gaza Strip
According to the same constitution, the Gaza Strip
was to be governed by an Egyptian General Adminis-
trative Governor to be appointed by the President
interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi.(trans.L.K.)
2lnterviews with Hayder Abdel-Shafi and ]farid Abu-
Wardah.
3lnterviews with Munir el-Rayyes and Hayder Abdel-Shafi.
The full text of this constitution is published in,
Arif el-Arif. The Tragedy In Palestine, Vol.V,
op.cit., pp. 1019-1025.
He used to be called General Military Governor.
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of Egypt. The constitution also stipulated the forma .-
tion of an Executive Council to assist the General
Administrative Governor in running the daily affairs
of the Strip. This Council was to be composed of
the General Administrative Governor as chairman, and
the directors of the departments of justice, finance,
mestic affairs and public security, social affairs
.d refugees, culture and education, and the depart-
nt of health. The directors of these departments
1
re to be appointed by the Egyptian Minister of War
e directors of at least half of these departments,
pecially the important ones like finance, domestic
fairs and public security, and justice, were always
yptians 2 . The constitution granted the Executive
uncil very little powers, and kept most of the
:ecutive and administrative powers in the hands of
ie General Administrative Governor of the Gaza
rip3.
The Legislative Council which the 1953 Constitu-
ion of the Gaza Strip envisaged was to be composed
' the General Administrative Governor as chairman,
mbers of the Executive Council, the Mayor of the
ity of Gaza and three of the members of its city
uncil to be chosen by the city council itself, the
yor of the City of Khan Yunis and three of the
embers of its city council, and finally six persons
ho represented the professions of medicine, teaching,
iaw, commerce, agriculture and industry to be chosen
1	 .Arif el-Arif, op.cit., p. 1021.
2lnterviews with Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Hamdi Husseini.
3See, Chapter II, Articles 26-29 of the constitution,
in, Arif el-Arif,op.cit., p. 1022.
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and appointed by the Executive Council'. The Legis-
lative Coii.ncil was meant to act as the parliament of
the Gaza Strip. However, the legislative powers of
this Council were severely limited. According to
article 21 and 34 of the same Constitution, the
General Administrative Governor of the Gaza Strip had
;he right to veto any of the laws passed by the
1egislative Council.2
The Constitution also affirmed the independence
)f the judicial body in the Gaza Strip, and stated
article 41) that the appointment of the High Court
Fudge (Egyptian) should be by a Presidential decree,
md that of other judges in the Gaza Strip by the
Unister of War3 . The constitution also stated that
!gypt exercised, through the office	 of the Egyptian
Unister of War, direct control over finanical and
.4riilitary matters related to the Gaza Strip
The Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip
Lmplemented those provisions of the constitution re-
Lated to the formation of the Executive Council and
bhe judicial body. However, the Legislative Council
gras not formed until l958. Moreover, the implemen-
Lation of the provisions related to guaranteeing the
)aSiC individual freedoms were not fully implemented,
specia1ly in matters related to freedom of expression,
See, Chapter III, Article 30 . of the constitution,in, Arif el-Arif, op.cit., p. 1022.
2Arif el-Arif, op.cit., p. 1022.
3lbid., p. 1023.
4See, Chapters V and VI, Articles 44-49 of the
constitution, in, Arif el-Arif, op.cit.,pp.l024-l025.
5lnterviews with Munir el-Rayyes, Zuhair el-Rayyes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Hamdi Husseini.
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association, and political activities which was also
the case, although less harshly, in Egypt.1
In addition to the introduction of this con-
stitution, the new Egyptian regime made other con-
tributions which were meant to facilitate the
olution or ease the problems confronting the inhabi-
ants of the Gaza Strip. In other instances, some
f these contributions were in response to popular
emands in the Gaza Strip. In this context, the
iggest contribution made by the Egyptian adminis-
ration was in the field of higher education2.
tudents from the Gaza Strip were accepted at
gyptian universities and institutes of higher
ducation, and were given special grants to support
hemselves during their studies iii Egypt 3 . In 19511,
nd upon a request made by the Mayor of Gaza, Munir
1-Rayyes, the Egyptian Minister of War agreed to
.dmit some Palestinians from the Gaza Strip into the
.cademy of War and the Academy of Police. Four
alestinians were admitted into each Academyhl. In
955, upon a further request by the same mayor, the
umber of Palestinians admitted into each academy
as raised from four to fifteen5.
In spite of all these changes during the period
952-1956, there were still many areas of disagree-
Lent between the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and
lnterviews with Hamdi Husseini, Zuhair el-Rayyes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Farid Abu-Wardah.
2lbid., also see, an interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
interview with Zuhair el-Rayyes. (el-Rayyes was
among the students who studied at Egyptian universi-
ties during the period 1950-1954.)
11An interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
5lbid.
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the Egyptian administration there. Among the major
areas of disagreement were those related to associa-
tion, political freedoms, and the rights and possibi-
lities for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to
have full control over running their domestic affairs,
in consultation with the Egyptian administration1.
oreover, the change of regime in Egypt did not bring
bout a complete change in the Egyptian personnel in
he Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the old established
rnpression formed by the Egyptian officials in the
aza Strip during the period 1949-1952, which trans-
ated any sign of Palestinian disapproval or discon-
ent regarding any policy or measure adopted by the
gyptian administration in the Strip as being acts
irected against the Egyptian presence there, and
s a reflection of the Palestinian hatred and resent-
ent of the Egyptians, remained unabated. It was,
herefore, inevitable that the period 1952-1956 should
itness a further growth in the Egyptian misunder-
tanding of the attitudes of the inhabitants of the
aza Strip, and consequently in the state of uneasiness
etween the Palestinians and the Egyptians in the
aza Strip2.
he Occupa'tion Period : October 1956 - March 1957
The Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip during
he period October 1956 - March 1957, had two major
oints of impact on the relations between the
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian regime,
and consequently the Egyptian administration in the
interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi.
2Egyptian-Sponsored raids inside Israel will be
discussed later. See, pp.266-268.
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Strip itself.
First, during the occupation period, the Palestinians
in the Gaza Strip adopted a pro-Egyptian atti-
ude in the sense that they made every effort
to help the Egyptian officials and civilians
who were trapped in the Gaza Strip, whether
through hiding them in their homes despite
the dangers involved, or through sending them
food and whatever they might need in their
detention camps 1 . This attitude helped, for
the first time since 1949, to prove to the
Egyptian officials and personnel who were
trapped in the Gaza Strip, that the attitude
of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip towards
them was not that of hatred and resentment.
econd, the attitude of the inhabitants of the Gaza
Strip, towards the Egyptian regime during the
occupation period left no doubts in the minds
of the Egyptians that they (the Palestinians)
did genuinely support the Egyptian presence
on the Strip. The most striking expression
of this Palestinian support to the Egyptian
administration of the Strip took place on
the eve of the Israeli withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip, when for seven consecutive days,
stretching from March 7 - March 14, 1957,
the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip demonstrated
against the "internationalization"' of the
'Interviews with Munir el-Rayyes, Zuhair el-Rayyes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Hamdi Husseini, and Farid Abu-
Wardah.
3mis meant putting the Gaza Strip under a United
Nations administration which was one of the conditions
for the Israeli withdrawal from the Strip in 1957.
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Gaza Strip, and in support of the return of
.1the Egyptian administration to the Strip
Moreover, the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip
called upon President Nasser of Egypt to
appoint and send, immediately, an Egyptian
Governor to the Strip 2 , who, upon his arrival
to the Strip, was wildly welcomed by the
Palestinians3.
The Third Period : 1957 - 19611.
The short period of Israeli occupation of the
aza Strip had an important impact on improving the
relations between the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
and the Egyptian administration there. The awareness,
by the Egyptians, of the high degree of Palestinian
3upport to the Egyptian administrative presence
ninimized, to a great extent, the old established
omp1exes, and encouraged the Egyptians to allow more
a1estinian participation in the administration of
bhe Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the period 1957-1964
as a period of relaxation in the relations between
the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian
idministration. This relaxation was immediately
nanifested in a more cordial and flexible attitude
) the Egyptian officials in the Strip towards the
Linterviews with Zuhair el-Rayyes, Hayder Abdel-Shafi,
Hamdi Husseini, Munir el-Rayyes and Farid Abu-Wardah.
Ibid.(This request was made by the Mayor of Gaza,
Munir el-Rayyes and was delivered to President Nasser
by an Egyptian journalist, Amin Abdel-Mu'men, who was
among the first three Egyptians to enter the Gaza
Strip after the Israeli withdrawal. For more informa-
tion see, interviews with Zuhair el-Rayyes and Munir
el-Rayyes).
3lnterviews with Zuhair el-Rayyes, Munir el-Rayyes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Farid Abu-Wardah and Hamdi Husseini.
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Palestinians'. This was due to the fact that after
the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the
restoration of the Egyptian administration, which was
not accompanied by the restoration of the Egyptian
military presence in the Strip, it was clear for the
Egyptians that their return to the Strip was mainly
ie to the determination of the Palestinians, and the
Ld established Egyptian belief that the Egyptian
'esence in the Gaza Strip was resented and hated by
ie Palestinian, was, therefore, refuted. This led
ie newly appointed General Administrative Governor
E' the Strip to declare, for the first time, that he
2s "the servant of the people of the Gaza Strip"
On the administrative level, the relaxation in
lestinian-Egyptian relations in the Gaza Strip was
.nifested in the implementation of the provision of
ie constitution which stipulated the formation of
ie Legislative Council 3 . The First Legislative
)uncil of the Gaza Strip was formed in the spring
C l958. All members of the First Legislative
)uncil were appointed : it was composed of the
neral Administrative Governor as chairman, members
C the Executive Council, and twenty other persons
iosen and appointed by the General Administrative
)vernor5 . Its powers, however, were severely limited
Ibid.
.n interview with Farid Abu-Wardah (trans. L.K.)Also
see, interviews with Zuhair el-Rayyes, Hayder Abdel-
Shafi and Hamdi Husseini.
3See, pp.253-255.
An interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi. (Abdel-Shafi
was a member of the First Legislative Council, and
Chairman of the Second Legislative Council).
5lbid.
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and overshadowed by the General Administrative
Governor who was both its chairman and the chairman
of the Executive Council, and who had the right to
veto any of the laws or decisions passed by the
Legislative Council 1 . The First Legislative Council
was short-lived in that it did not last for more
than a year.
In the summer of 1962, the Second Legislative
Council was formed. However, between mid 1959 and
the summer of 1962, the First Legislative Council
was not functioning because the General Administra-
tive Governor simply did not convene it 2 . The
Second Legislative Council was formed on better
constitutional bases than its predecessor. Half
the members of the Second Legislative Council were
elected by the people of the Gaza Strip and the
other half were appointed. Half of the appointed
members of the Second Legislative Council were
members of the Executive Council, and the other half
were chosen.by the General Administrative Governor3.
The chairman of the Second Legislative Council was
.4elected by the members of the Council • The powers
of the Second Legislative Council were stronger than
those of its predecessor, and the General Adminis-
trative Governor did not have the power to veto any
of its decisions 5 . The Second Legislative Council
functioned from 1962-1964, after which it was not
convened by the General Administrative Governor.
Among the probable reasons for not convening the
Second Legislative Council during the period
1lbid.
3Ibid.
4lbid.
5lbid.
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1964 - 1967 was the feeling, by the Egyptian Adminis-
tration, that " the •Second Legislative Council exer-
cised its right to question and observe the Executive
more vigorously than what was expected, and probably
1planned for it, by the Egyptian Administration"
The third and final administrative area in which
the relaxation in Pa1es±inin-Egyptian relatiom was
nanifested was that of. political organization s . In
L959, after a year of consultations in the Gaza Strip,
the Palestinian Arab Nationalist Union was formed on
similar lines to that of Egypt and Syria . The
Palestinian Arab Nationalist Union was meant to serve
as the only political organization for the Gaza Strip
and as a general framework for political activities
in the Strip 2 . In 1959, after consultations with the
leading personalities of the Gaza Strip, the General
&dministrative Governor of the Gaza Strip appointed
the First Higher Executive Committe of the Palestinian
&rab Nationalist Union3 . This Committee then started
to organize the different formations and infrastructure
'Ibid. (trans. L.K.)
The inclusion of the Palestinian Arab Nationalist
Union (P.A.N.U.) under this part which deals with
administrative changes in the Gaza Strip and not
under the forthcoming part which deals with political
attitudes and activities of the Palestinians in the
Gaza Strip was determined by the fact that the
P.A.N.U. was created by the Egyptian Administration,
and was, functionally, a part of the institutions of
the Egyptian administration in the Strip See, pp.263-271.
At that time, Egypt and Syria were merged into the
United Arab Republic.
does not necessarily mean that it was so;
see, pp. 265-271.
interview with Zuhair el-Rayyes.(el-.Rayyes was a
member of the First Higher Executive Committe of the
Palestinian Arab Nationalist Union).
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of the Palestinian Arab Nationalist Union 1 , It was,
therefore, the reverse of the usual process in that
the initiative came from the top rather than from
the bottom. However, when the First Higher Execu-
tive Committee completed the process of building
the infrastructure of the Palestinian Arab Nationa-
list Union, it was dissolved, and the Second Higher
Executive Committee was appointed from among the
members of the General Assembly of the Union who
constituted the broad elected base of the Palestinian
2Arab Nationalist Union . Moreover, the elected
members of the Second Legislative Council were
supposed, by law, to have been members of the General
Assembly of' the Palestinian Arab Nationalist Union3.
The Second Higher Executive Committee survived until
May 1964, when the First Palestine National Congress
of the Palestine Liberation Organization was held,
after which the Second Higher Executive Committee
decided to dissolve the Palestinian Arab Nationalist
Union4.
The Period 1964 - 1967
In May 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) was established. Accordingly, the Gaza
Strip, as a Palestinian territory administered by
Egypt, was destined to witness some administrative
changes such as the dissolution of the Palestinian
Arab Nationalist Union, in addition to other
administrative changes which were meant to reflect
'Ibid.
3Ibid.
4lbid.
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the new realities in the Gaza Strip as a result
of the establishment of the Palestine Liberation
Organization as a representative of the Palestinian
entity in 1964. Accordignly, no discussion of this
period will be attempted now as it will be covered
under the activities of the Palestine Liberation
Drganization in the Gaza Strip, which will be dealt
iith as we proceed1.
Political Attitudes and Activities of the
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip: 1949-1967
This part concerns the political parties in the
aza Strip, in addition to para-military activities
and the attitude of the Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip towards the major political issues which they
had to face. Moreover, this part will attempt to
shed light on the attitude of the Egyptian adminis-
tration in the Gaza Strip towards Palestinian
political and para-military activities during the
whole period.
The period 1949 - 1952
During this period, the Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip, who were shocked and stunned with the outcome
of the 1948-War, were preoccupied with securing the
basic necessities of life, whether in terms of food
or shelter, and no serious political activities were
therefore undertaken2.
1See, Chapter Six, pp.299-321.
2lnterviews with Munir el-Rayyes, Hamdi Husseini,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Farid Abu-Wardah.
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The political forces present in the Gaza Strip
at that time were the remnants of some of the
traditional Palestinian forces such as Al-Arabi
(Arab) Party, the Arab Higher Committee'and the
Palestinian Communist Party. During the period
1 9 4 9- 1 95 2 , the Palestinian Communists were repressed
.2by the Egyptian authorities in the Gaza Strip . Many
of them were detained on the grounds that the stand
of the Palestinian Communist Party in 19147 and 19148,
when it endorsed and advocated the partition plan,
and adopted, therefore, an anti-war attitude, was
considered to be a traitorous stand and a sell-out
to the Zionists. This period witnessed, too, the
begining of the spread of the Moslem Brotherhood
Movement in the Gaza Strip 3 . However, all through
the period 1 949- 1 952, political parties and politi-
cal activities by the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip,
which in any case not surprisingly were very little,
were not tolerated and were severely hit by the
Egyptian authorities in the Strip4.
The most significant political development in
the Gaza Strip during this period was the formation
of the All-Palestine Government 5 . However, the
presenée of this Government in the Gaza Strip was
very short, and thns, it could not play any role in
shaping the events which took place in the Gaza
Strip over the subsequent two decades
1 See, chapter Two, pp.49-52.
2lnterviews with Hamdi Husseini, Zuhair el-Ray-yes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Farid Abu-Wardah.
3See, Chapter Three, pp. 14 7- 1 50 , 151-153.
Interviews with Zuhair el-Rayyes, Hayder Abdel-Shafi,
Farid Abu-Wardah, and Hamdi Husseini.
5For more information on the All-Palestine Government,
see, Chapter Six, pp. 275-278.
6For more information on the reasons behind the failure
of the All-Palestine Government see, Ibid.
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The Period 1952 - 1956
This period witnessed a general move among the
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip towards political
activities. This was due to two main factors.
First, four years after the X catastrophe* the Pales-
tinians in the Gaza Strip seemed to have absorbed
the shock which they experienced immediately after
the 'catastrophe' 1 . Moreover, during those four
years, the majority of the Palestinians were, more
or less, able to secure their very basic needs of
life, a thing which the majority of the Palestine
refugees lacked in the period immediately after the
catastrophe. Second, the Egyptian Revolution of
1952 provided a relatively more relaxed atmosphere
•	 .2in the Gaza Strip , and the Palestinians there were
thus able, though always unofficially and illegally,
to undertake some sort of political activity and to
join political parties. Besides, the change of
regime in Egypt stirred the hopes of the Palestinians
that a new era in Arab politics might have started,
and that the 'liberation of Palestine t could thus
be speeded up.
During this period, the spread of the Moslem
Brotherhood Movement was in earnest, and in l954, it
was the single most powerful party in the Gaza
Strip 3 . However, when in the summer of 19511, members
of the Moslem Brotherhood MoVement (MBM) shot at
'See, Chapter Two, pp . 68-70 , 80-82.
2See, pp . 252-255.
3For more information on the reasons behind the
spread of the Moslem Brotherhood Movement in the
Gaza Strip, see, chapter Three,pp. 1118-150.
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President Nasser of Egypt, which resulted in the
banning of the MBM in Egypt and a hunt for its
members, the Egyptian administration in the Gaza
Strip followed suit 1 . The hunt for the members of
the MBM in the Gaza Strip was, however, milder and
slower, although such mildness and delay never
iappened when other groups, such as the communists,
.2
ere hunted in the Gaza Strip . In spite of this
iunt, the MBM remained, until 1956, the biggest
arty in the Gaza Strip. However, towards the end
)f this period, 1952-1956, the Arab Ba t th Socialist
Party3 , and to a lesser degree, the Arab Nationalist
4ovement, started to gain support in the Gaza Strip.
This period had also witnessed the start of
gyptian-sponsored Gaza - based guerrilla operations
Lnside Israel. The launching of these operations
as sometimes portrayed by Egyptian officials as
Deing in response to the demands of the inhabitants
)f the Gaza Strip 5 . It is, however, believed that
these guerrilla operations were meant to contain
nd to channel Palestinian-initiated raids under
gyptian command, and to use such guerrilla opera-
tions as a means of Egyptian re.taliation to Israeli
raids as well as	 for intelligence purposes.
1lnterviews with Hamdi Husseini, Zuhair el-Rayyes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Farid Abu-Wardah.
was mainly due to the sympathetic attitude of
many of the Egyptian officials and army officers
stationed in the Gaza Strip towards the Moslem
Brotherhood Movement. See, an interview with
Zuhair el-Rayyes.
3See Chapter Three, pp. 157-160 , 162-169.
Ibici., pp. 161-162.
5lnterviewswith Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Farid Abu-Wardah
and Zuhair el-Rayyes.
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According to available information, the Egyptian
decision to start guerrilla operations inside Israel
was taken sometime in 19531. The entire command of
the guerrillas was Egyptian, while the guerrillas
themselves were all Palestinians. 2 The Egyptians
exercised strict control over the guerrilla opera-
tions, and placed all the guerrillas under observa-
tion in an effort to prevent them from launching any
operations on their own initiative inside Israel.
Moreover, during the same period, the Egyptians
searched for, jailed and sometimes shot many Pales-
tinians, who were mainly members of the Moslem
Brotherhood Movement, who were either attempting
to infiltrate into Israel, or were returning from
there after they had completed an operation. Those
Palestinian guerrillas who were not under the
Egyptian command, if caught by the Egyptians, were
often accused of being spys for Israel3.
The guerrilla operations from the Gaza Strip
reached a climax in 1955 when, in retaliation for
such operations, Israel launched a major offensive
on the Gaza Strip, and was able to advance very deep
inside the Strip, without facing any strong Egyptian
x'esistence 4 . This invited an immediate sharp reaction
by the Gaza Strip. This reaction, which took the
form of violent demonstrations and attacks on 1JNRWA
offices and the offices of the Department of Social
Affairs and Refugees 5 , was in protest against the
"weakness of the Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip,
which, itself, was a reflection of the weakness of
1id.
2Ibid.
3lbid.
An interview with Farid Abu-Wardah. Also see, Chapter
Six, p.270.
'An interview with Farid Abu-Wardah.
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the Egyptian army at large"'. Those demonstrations
which were spearheaded by the Communists and members
of the Moslem Brotherhood Movement, were followd by
mass arrests among the Palestinians by the Egyptian
authorities. 2 The outcome of these demonstrations
was most important as they prompted President Nasser
)f Egypt to look for new sources of arms 3
 which
ventually resulted in the Czech Arms Deals of 1955,
tnd the subsequent withdrawal by the United States
tnd Britain of their offer to subsidize the building
)f the High Dam in Egypt, which in turn, led to the
iationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which it-
self instigated the Tripartite attack on Egypt in
L956.
Another important political incident, though
Less significant, took place in 1954 when the Sinai
eninsu1a was suggested by the Egyptian Government
s the place for resettling the Palestine refugees,
md thus solving the Palestine Problem. There were
Lmmediate demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against
Lhis project , until President Nasser assured the
?alestinians in the Gaza Strip that there were no
lans to implement such a project5.
1 Ibid. (trans. L.KO)
Interviews with Hamdi Husseini, Farid Abu-Wardah,
Zuhair el-Rayyes and Hayder Abdel-Shafi.
3Falastine Mm Akwal A1-Payyes Gamal Abdel-Nasser
(Palestine In The Speeches of President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser), (Cairo : Department of Information, 1965).
(see,President Nasser's speech to the students of
the Academy of War on October 2, 1955).
4For more information see, Chapter Two, pp.8 3-86 , 88-101.
5lnterviews with Hayder Abdel-Shafi, Farid Abu-Wardah
and Zuhair el-Rayyes.
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The Period 1957 - 19671
This period witnessed an intensification in the
consultations for the revival of Palestinian identi-
ty2 . Although the demand was Palestinian 3 , the ini-
tiative to hold such consultions came from Egypt
ien, in 1958, it encouraged the holding of a con-
rence to discuss the possibilities of reviving the
ilestinian identity4.
Another important development took place in 1962
ien Egypt agreed, in principle, to a Palestinian
iggestion to Palestinize the Egyptian administration
1 the Gaza Strip. The idea, was, then, that all
ads of department and members of the Executive
)uncil and Legislative Council be Palestinians, and
iat the General Administrative Governor of the Gaza
brip (Egyptian) should have an advisory council
)mposed of three Palestinians from the Strip 5 . These
ianges were supposed to come into force on March 7,
)676. However, the constitutional changes necessary
r the implementation of these proposals necessita-
?d a further delay in their implementation. The
-uption of the 1967 war marked, nevertheless, the
id of these proposals.
fost of the political activities during this period
were related to the revival of the Palestinian
Ldentity, which will be dealt with at length, in
hapter Six.
Enterviews with Munir el-Ray-yes and Hayder Abdel-Shafi.
JAn interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
4For more information on these consultations see,
Chapter Six, pp. 295-297.
5An interview with Munir el-Rayyes, (el-Rayyes, to-
gether with Hayder Abdel-Shafi were the Palestinian
representatives in these talks and .they were the ones
who suggested these changes).
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On the level of political parties, the period
1957 - 1967 witnessed the spread of pan-Arab parties
in.the Gaza Strip. While both the Communist Party
and Moslem Brotherhood Movement were still in
existence in the Gaza Strip, the tide was, until 1958,
in favour of the Arab Ba t th Socialist Party 1 . How-
?ver, when al-Ba t th dissolved itself in Syria after
Lhe merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab
epub1ic in 1958, the popular tide in the Gaza Strip
thifted towards the Arab Nationalist Movement which
'as, on the eve of the 1967-War, the strongest party
.2
Lfl the Gaza Strip
Finally, Palestinian-Egyptian relations in the
aza Strip during the period 191t9-1967 were charac-
berized, when compared with Palestinian-Transjordan-
Ian relations during the same period, by the rela-
bive ease with which both parties managed to co-exist
uid to solve their differences. Besides, there was,
ll the time, a Palestinian conviction that the
gyptian regime had no plans to eliminate the
E'alestinian character of the Gaza Strip, or to exploit
bhe inhabitants of the Gaza Strip for economic or
4olitical gains . Quite to the contrary, the Pales-
binians in the Gaza Strip appreciated the fact that
bhe Gaza Strip was an economic burden and a military
)urden on Egypt 5 . Even on issues like the absence
)f political freedom, banning of political parties
1lnterviews with Zuhair el-Rayyes, Hamdi Husseini
and Munir el-Rayyes.
2 interview with Zuhair el-Rayyes.
3See, Chapter Four.
4lnterviews with Munir el-Rayyes, Hayder Abdel-Shafi,
Zuhair el-Rayyes, Hamdi Husseini and Farid Abu-Wardah.
5Ibid.
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and associations, suppression and detention of'
politically active elements among the Palestinians,
and the concentration of power in the hands of one
individual, (the General Administrative Governor),
there was a Palestinian conviction that all these
policies were not designed solely for the Gaza Strip,
but were simply a reflection of what was implemented
in Egypt, and that the Egyptian regime could not
afford to grant the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip
the right to political freedom, and at the same
time deprive the Egyptian people from similar rights.
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Chapter Six
Palestinian-Arab Relations: The Era of Revival,
1 9 6 :3 - 1967
"In the name of the First Arab Palestine
Congress. . ....... I do hereby proclaim
the establishment of the Palestine
Liberation Organization as a mobilizing
leadership of the forces of the Palestine
Arab people to wage the battle of libera-
tion, as a shield for the rights and
aspirations of the people of Palestine
and as a road to victory".
Ahmad Shukairy
Chairman of the First Arab
Palestine Congress
Seven months after the proclamation of the
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO), on January 1, 1965, Al-Fatah: Palestine
National Liberation Movement1 announced its existence.
Ever since that day, all political and paramilitary
developments in the Palestinian arena have moved in
the direction of reviving the Palestinian entity
and stressing the Palestinian character of Palestin-
ian-sponsored political and paramilitary organiza-
2tions. For decades stretching from before l9 1 8 ,
and through the 1950 t s, the majority of the Arab
Palestinians thought of themselves as Arahs rather
than as Palestinians, and conducted their political
1In the remaining part of this work, tAl_Fatah :
Palestine National Liberation Movement 2 will be
refered to by its usual abbreviation 'Al-Fataht.
3The term t Palestinian entity t is the one used by
the PLO.
2See, Chapter Two, pp. 56-63.
See, Chapter Three, pp. 125-169.
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thinking and military struggle through a Pan-Arab
approach and in a Pan-Arab manner'. The shift among
the Palestinians, in the late 1950 r 5 and early
1960 t s, towards stressing their Palestinian identity
and the Palestinian character of Palestinian-sponsor-
ed political and para military organizations, must
be comprehended as a manifestation of a basic and
far-reaching change in the traditional Pan-Arab
political and para military convictions of the
majority of the Arab Palestinian people. The reasons
behind this change, and its early organized manifes-
tations in the form of the PLO and the Al-Fatah,
constitute the subject-matter of this chapter.
This chapter will be divided into three major
sections. The first section will deal with the
factors which led to the revival of Palestinian
entity. The second section will be devoted to an
analysis of the Palestine Liberation Organization as
an Arab states-sponsored form of Palestinian entity.
rhe third section will similarily be devoted to an
analysis of Al-Fatah: Palestine National Liberation
4ovement, as a Palestinian-sponsored form of Pales-
tinian entity.
i'actors Behind The Revival of Palestinian Entity:
L9119 - 19614
No single group or political incident or develop-
went can held primarily responsible for the revival
of the Palestinian entity. Similarily, no specific
date can be identified precisely as the starting date
of the move towards stressing the Palestinian
'Ibid.
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identity. For some Palestinians , Palestinian
identity, in the form of political entity, had never
existed, since Palestine was always a part of a
bigger Arab entity 1 , and since the Palestinians
themselves conducted their political activities and
para military struggle in a Pan-Arab manner. For
thers, however, a Palestinian identity, in the
ense of political identification, had always
xisted, and the revival of a Palestinian entity did
.ot, therefore, need a birth-certificate from the
.rab States, but rather it needed their support and
:ooperation2 . Nevertheless, the revival of the
alestinian entity which took its first organized
orm3 in 1964 and 1965 with the establishment of the
alestine Liberation Organization and the emergence
f the Al-Fatah, respectively, was the product of a
Liverse combination of factors which were partly
elated to the Palestinians themselves, partly
elated to the Arab Host-States, and very much a
unction of the relations amongst the Arab States
;hemselves, and between the Palestinians and the Arab
tates. While it is impossible to isolate these
actors individually, as they are so much inter-
elated and interdependent, the attempt to isolate
hem, for analytical purposes and for purposes of
stimating their importance, will nevertheless be
ttempted.
Syria.
2 interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
3After 1948.
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Factors Related To The Palestinians
There were four main factors which combined to-
gether, created a general feeling among various
groupings of Palestinians in the Arab World of the
need to revive the Palestinian entity. These factors
rere:
Rights and Possibilities for the Palestinians
Between the first armistice of 19118 and the
second armistice of 1949, the first and last
attempt by the Palestinian traditional leader-
.1	 .	 2
ship , with the help of some Arab states , to
introduce a Palestinian political framework, in
the form of a Palestinian government, was
initiated.
On September 1, 1948, the Arab Higher Committee
called for a conference in Gaza, which was attend-
ed by eighty five leading Palestinians, to discuss
the establishment of a Palestinian administration
for "the whole of Palestine "i. The conference,
whch was called the National Congress, declared
the independence of the whole of Mandatory Pales-
.4	 .tine , and the intention to establish " a free
democratic" state in the "whole of Palestine"5.
The Arab Higher Committee. See, Chapter Two, p. 52.
2They were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.
3Arif el-Arif, vol. III, op.cit., p. 703.
4By that time the State of Israel had already been
in existence on a part of the territory of Palestine.
5Arif el-Arif, vol. III, op.cit., p. 704.
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Thus, the National Congress declared the for-
mation of a government, which 1as been known
since as the All-Palestine Government, with Ahmad
Hilmi Abdel Baki as Prime Minister. The city of
Gaza was declared as the "temporary" headquarters
of the Government. On October 15, 191t8, the
governments of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and
Lebanon recognized the All-Palestine Government.
1With the exception of Transjordan , the attitude
of the other Arab states was to grant nominal
support to the All-Palestine Government.
As we will see later, short of issuing pass-
ports 2 , the All-Palestine Government played no
role, whatsoever, in any of the political develop-
ments or Arab decisions related to the Palestine
Problem.
In 1952, the Arab League decided to reduce the
already largely non-functioning government, into
a government composed of a Prime Minister, a
General Secretary, and four other employees, and
all the Ministerial and other posts related to
All-Palestine Government were thus abolished3.
After 1952, the existence of the All-Palestine
Government was confined to the person of its
Prime Minister, in his capacity as the represen-
tative of Palestine at the Arab League.
Lich was later joined by Iraq when Nun el-Said was
appointed as Prime Minister of Iraq later in the year.
2During its life-time, the All-Palestine Government
issued ll, L100 passports which were accepted by all
the Arab States (except Jordan) and Afghanistan.
See, Arif el-Arif, Vol. III, p.cit., pp. 710-711.
3lbid. pp. 710-711.
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The total failure of the All-Palestine Govern-
ment was due to several factors, The establish-
ment of the All-Palestine Government was an act
of Arab cold war, which was designed by the Arab
Higher Committee (in the person of its chairman
Haj Amin Husseini) together with Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Syria to pre-empt King Abdullahts
plans to annex central Palestine (the West Bank)
to his Kingdom, Transjordan1 . Being an act of
Arab cold war, the All-Palestine Government was,
therefore, not meant, by the sponsoring Arab
States, to be a viable government, but rather a
political tool in the hands of Egypt (primarily),
Saudi Arabia and Syria in their conflict with
King Abdullah of Transjordan. Accordingly, the
support granted to the All-Palestine Government
was conditional upon the state of relations bet-
ween Transjordan and Egypt. Hence, when Jordan
asked the Arab League in 1952, to withdraw its
recognition of All-Palestine Government, the
compromise solution was to reduce it to the
nominal status of being a government with a Prime
Minister, but without Ministers or functions.
In addition, the occupation, by Israel, of the
Neqab Desert, after the formation of the All-
Palestine Government, resulted in separating
central Palestine (the West Bank) from southern
Palestine (the Gaza Strip). Moreover, the annexa-
tion of the West Bank weakened, to a great extent,
the prospects of an All-Palestine Government, due
to the fact that the majority of the Palestinian
people and the greater part of the Palestinian
'For more information, see, Chapter four, pp.171-i86.
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territory under Arab control lie in the part of
Palestine which was annexed by Transjordan.
Furthermore, All-Palestine Government did not
arise out of a Palestinian popular demand, and
it therefore lacked the popular support of the
Palestinian masses who had more urgent pre-
occupations like securing food and shelter, in
addition to their belief that their refuge was
temporary and that they would shortly be return-
ing to Palestine 1 . Moreover, the Palestinians
quickly realised the non-viability of the All-
Palestine Government, and all those Palestinians
who took ministerial posts in it, on the eve of
its formation, left it very soon and took other
posts in the various Arab governments and the
Arab League2 . Among the reasons for this Pales-
tinian attitude towards the All-Palestine Govern-
ment was the fact that it came out of an arrange-
ment between the traditional Palestinian leader-
ship (Arab Higher Committee) and some Arab states
like Egypt and Syria under whose previous leader-
ship the catastrophe in Palestine had taken place.
The failure of the Arab states and the
traditional Palestinian leadership in handling
the conflict in Palestine in the l9L8 - War
prompted some Palestinian attempts to try to take
the initiative and handle the issue of Palestine
independently from the Arab states and the
1 lnterviews with Hamdi Husseini, Nunir el-Rayyes,
Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Mustafa Talier. Also see,
Arif el-Arif, Vol. III, op.cit., pp . 703-711.
2	 .Arif el-Arif, Vol. III, op.cit., p. 711.
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traditional Palestinian leadership of the Arab
Higher Committee. The earliest move in this
direction took place early in 1949 when some
Palestinian refugees, with the support of the
Transjordaruan authorities, established the
Office for Refugee Affairs in the city of
Ramallah in the West Bank, with the sole aim of
assisting the Red Cross to distribute food and
clothes to the Palestine refugees in the West
1Bank • In April of the same year, the organizers
of the office for Refugee Affairs called for a
general meeting for the palestine refugees " to
decide the destiny of the Palestine refugees and
2to try and put an end to their sufferings . The
conference was attended by 800 delegates. Its
resolutions stressed "the determination of the
refugees to return to their homes in Palestine",
and called, among other things, for "the election
of an Executive Council of ten persons to repre-
sent the Palestine refugees at any talks". How-
ever, this council was not empowered to endorse
any solution unless it obtained the prior approval
of the general assembly of the Refugee Conference3.
Moreover, the resolutions of the Refugee Confe-
rence asked the Executive Council	 make con-
tacts with all international bodies and govern-
ments with the aim of securing the rights of
Palestine refugees and solving their problem,
independently from the Arab states, the Arab
"1.
League, and the Arab Higher Committee
1	 .	 .Mohammad Nimr Al-Hawwari. op.cit., pp. 346-347.
2lbid., p. 347. (trans. L.K.)
3lbid., pp . 347 - 348.4.Ibid. (trans. L.K.)
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The same refugee conference elected a delega-
tion1
 to represent the Palestine refugees at the
Conciliation Talks in Lausanne. The formation of
this delegation met with fierce resistence from
the Transjordanian government which suggested the
inclusion of some Palestinian personalities with-
in the official Transjordanian delegation to
Lausanne. The refugees refused the Transjordanian
suggestion and insisted on being represented by
their own delegation 2 . The Transjordanian govern-
ment agreed after the refugee delegation gave
assurances that its representation of ±he refugee
problem would not be conducted in any manner that
might jeopordize the interests of Transjordan3.
On its way to Lausanne on April 29, 1949, the
refugee delegation went to Egypt to give assurances
to its government of the independent nature of the
delegation, and that the delegation was neither
financed nor supervised by the Transjordanian
4government
In Lausanne, the Arab states of Egypt, Trans-
jordan, Syria and Lebanon were represented. With
the exception of Lebanon, each of the other three
delegations had Palestinian members. The Arab
embers of the delegation were Aziz Shehada, Nasib
oulos, Mohammad Nimr Al-Hawwari and Yahya Hammodeh
the latter declined and was replaced by Zaki
arakat). For more information see, Mohammad Nimr
l-Hawwari, op.cit., p. 351; also see, Arif el-Arif,
Vol. 5, op.cit., p. 1095.
2Mohammed Nimr A1-Hawwari, pcit., p. 352.
3lbid.
4lbid.
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delegations, however, did not attempt to
cooperate with the refugee delegation1.
In Lausanne, too, the refugee delegation took
the initiative to meet directly and publically ,
2
and for the only time since 1948 , with the Israeli
delegation, in an attempt to reach a solution to
the Palestine refugee problem 3 . The response of
the Israeli delegation was very discouraging for
the refugee delegation as Israel refused to enter
into any discussions of the refugee problem with
the refugee delegation on the grounds that Israel
was willing to talk only to the Arab States4
However, when the talks at Lausanne between the
Arab delegations and the Israeli delegation seemed
to be moving to a dead end, the refugee delegation
asked all the delegations to proceed on the bases
of United Nations resolutions 181 (ii) of 29
November 1947 recommending the partition of
Palestine, and, 194 (III) of 11 December 1948
resolving that the Palestine refugee should be
given the choice between repatriation or
compensation' 5 . This demand by the refugee
delegation incited the anger of the Transjordanian
government, since United Nations resolution 181
(II) recommended, inter alia, the establishment
of an Arab Palestinian state on the part of
Palestine allocated to the Arabs, which was in
Ebid., pp. 358-359.
2	 .Until this time, no Arab government or statesman had
confessed to have conferred directly with any re-
presentative of the State of Israel.
3Nohammad Nimr Al-Hawwari, op.cit., pp. 37 6
-387.(Al
-Hawwari was the chairman of the refugee delegation,
and he gives, in his book, the details of the two
meetings which took place with the Israeli delega-
tion in Lausanne).
4Ibid., pp. 377-379.
5Ibid., pp. 388-389.
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basic contradictions with the pians of the Trans .
-jordanian government to annex central Palestine
(the West Bank) 1 . Although this demand by the
refugee delegation was not accepted by all the
other delegations, Transjordanian forces never-
theless occupied the headquarters of the Office
for Refugee Affairs in Ramallah and confiscated
its contents and banned its activities 2 . The
refugee delegation, then, returned in total
failure.
After this first Palestinian attempt in 19119,
there were, between 1951 and 1956, many other
Palestinian attempts to create some form of
organization for the Palestine refugees. Most
of these attempts were either insignificant, or,
for one reason or another, short lived. However,
m'ost noticeable among those attempts were three.
The first attempt took place in 1953 when some
former members 3 of the Executive Council of the
dissolved Office for Refugee Affairs 4 submitted,
through the Lebanese Government, a memorandum to
the United States Secretary of States, outlining
a solution for the refugee probeim. This proposed
solution covered eight major points5
LSee, Chapter Four, pp.171-186.
2	 .Mohammad Nimr A1-Hawwari, op.cit., pp. 389-390.
3They were Izzat Tannos, Aziz Shehada, Hasan Habib
Hawa, Fayez el-Hajj, Mohammad el-Yahya and Yahya Hammodeh.
See, Al-Awdah Newspaper, Vol. I.,No. 25 ( Amman ,
21/1/1953), p. I.
See, PP.278-279.
John Foster Dulles.
5A1-Lvdah Newspaper, Vol. I.,No. 24 (14/5/1953)
p. I. (trans. L.K.)
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1-. "The internationalization of the cities of
Jaffa and Jerusalem".
2- "The implementation of the Partition Plan e and
the return of the refugees to the part of
Palestine allocated to the Arabs according to
the Partition Plan",
3- "The appointment of an international committee
to supervise refugee property in the Jewish
section of Palestine, with powers to sell,
exchange or accept compensations with non-
Israeli currencjes".
4- "The return of the Arabs to their properties
in the internationalized cities".
5- "The payment of a just compensation to all
those who wish not to return".
6- "The return of the Arabs to the part of Pales-
tine allocated to them could extend over five
years".
7- "The Arab part of Palestine should be put under
international supervision for a period of five
years, which could be renewed".
8- "Since the Israelis would not accept this
solution, the United States has to enforce it
on them".
During his visit to Jordan in June 1953, the
Lebanese President, Mr. Camille Chamoun, confirmed,
in a press conference, the existence of such a
plan1 . This confirmation led to immediate
*U.N. Resolution 181 (Il) of 29 November 1947,
1Al-Awdah Newspaper, Vol. I.,No. 29 (25/6/1953), p.1.
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reactions among the Palestine refugees who
attacked the sponsors of this solution on the
grounds that their plan constituted a sell-out
to "the imperialists who wanted to liquidate the
Palestine Problem" and that such a solution
would lead" to the destruction of the national
unity in Jordan1 ". Moreover, the refugees declar-
ed that the sponsorers of this solution did not
represent the Palestine refugees and that they
only represented themselves 2 . That marked the
end of this attempt.
In 1953, there was another attempt to organize
the Palestine refugees. This attempt, which was
initiated by Aziz el-Dahoodi and Mustafa E1-.Taher,
was meant "to preserve the rights of the refugees
and to defend them" 3 . A meeting of some leading
Palestinians was held in Amman at the invitation
of Aziz Dahoodi, which resulted in the establish-
ment of the Refugee Office 4 . The attitude of the
Jordanian government towards the establishment
of the Refugee Office was tolerent. This was due
to two factors. Firstly, there was no participa-
tion by the refugees themselves in the whole
process. Secondly, the Refugee Office made it
clear that it was a non-political organization
and that its sole aim was "to look after the
1Ibid. Vol. I.,No. 25 (21/5/1953) p. 1. (trans.L.K.)
____ For more information on this Palestinian
attitude See, Chapter, Two pp. 96-101.
3An interview with Mustafa el-Taher. (trans. L.K.).
4Aziz Dahoodi was elected as Chairman of the Refugee
Office, and Mustafa el-Taher was elected as its
Secretary-General. See, an interview with Mustafa
el-Taher
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refugees and to protect their social and economic
interests"'. However, when in 1956, the Refugee
Office tried to undertake political activity by
calling upon the Palestine refugees in the camps
to demonstrate in support of King Husseints
decision to oust General Glubb from the command
of the Jordanian army, the Jordanian government
banned this demonstration and accused the Refugee
Office of "forcing, the refugees to demonstrate"2.
This incident marked the end of the Refugee
Office.
In 1956, the third attempt to organize the
Palestine refugees took place. This time the
attempt took the form of a refugee conference.
The holding of this refugee conference took place
under the relaxed political atmosphere which
accompanied the formation of the Nabulsi Govern-
ment in Jordan3 . Accordingly, there was a
partisan participation in this refugee conference.
The Al-Ba t th Party, the Communists, the Arab
Nationalist Movement and the Nationalist Socialist
Party, all participated in the conferences This
conference, which was politically oriented, voted
against the election of an executive committee
because "it did not want to give any person or
group of persons the right to represent the
Palestine refugees and to talk on their behalf.
This was meant to serve as a guarantee against
any solutions that might be short of the return
1lbid. (trans. L.K.).
2lbid. (trans. LK.).
3See, Chapter Four, pp. 223-226.
An interview with Mustafa el-Taher.
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of the refugees to their homes and lands in
Palestine" 1 . On these lines, the conference
elected a preparatory committee which was of an
administrative nature. This committee survived
until early 1957, when the Nabulsi Government
was asked to resign, and the Jordanian regime
banned all forms of political organization2.
2. The Attitude of' the Arab Host-States Towards
the Palestinians
During the period 1949-196k, the Palestinians
in the Arab Host-States were living under dis-
advantagous conditions 3 . As we have seen in the
previous chapters, the Palestinians in each of
the Host-States (with the exception of Jordan )
did not acquire the status of being citizens in
their respective Host-States. As for Jordan
and the Gaza Strip, we observed that the Pales-
tinians, although living on a Palestinian terri-
tory, also suffered. In Jordan, for example,
the Palestinians, although citizens, were treated
as second-class citizens and were discriminated
against both as individuals and as a territorially
based group by the Jordanian regime. This dis-
crimination covered most aspects of life which
ranged from constitutional and political dis-
crimination, to economic, educational, cultural
and moral discrimination4 . In the Gaza Strip,
1lbid, (trans. LIK.)
2See, Chapter Four, pp . 230-232.
3See, Chapter Two pp. 76 - 78 , Chapter Four and
Chapter Five.
4See, Chapter Four, pp. 170-223.
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the Palestinians, who were stateless, also
suffered all the limitations and short-comings
inherent in the Egyptian regime 1 . Moreover,
they also suffered from their lack of any sub-
stantial rights to govern themselves or, at
least, to have a say in the way they were govern-
2
ed
The attitude of the Arab Host-States towards
the Palestinians was in itself a source of Pales-
tinian resentment and frustration. The condi-
tions under which the Palestinians in the Arab
Host-States lived proved far from being a political
haven or a source of satisfaction, and the Pales-
tinians had, therefore, a strong motive to try
and break out of these conditions through the
revival of a Palestinian identity as a political
reference point for the dispersed Palestinians
and as a means towards organizing the Palestinians
and defending their rights3.
3. The Collapse of the Unity Between Egypt and Syria
and the Success of the Algerian Revolution
The collapse of the unity between Egypt and
Syria in September 1961 and the success of the
Algerian Revolution in July 1962 were two major
LSee Chapter Five, pp. 2Lt9_256, 258-26l
3This does not apply to the Palestinians in Jordan
who wanted to preserve the unity of the West Bank
and Transjordan, and who struggled for changing the
regime in Jordan as a means towards improving the
conditions of the Palestinians in Jordan, and, above
all, as a means towards re-activating the role of
Jordan as a front-line country, in any battle with
Israel. For more information on this attitude,see,
Chapter Six, pp. 300-301.
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developments in Arab politics which had an impor- -
tant bearing in promoting the moves by some
Palestinians towards the revival of' a Palestinian
entity and the subsequent emergence of Palestin-
ian-sponsored political and para-military
organizations. This development which although
it originated from the contrasting experiences of
the failure of the unity between Egypt and Syria
and the success of :the Algerian Revolution, did,
however, lead, as far as the Palestinians were
concerned, to the same conclusion.
The failure of the unity between Egypt and
Syria and the dismemberment of the United Arab
Republic in September 1961 constituted a severe
blow to the cause of Arab unity in general, and
to the Palestinians in particular. This was due
to the fact that since 19119, the Palestinians
conducted most of their political activities and
based their strategy for the t Liberation of
Palestine t
 on Pan-Arabism and Arab unity1.
Accordingly, after 1961, the achievement of the
goal of Arab unity seemed so remote that it was
inevitable that the Palestinians should choose a
path other than that of Arab unity for the
achievement of their goals2.
The success of the Algerian Revolution in
July 1962 indicated that the line which was
adopted by the Algerians whereby the major burden
1 See, Chapter Three, pp .125-143.
did not mean, at any time, that the Palestinians
denounced Arab unity, but they simply realized that
it was impractical for them to wait until Arab unity
was achieved before they sought their goal of the
'Liberation of Palestine'. For more information
see,pp.3112-343.
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of initiating and conducting the struggle for
independence should be undertaken by the Alger-
ians themselves, with the role of the Arab
states and the Arab people as a supportive one,
whether in terms of political and diplomatic
support, or military and financial help. The
success of this Algerian line encouraged some
Palestinians to imitate the Algerian experience
and to adopt its line, both in terms of its
sponsorship of the struggle, and in terms of its
relations with other Arab states1.
Li. Culmination of Palestinian Frustration
After more than a decade since the 'catastrophe
in Palestine 2 , the Palestinians had come to
realize that very little had been done to bring
about tliberation'.
The pursuance of the struggle through the
cause of Arab unity which had flourished in the
early 1950's and reached its climax in 1958,was
severely hit in the early 1960's with the collapse
of the United Arab Republic.
The struggle through extra-national political
parties, whether religious, Communist, or Pan-
Arab, was also met with set-backs at different
times and for various reasons 2 . The extra-
national religious parties proved unsuccessful
interview with Khalil el-Wazir(Abu-Jihad):Beirut,
January 6, 1975. (Abu-Jihad, a prominent leader of
the Al-Fatah and one of the five original founders
of the Al-Fatah: Palestine National Liberation
Movement).
2See, Chapter Three, pp. 1 5 2-1 53, 156-157, 168-169.
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in the early 1950's because, among other things,
of their attitude towards President Nasser of
Egypt1 . The extra-national Communist parties
were no better because of their anti-pan-Arab
attitude on the one hand, and because of the
attitude of the Communist Party in Iraq in
1958-1959, on the other hand 2 . The extra-
national pan-Arab parties, although never
actually failures, were forced to play a minimal,
and for the most part, a subsidiary role to that
of Nasser3.
The struggle through Palestinian-sponsored
para-military activities was partly limited in
areas like the Gaza Strip, and was never
allowed to exist in other areas like Jordan and
Lebanon.
In contradistinction to all these set-backs
in the modes of struggle, the Arab States pro-
vided no other alternative modes of struggle
for the Palestinians. Furthermore, the Arab
States had no substantial achievements during
the period 19L19_196t1 which would have indicated
to the Palestinians that they,whether wholly,
partly or individually, were taking serious
steps for the 'liberation of Palestine t . All
these failures which were related, one way or
the other, to the sponsorship, guidance or
intervention of one or more of the Arab states,
prompted some Palestinians to try and take the
initiative in the form of Palestinian-sponsored
organizations
1lbid., pp . 152-153.
2Ibid., pp. 156-157.
3lbid., pp. 168-169.
See, Chapter Five, p . 267.
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Factors Related to the Arab States
The l95O t s were the era which witnessed the
growth of the Arab cold war. After 1949, inter-Arab
politics were revolving around shifts in alliances
among the various Arab states. Although originally
a reflection of old rivalries among the monarchical
ruling families in the Arab world, such rivalries
and shifts in alliances were, after 1958, revolving
around the attitude of Egypt, in the person of its
leader Gamal tAbdel_Nasser,towards other Arab states.
Until 1952, the three main centres of the Arab
cold war were the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan,
the Saudis in Saudi Arabia and King Farouk of Egypt.
The Saudis and the Hashemites mutual hatred and
animosity dated back to the days when the Saudis
drove the Hashemites out of Arabia. The Hashemites
had a dream of ruling Greater Syria, which the
Saudis wanted to frustrate, the Egyptians would
never endorse and the Syrians bitterly resisted.
Accordingly, the earliest Arab cold war alliance
after 1949, took the form of an Iraqi-Jordanian
alliance versus a Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian alliance.
The issue which stirred this alliance was, then, the
plan of King Abdullah of Transjordan to annex central
Palestine (the West Bank) to his Kingdom1.
In 1952, a coup d t tat in Egypt ushered in a
new era in Arab politics and political alignments
among the Arab states. The Egyptian coup, which
was destined to herald a revolution, marked a basic
shift in the criteria of alignment in Arab cold war
1See, Chapter Four, pp. 170-189.
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to that of t revolutiojiary ! Arab states and
t reactionary t Arab states. Such a classification
did not, however, immediately take a definitive
orthodox form. The beginning of this bipolariza-
tion took place in 1955 when the Western arms
embargo forced Egypt to buy arms from the communist
bloc. In 1955, the signing of the Baghdad Pact led
to a bitter Egyptian-sponsored attack on the Pact.
In doing so, Egypt was supported by both Saudi
Arabia and Syria against the ruling Hashemite family
in both Iraq and Jordan. The Suez Wax' of 1956
established Nasser as the undisputed hero of the
Arab masses, and the war itself gave rise to a
brief period of declared Arab solidarity in support
of Egypt. However, the introduction of the Eisen-
hower Doctrine to the Arab world, and the immediate
unqualified acceptance of that Doctrine by Lebanon,
Jordan and Saudi Arabia put an end to the truce
among the Arab states. This time, the bipolariza-
tion was more logical as it contained Egypt and
Syria versus Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.
Most important, however, was the fact that the
acceptance by Lebanon, of the Eisenhower Doctrine,
triggered a civil war in Lebanon with the explicit
aim of forbidding the then President of Lebanon,
Camille Chamoun, from renewing his term in office,
and the implicit aim of re-securing the traditional
neutral foreign policy of Lebanon, which Chamoun
violated in his strongly pro-American policy. More-
over, the attitude of Syria towards the Eisenhower
Doctrine, resulted in an American-inspired move by
Thrkey to mass her army on the Syrian borders1.
'Malcom Kerr. The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967: A study
of Ideolo ry in Politics, second edition (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 6.
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This eventually prompted a call for the unification-
of Egypt and Syria which actually happened in Feb-
ruary 1958. In May 1958, the civil war in Lebanon
broke out and ended in the reaffirmation of the
neutrality of Lebanon. Two months later, in July
1958, the Iraq revolution put an end to the Hashemite
rule there, and the balance seemed to shift radically
to the side of the "revolutionary" Arab states.
However, the anti-unionist attitude of the new Iraqi
leader, General Abdel-Karim Qassem, and the rise of
the communists to power in Iraq was destined to
force new alliances in the Arab world. This time,
the Saudis joined the United Arab Republic in con-
demning the spread of communism in trevolutionaryt
Iraq (in Augist 1959).
On September 28, 1961, the secession of Syria
from the United Arab Republic meant the actual
isolation of Egypt. The anti-Egyptian alliance
included, then, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Iraq. However, the independence of Algeria in July
1962, and the Yemeni revolution in September of the
same year boosted the morale of Egypt as the leader
of the t revolutionary t Arab states.
On February 8, 1963, Qassem t s regime in Iraq
was overthrown by the Ba 1 th Party branch in Iraq,
and a month later, the Syrian secessionist regime
was similarily overthrown by the Bath Party in
Syria, which immediately declared that the aim of
the new Syrian regime was to lead Syria back to
union with Egypt. Once more, things seemed to go
favourably for Egypt and the Arab Irevolutionary
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states. However, unity talks between Egypt, Syria
and Iraq which commenced on March ill, 19 63, ended
on April 17, with the Tripartite Union Agreement
between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The collapse of
this Agreement was an inevitable consequence of the
grave mistrust between Nasser and the Ba t th Party
which had its roots in the union period when in
1959, the Ba t th Party withdrew all its Ministers
from the Government of' the United Arab Republic1,
in addition to the signing, by some Bat thi leaders2,
of the secession manifesto 3 . The final blow to the
Tripartite Union Agreement took place exactly three
months after it was signed, when, on July 18, 1963,
a Syrian Nasserite - sponsored attempt to overthrow
the Ba t th regime in Syria failed. In November 1963,
the Iraqi President, Abdel-Salam Arif initiated a
coup from the top whereby he eliminated the Batth
presence from the Iraqi regime.
At the end of 1963, the Arab World was in total
conflict. The United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia
were fighting each other in Yemen. Syria and Iraq
were exchanging propaganda attacks through the media,
as were Egypt and Syria. In addition, Egypt and
Syria were exchanging propaganda attacks with Jordan.
Algeria and Morocco were fighting each other over
a border dispute. Similarily, relations between
Algeria and Tunisia were cool because of a border
dispute. The recognition by. Tunisia of the indepen-
dence of Mauritania, which Morocco claimed as part
of its territory, reduced relations between Tunisia
1}lalcom Kerr, op.cit., pp. 15- 21.
2They were Akram al-Howrani and Salah Beitar, See,
Ibid.., p. 45.
3Ibi.
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and Morocco to mere formalities. Only Kuwait,
Sudan, Libya and Lebanon were able to maintain
more or less friendly relations with the Arab
states.
Accordingly, on the eve of the holding of the
First Arab Summit Conference the background to the
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion was characterized by a grave disarray on the
Arab scene, in which most of the Arab states,
especially those neighbouring Israel, were at each
other's throats. More important, as a consequence
of that disarray the period l9t9-l963 was characte-
rized by the absence of any Arab states-sponsored
steps towards the 2 liberation of Palestine'.
Background To The Arab States-Sponsored Attempts
To Revive Palestinian Entity: l9Li9 - l96ti
The earliest official mention of the issue of
Palestinian representation was made in the appendix
of the Arab League Charter. It says:
"Considering Palestine t s particular position
and until Palestine attains its independence,
the Arab League Council is commissioned to
select a Palestinian Arab delegate to
participate in its proceedings".
The appointment of a Palestinian Arab delegate
was not, however, made until September 23, 1952 ,
when the Arab League Council resolved that,"because
the All-Palestine Government has not been able to
assume its duties, in view of the circumstances,
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the Premier of the Government will represent Pales-
tine in the Arab League"1.
The continued symbolic existence of an All-
Palestine Government in the person of its Prime
Minister, Ahmad Hilmi Abdel-Baki, as the represen-
tative of Palestine at the Arab League, until his
eath in 1963, did not really indicate that no other
rab-sponsored attempts were made to establsih some
orm of Palestinian entity.
In 1958, as a result of earlier demands by the
alestinians in the Gaza Strip 2 , the Egyptian govern-
ent suggested a meeting to discuss the revival of
he Palestinian entity. The first meeting was held
u Cairo early 1958. It was attended by six
alestinians from the Gaza Strip 3 , together with two
epresentatives of the Palestine Club in Cairo, one
epresentative of the All-Palestine Government 5 , and
wo representatives of the Arab Higher Committee
he first two sessions of the meeting were also
ttended by Haj Amin Husseini 7and Ahmad Hilmi Abdel-
ai8 . The Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab
Adli Hashshad. The Palestinian People and Their
Repatriation(Cairo,l96 L1-), p.103. For more information
on the All-Palestine Government, see, pp. 275-278.
An interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
They were Zuhdi Abu - Sha t ban, Mustafa Abdel-Shafi,
Qassem el-Farra, Issam Agha, Gamal el-Surani, and
Munir El-Rayyes, See, an interview with Munir el-
Rayyes.
They wer Sharif el_Ja ! abari and Fadel Zaydan.
See, Ibid.
5He was Mohmood Najm, See, Ibid.
°They were Mohammad Munif el-Husseini and Sheikh
Sabri Abdin, See, Ibid.
7He was the Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee.
For more information see, Chapter Two, pp. 51-52.
8	 ..He was the Prime Minister of the All-Palestine
Government. For more information see, pp. 275-278.
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League, Sayyed Nofal, was asked to preside over
the meeting "in order to give the meeting an official
form and in order to indicate that the holding of
this meeting was approved by the Arab League1".
A second meeting was, however, held towards
the end of 1958. In addition to the participants
in the first meeting, the second meeting was attend-
ed by a representative of the Palestinians in
2Lebanon and three representatives of the Pales-
tinians in Syria 3 . This meeting resolved, inter
alia, that all efforts must be directed towards
reviving the Palestinian identity, and that an attempt
must be made to establish some form of Palestinian
organization which would serve as a medium for
organizing the Palestinians and have a leadership
4role
The outcome of these two meetings was reflected
in the recommendation, suggested by Egypt and
approved, in March 1959, by the Council of Arab
,League, "to reorganize the Palestinian people whose
voice would be heared all over the world through
representatives selected by the Palestinian people."
Once more 5 , this recommendation met with the
bitter opposition of the Jordanian regime, and as
a result, this recommendation was not discussed
interview with Munir el-Rayyes.(trans. L.K.)
2He was Khaled el-Yashruti, See, Ibid.
3One of them was Kamal Tuffaha, See, Ibid.
interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
5See the attitude of Jordan towards the All-Pales-
tine Government, pp. 276-278.
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seriously and no steps to implement it were taken by
the meeting of the Council of the Arab League held
in Casablanca in September 1959. In August 1960, a
meeting of the Council of the Arab League was held
in Chtaura, Lebanon, to discuss, among other things,
"the re-organization of the Palestinian people" and
"the formation of a Palestinian army in the Arab
Host-States" 1 . Two Palestinian delegations, one
representing the Gaza Strip 2 , and the other repre-
senting the Arab Higher Committee 3 , went to attend
the meetings of the Council of the Arab League
during its discussions on Palestine, but were not
4allowed to attend • This was mainly due to the
opposition of the Jordanian delegation, which was
against the very principle of discussing the revival
of the Palestinian identity on the grounds that
Jordan was Palestine and Jordan represented the
Palestinians 5 . The meeting at Chtaura failed, and
all efforts at mediation between the pro-Palestinian
entity attitude of the United Arab Republic and the
anti-Palestinian entity attitude of Jordan failed6.
A compromise solution seemed, however, to come about
in June 1961, when a Technical Committee, appointed
by the Secretary-General of the Arab League and
consisting of representatives for the United Arab
'Falastin Daily Newspaper. (Jerusalem) ,(23/8/l960),
pp. 1 and 4
2Members of this delegation were Munir el-Rayyes,
Abdallah Abu-Sitteh, Gamal el-Surani, and Dawood
Sayegh. See, an interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
3Members of this delegation were Emil el-Ghuri, Izzat
Tannous and Khalil el-Tabari. See, Ibid.
4An interview with Munir el-Rayyes.
5Falastine Daily Newspaper, p.cit., (27/8/1960),
pp. land4.
6Ibid.
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Republic, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, held a
meeting in Cairo and decided to recommend the con-
tinued support of an All-Palestine Government both
materially and politically as a substitute for the
establishment of a new Palestinian entity1.
The death, in 1963, of the representative of
Palestine at the Arab League and the Prime Minister
of the defunct All-Palestine Government, Ahmad
Hilmi Abdel-]3aki, and the appointment of his succe-
sser, re-activited the issue of the revival of
Palestinian entity. With the active support of
Egypt, Ahmad Shukairy was chosen in 1963 as the new
representative of Palestine at the Arab League.
Palestine Liberation Organization: An Arab States-
ponsored Form of Palestinian Entity, 1964-1967
On January 13, 1964, the First Arab Summit
Conference was held in Cairo to discuss ways and
means to prevent Israel from diverting the waters
of the Jordan River. This Conference resolved,
among other things, that the organization of the
Palestinian people constituted one way of repelling
the threats of Zionist danger 2 . The task of
organizing the Palestinian people was entrusted to
the newly-appointed representative of Palestine at
the Arab League,Ahmad Shukairy.
1Ahmad Shukairy. Mm A1-Qimmah ha A1-Hazimah
(From Summit To Defeat), (Beirut: Dar Al-Taliah,
197 1 ), pp. 57-60.
2Arab League, Statement by the Council of the Kings
and Presidents of State ( 17th January, 1964),p.l.
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After three .rnonths of consultations, the First
Palestine National Congress was held in the city of
Jerusalem on Nay 28, 1964, and was attended by 422
delegates representing the Palestinians in the Arab
World1 . The Congress approved the projected covenant
and Fundamental Law and declared the establishment of
Ithe Palestine Liberation Organization " as a mobiliz-
Lng leadership of the forces of the Palestine Arab
)eople to wage the battle of liberation, as a shield
ror the rights and aspirations of the people of
'alestine and as a road to victory" 2 . The Second
rab Summit Conference held in Alexandria on Septem-
er 1, 1964, welcomed the establishment of the
'alestine Liberation Organization.
.ttitudes of the Palestinians Towards the Establish-
nent of the Palestine Liberation Organization 1964-1965
The attitude of the Palestinians towards the
stablishment of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-.
ion at both the level of the Palestinian masses,
nd on the level of the Palestinian organizations
)perating in the Arab world at the time of the
stablishment of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
bion can be analysed separately.
On the level of the Palestinian masses there was
. general enthusiasm for the establishment of the
alestine Liberation Organization3 . This enthusiasm
1	 .Palestine Liberation Organization. The First Pales-
tine National Congress: Its Proceedings and Resolu-.
tions, pp. 77-85.
2lbid., p. 42.
3Al-Jihaci Daily Newspaper. Vol. 12, Nos. 3257 & 3258
(Jerusalem, 25 & 26 February 1964). Also see, Al-Kifah
Daily Newspaper. No. 1827 (Beirut, 26 February 1964).
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derived its strength among the Palestinians in
Jordan from the fac.t that the establishment of the
PLO was not meant to separate the West Bank from
Transjordan, but rather to allow the Palestinians
to play an active, and, if possible, a leading role
in any future Arab effort towards the tliberation
of Palestine t1 . However, as for the Palestinians at
large, the establishment of the PLO as a represen-
tative body of the Palestinian people was, itself,
an act of self-fulfillment for the dispersed Pales-
tinian people who had lacked an identity since 191t82.
Moreover, the legitimacy endowed on the PLO through
its endorsement and recognition by the First and
Second Arab Summit Conferences, was a source of
comfort for the majority of the Palestinians who did
not want to have an entity of their own at the
expense of dissociating themselves from the other
Arab states, or, more precisely, at the expense of
relieving the Arab States from their responsibili-
ties towards the 1 liberation of Palestine2.
The attitudes of the Palestinian organizations
and Pan-Arab parties with primary Palestinian pre-
occupations towards the establishment of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization were, generally speak-
ing, less enthusiatic than that of the Palestinian
masses at large. Such attitudes, which ranged from
complete opposition to procedural opposition and
cautious support, were conditional, among other
things, upon three factors. Unlike the Palestinian
1	 /An interview with Walid Kamhawi. Kamhawi was a
member of the First Palestine National Congress and
a member of the first Executive Committee of the
Palestine Liberation Organization). Also see,
Al-Jihad Daily Newspaper, op.cit.
interview with Walid Kanihawi, op.cit.
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masses, the Palestinian organizations did not feel
the self-fulfillment which the dis-organized Pales-
tinians felt upon the establishment of the PLO
Indeed some of the Palestinian - oriented organiza-
tions like the Al-Ba t th Party and the Arab Nationa-
list Movement preached doctrines and ideologies
which were not particularily enthusiastic about the
establishment of a purely Palestinian organization
such as the PLO.Lastly, and most important, was the
fact that the attitude of the Palestinian organiza-
tions towards the Palestine Liberation Oranization
was, by and large, a reflection of the attitudes of
the various Arab States with which most of these
organizations had special bilateral relationships.
The attitude of Syria, for example, was bound to
condition the attitude of the Al_Ba t th Party towards
the PLO. Similarily, the attitude of Saudi Arabia
towards the PLO was bound to condition, among other
things, that of the Arab Higher Committe whose funds
were almost exclusively Saudi Arabian.
The following pages will be devoted to an
analysis of the attitudes of the major Palestinian
organizations towards the establishment of the
1Palestine Liberation Organization . These are the
Arab Higher Committee, the Palestinian branch of
the Arab Nationalist Movement and the Arab Ba'th
Socialist Party.
The Attitude of The Arab Higher Committee
The attitude of the Arab Higher Committe towards
the establishment of the Palestine Liberation
1.	 .	 .With the exception of the Al-Fatah Organization
which, in 1964, had not yet declared its existence.
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organization did not derive its significance out of'
any real importance attached to a certain role,
whether political or otherwise, played by the Arab
Higher Committee, but rather as a reflection, on
the one hand, of the historical importance attached
to the Arab Higher Committee as the last form of
Palestinian political organization in the pre-l9l49
period, and on the other hand, as a reflection of
a part of organized Palestinian public opinion which,
although limited in its existence to the leadership,
could not be completely discarded.
The attitude of the Arab Higher Committee
towards the establishment of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization was, in the beginning, concilia-
tory, in the sense that it declared" its good
intentions to cooperate with any body who works,
truely and sincerely, in the service of the Pales-
tinian cause, and who fights firmly and strongly,
any policy which aims at liquidating it"'. However,
this attitude was later developed into an attitude
of declared opposition and hostility. This attitude
was justified, by the Arab Higher Committee, on the
grounds that the formation of the First Palestine
National Congress and the Executive Committe of the
Palestine Liberation Organization was done by
appointment rather than through elections 2 . This,
the Arab Higher Committee argued, did not prove
that the PLO represented the Palestinians at large
and had secured their consent 3 . Accordingly, the
Arab Higher Committee opposed the PLO and withheld
its support for it.
1A1_Usbu ! Al-Arabi Magazine.(Beirut, September 196k)
p 34.(trans. L.K.)
alastin Magazine. No. kk (Beirut: Arab Higher
Committee, October 196k), pp. 23-2k.
3lbid.
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However, the real motives behind the opposition -
of the Arab Higher Committee to the establishment
of the Palestine Liberation Organization were
different and deeper from that of 1ections, for,
after all, the Arab Higher Committee itself had
never been the product of popular elections. There
were three main factors behind the hostile attitude
of the Arab Higher Committee towards the PLO. First,
it was an act of self-defence in the sense that had
the Arab Higher Committee supported the Palestine
Liberation Organization, then, very little argument
would have been left for the Arab Higher Committee
to remain in existence, rather than be dissolved
into the Palestine Liberation Organization. This
was, more or less, made clear by the Arab Higher
Committee when it argued, though impicitly, that
the establishment of the Palestine Liberation
Organization should not be at the expense of other
existing Palestinian organizations 1 . This implied
a non-recognition by the Arab Higher Committee that
the PLO represented all the Palestinians. Second,
there was a clear role for some Arab states such as
Saudi Arabia who were either against Al-Shukairy
personally or, like Syria, against the so-called
"ProNasser orientation" of the PLO, in promoting
and encouraging the Arab Higher Committe to adopt
an attitude of opposition to the PLO 2 . Finally,
the personal rivalry between Haj Amin Husseini 3
 and
4Ahmad Shukairy as to who represented the
Llbid., pp. 26-27.
2The attitude of the Arab states towards the PLO
will be dealt with on pp. 313-318.
3He was Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee.
4	 .He was Chairman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
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Palestinians and spoke on their behalf played a role
in determining the attitude of Haj Amin Husseini
towards the PLO. Clearly, there was no room for
cooperation between the two, since such cooperation
would have meant that one of the two had to concede
that the other represented the Palestinians.
['he Attitude of the Arab Nationalist Movement
Basically, the attitude of the Arab Nationalist
4ovement towards the PLO was in favour of the prin-
iple of having an organization which would repre-
sent the Palestinian people1.
"The Palestinian people(have)endured very
difficult circumstances during the past
sixteen years. Such circumstances preven-
ted this people from exercising its duties
in serving its cause as fully as expected.
However, a new awakening has begun to
manifest itself in many forms; this expre-
sses the determination of the Palestinian
people to perform its duties in order to
recover its usurped homeland. The Summit
Conference gave the Palestinian people
the opportunity which prescribes to the
organized forces the duty of making use of
this unique experiment in Arab co-operation
in order to seriously get ready for
liberating Palestine"2.
1AlTJsbu tAlArabi, op.cit., pp. 3t-35.
2Arab Political Documents: l96t. Doc. k2, "Joint
Communique on the Palestine Entity Issued by the Arab
Nationalist Movement, the Federation of Palestine
Students, the Palestine Liberation Front and the
Palestine Arab Youth in Lebanon", pp. 80-82(Beirut:
The American University of Beirut, 1965) p.80.
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This attitude, however, while in support of the -
idea of reviving the Palestinian identity and crea-
ting a Palestinian entity, was not similarily ex-
pressed in terms of the procedure which was adopted
by Shukairy in his making of the PLO1.
The roots of the supporting attitude of' the Arab
Nationalist Movement to the revival of Palestinian
identity could be traced back to the good relations
and co-ordination between Nasser and the Arab
Nationalist Movement at that time and the support
which Nasser rendered to the idea of reviving the
Palestinian identity. More important, the revival
of a Palestinian identity which was the product of
an all-Arab decision was not, therefore, in contra-
diction with the Pan-Arab orientation of the Arab
Nationalist Movement which had always accorded the
Palestine Problem a central concern in its Pan-
Arab struggle2.
The roots of the opposing attitude, by the Arab
Nationalist Movement, to the procedure adopted by
Ahmad Shukairy in his making of the PLO should be
seen in terms of the immediate interests of the
Arab Nationalist Movement as an established popular
party to which the procedure of' Shukairy gave no
role to play in the making of the PLO. This was
made clear in the following statement issued by the
Arab Nationalist Movement togother with some of its
off-shoots3.
1	 .For more information see, pp. 309-314, 318-320.
2See, Chapter Three,pp. 161-162.
3See, P. 305 , footnote No. 1.
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"The Palestine Entity shall emanate from
free elections that truly express the
authentic revolutionary will of the people.
If for some over-powering reasons, the
elections can not be conducted, then
the revolutionary people t s will must be
represented in a general national con-
ference. A provisional committee that
represents all the revolutionary organiza-
tions and active forces shall call for
this conference which will guarantee for
the Entity a revolutionary character".
This demand which was not met by Shukairy on
the grounds that the incorporation of existing
Palestinian political organizations and parties
within the PLO would lead to making the PLO an
arena for conflicting political parties and
organizations which should not be the case, because
the struggle for Palestine necessitates that the
only loyalty should be to Palestine rather than to
a political party or organization" 2 . This exclus-
ion, by Shukairy, of existing political parties
and organizations as the popular base of the PLO
led the Arab Nationalist Movement to issue a
statement on June 14, 1964, in which it declared
that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestine National Congress" did not meet the minimum
requirements of the Palestinian masses" 3 . The same
statement spelled out these minimum requirements
by saying:
1Arab Political Documents: 1964. Doc. No.42, op.cit.,
p. 81.
2A1-Musawwar Magazine. (Cairo, 28/5/19 64), p . 27.
(trans. L.K.)
3Arab Political Documents: 1964. Doc. No. 100,
"Statement by the Arab Nationalist Movement Con-
cerning the Palestine Congress and the Palestine
Liberation Organization", pp.243-246. (Beirut:the
American University of Beirut, 1965),p. 245.
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"These (Palestinian) masses want the
Entity, the Liberation Organization and
the Congress to create an effective
Palestinian military outfit. They demand
that the Palestinians be properly organi-
zed, that the Liberation Organization
should have collective leadership, that
it should work in a true revolutionary
fashion according to a clear mandate,
and that it should procure for itself
an independence which would allow it to
function effectively and to be free of all
pressures from reactionary quarters"1.
This reaction by the Arab Nationalist Movement
to the attitude of Shukairy towards political parties
and organizations led, eventually, to a rift between
the PLO and existing Palestinian political parties
and organizations. The outcome of this rift was
catastrophic to the status and prospects of the PLO
as the mother-organization and representative of
the Palestinian people, because other Palestinian
political parties and organizations would not con-
ceive of the PLO as being the mother-organization,
but rather as another Palestinian political party
or organization, with no legitimate right to contain
and to represent other Palestinian political parties
and organizations.
"The Arab Nationalist Movement firmly
believes that the failure of the Jerusalem
Congress can in no way affect either the
Palestinian spirit or the revolutionary
1Ibid.
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course chosen by the Palestinians since
the catastrophe. It wishes to reaffirm
that the responsibility for serious and
consistent hard work which can alone
cope with the dangers of the battle for
the liberation rests with the revolu-
tionary elements and forces. These
forces must relentlessly pursue their
attempt to establish a unified force
capable of standing up to all suspicious
movements that are determined to crush
the genuine Palestinian revolutionary
spirit. These forces must be ever on
their guard against weakness, resigna-
tion and compromise which were allowed
to dominate the Entity. The poor results
achieved by the Congress are, once more,
a proof of the fact that the masses alone
are the beginning, the means and the
end and that our path must lie through
effective revolutionary organizationIl•
The Attitude of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party
According to the Arab Bath Socialist Party,
"The Palestine entity...... is the practical
2
embodiment of the goals of Palestinian struggle"
However, the Ba 1 th Party did not accept that the
idea of the Palestine entity as laid down by the
First Arab Summit Conference was enough 3 . The
1lbid., p. 2L6.
2lbid.,Doc. No. 35, "Statement of the National
Command of the Ba t th Party Concerning the Palestine
Entity", p. 70.
3lbid., p. 71.
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alBa'th Party demanded that, if the Palestine entity
were to become viable and capable of proper develop-
ment, it should obtain the following conditions:
First, that the proposed Palestine entity should have
a popular organization which would represent the
Palestinian masses and would enjoy an "actual autho-
.ty to exercise all the rights which are derived
om the Palestine Arab people's complete sovereignty
•er their homeland" 1 . Second, the proposed Pales-
ne entity should have a Palestinian army, commanded
• Palestinians under the higher authority of the
vilian leadership of the Palestine entity. The
:istence of this army would "guarantee the develop-
nt of the entity as a force for liberation and
volution, and not as a substitute for these"2.
.ird, that the proposed Palestine entity should have
.e financial and moral support of the Arab states
thout being subjected, in consequence, to any in-
uence or pressures 3 . These conditions were later
corporated within the memorundum presented by the
nan delegation to the Second Arab Summit Con.
-rence held on September 10, l96 l . However, the
titude of the al_Ba t th Party towards the Palestine
beration Organization could best be detected through
.e attitude of Syria towards the PLO which will be
scussed in a forthcoming part of this chapter.
bid.
_bid.
3lbid.
Ibid., Doc. No. 171, "The Memorundum Presented
by the Syrian Delegation to the Second Arab Summit
Conference Concerning the Palestine Entity "
p. 387.
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Palestinian Conception of the PLO Compared with the
Arab States Conception of the PLO :1964 - 1965
The establishment of the Palestine Liberation
Organization was an official Arab response to a
Palestinian popular demand'. The demand was basic-
ally a logical outcome of more than two decades of
neglecting the Palestinians and depriving them from
playing any substantial role to serve their cause
2in Palestine • The Palestinians believed that
"they had potential and resources which they could
utilize for serving their cause and that they only
needed a Palestinian political framework and organi-
zation to do it" 3 . The Arab States however did not
allow this belief tobe translated into action4.
Furthermore, the Arab States, while preventing the
Palestinians from organizing themselves and taking
any initiative to serve their cause directly, did
not themselves take any serious initiatives on the
road to the "liberation of Palestine"5.
The response of the Arab states, which was ex-
pressed through the approval of the First and Second
Arab Summit Conferences to the establishment of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, was an accumula-
tion of a long process of Arab political failures
which were characterized by an almost continuous
process of Arab cold war
1lnterviews with Hayder Abdel-Shafi and Walid Kamhawi.
2See, pp. 275-287, 289-290.
interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi.(trans. L.K.).
4See, pp. 275-287.
5See, pp. 291-295.
6See, Pp . 291-295,
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The response of the Arab states, motivated as
it was by political conditions, limited the role
which the PLO was meant to play. The true nature of
this role, which was never made explicity clear by
the Arab states, reflected itself in the dilemma
which confronted many o the members of the First
xecutive Committee of the PLO, who did not really
mow the extent of the powers and freedom of action
Lccorded to the PLO by . the Arab states.
"As a matter of fact, things were not
clear before us. We did not know the
extent of the PLO military and political
powers and the degree of freedom accorded,
by the Arab states, to the PLO to practice
its authority over the Palestinian people.
More ambigious was the relationship and
degree of co-ordination between the PLO
1
and the Arab states"
The Palestinian conception of the PLO was clearly
[ifferent from that of the majority of the Arab States.
)uring the first meeting of the First Executive Co-
imittee of the PLO, held in Jerusalem on August 25,
.96k, a memorundum which was presented by one of the
,embers 2 , was accepted as a basis for discussion.
his memorundum which treated, among other things,
;he aims and duties of the Palestine Liberation
)rganization revealed that the Palestinians thought
interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi.(trans. L.K.);
Also see, an interview with Walid Kamhawi, (Both
Abdel-Shafi and Kamhawi were members of the First
Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation
Organization).
2He was Bahjat Abu-Gharbiyyeh.
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of the PLO as an organized framework for leading and
mobilizing the Palestinian people politically and
militarily in preparation for the "liberation of
Palestine". In this context, the memorandum stress
four major points as being the principal aims of the
1PLO . First, to point, out the independent Pales-
;inian character and Palestinian will and determina-
ion to liberate the occupied parts of Palestine.
econd, the preservation of the Palestine Problem
Lnd defending it against any attempts to solve it in
Lny manner short of total liberation. Third, an
xtensive military and political mobilization of the
'alestinian people "in order to make them capable
Lnd ready for effective participation in the libera-
ion of occupied territories when the time of libera-
ion comes". This also covered the holding of general
lections for electing a Palestinian National Congress
rhjch would also lead to an elected Executive Committee.
ourth, leading the Palestinian people, both as army
nd as people, along side the armies of the Arab
tates when the war of liberation eruptst•
This optimistic Palestinian conception of the
ims and duties of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
ion was quickly brought to an end. During the Second
.rab Summit Conference, the PLO delegation was told by
he Syrian President, General Amin El-Hafez, to pack
nd leave because the Arab states were not serious
Lbout the Palestine Liberation Organization 2
Similarily, when the then Egyptian Vice-President,
'Unpublished Document. (from the private papers of
Valid kamnawi, member of the First Executive
Committee of the PLO). (trans. L.K.).
2 interview with Valid Kamhawi.
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Zakariyya Muhyiddin, was asked about the U, A. R.
conception of the nature of the role to be played by
the PLO, he emphasized that such a role would be
mainly confined to "representing the Palestinian
people on the international scene, as well as, pro-
pagating the Palestinian cause"1.
This Arab states' conception reflected itself on
bhe policy which was pursued by the PLO during its
arly stages and which was mainly directed at opening
information offices and sending delegations to
rarious international conferences. This, however,
ias not tolerated by the Palestinians who kept on
lemanding that the major activities of the PLO should
e in the military area and in the area of popular
)rganization of the Palestinian masses 2 . The imple-
nentation of these two major demands was frustrated
by the Arab states.
The decision to form a Palestinian liberation
army was taken by the Executive Committee shortly
before the Second Summit Conference was held. How-
nver, in the background of this decision was the
Palestinian popular demand and the resolutions of the
'irst Palestine National Congress which called, inter
alia, for the "immediate military training of all
able Palestinians, men and women, on a permanent and
compulsory basis", "the formation of Palestinian
interview with Walid Kamhawi, (Kamhawi was the
PLO member who met Vice-President Muhyiddin).
2	 .Al-Jihad Newspaper, op 0 cit. A1-Kifah Newspaper,
op.cit.; A1-Fluriyyah Magazine, (Beirut) Vol. 5
Nos. 205, 206, 211, 214, 216, 220, respective pages
being, 8-9, 8-9, 5, 12, 7, 7.
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military regular regiments, as well as efficient and
effective commando regiments", and
	 practice of
popular resistence and civil defence among the ranks
of the Palestinian people"1.
The Arab endorsement of the PLO decision to form
Palestine liberation army did not indicate an Arab
Lcceptance that the PLO should exercise full autho-
ity in such areas as military action. The size of
unds allocated by the Second Arab Summit Conference
or the Palestine Liberation Army, which were 5.5
il1ion pounds sterling, gave an indication as to
he extent of military strength the Arab States had
.n mind for the proposed Palestinian army. Moreover,
;he attitude of countries like Jordan and Egypt,
rhich controled the largest concentrations of Pales-
;inian populace and Palestinian land to any possible
Lttempt by the PLO to exercise full authority in
reating such Palestinian institutions as an army
nd a popular organization, was of crucial impor-
;ance, and a reflection of the Arab states' concep-
;ion of the PLO.
In dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organi-
ation, the basic official attitude of the Jordanian
egime was that "the problem of Palestine is the
2
roblem of Jordan, and that Jordan is Palestine"
Lccordignly, the Jordanian regime consistently argued
Lgainst the development of autonomous PLO institutions
1
Palestine Liberation Organization. The First Pales-
tine National Congress: Its Proceedings and
Resolutions, p. 10.
2Arab Political Documents: 1965. Doc. No.152 "Speech
of King Hussein in the Royal Palace". pp. 35b-359
(Beirut: The American University of Beirut, 1966),
p. 358.
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in Jordan on the basis that such institution were
existing in Jordan, and since Jordan and Palestine
were one and the same, then the PLO could function
through those existing Jordanian institutions, bc-
cause the development of Palestinian institutions
alongside existing Jordanian ones might undermine
Lational unity.
"Quite recently the sons of Palestine have
begun to organize their ranks else where
than in Jordan, but we started this our-
selves a long time ago. We have recently
heard certain strange rumours and suspicious
gossip which can only be intended to split
our unity. This we can not in any way
tolerate. Furthermore, such rumours are
underhanded attempts to violate Arab
unanimity and Arab plans for liberation by
a unified command to which we must offer
our total support"1.
The Jordanian attitude was thus a refusal to have
t Palestinian army on its territory. Similarily, the
Fordanian regime refused to permit the formation of a
'alestinian popular organization to serve as a means
or mobilizing the Palestinian masses. This attitude
i-as made clear by King Hussein of Jordan, when he
said in his speech of October 4, 1965:
"There is to be no organization in this
country which does not originate from the
need to organize through the proper national
channels, and there is to be no military
recruitment except within the ranks of the
'Ibid., pp. 357-358.
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armed forces. Nor is there to be any
activity which could adversely affect the
people i s
 unity, morale and development"1.
The attitude of Egypt was more positive than that
of Jordan. Egypt agreed that the PLO could open
amps for military training in the Gaza Strip. More-
)ver, Egypt offered all the assistance needed for
)Uildiflg the first two regiments of the Palestine
iberation Army, whether in terms of instructors,
quipment or weaponry 2 . However, Egypt was careful
iot to give the Palestinian army in the Gaza Strip
omplete independence, but rather to keep it under
gyptian supervision3 . This meant that, in practice,
;here was a limit on the extent of the support ren-
Lered by Egypt to the PLO, in both the military
phere and the sphere of popular organization. Egypt
Lad no intention of giving the PLO an unlimited free
Land to organize the Palestinian masses and to under-
;ake military activities from bases in the Gaza Strip5.
'his attitude by Egypt was legitimized on the grounds
hat any Palestinian military action or build-up in
;he Gaza Strip might unvite Israeli reprisals which
rould definitely involve the Egyptian army. However,
he gap in this Egyptian attitude was the fact that
t was not declared. In other words, while Egypt did
ot make her attitude of limited PLO authority in the
Ibid., p. 358.
An interview with Hayder Abdel-Shafi.
3lbid.
i d.
5lbid.; also see, an interview with Valid Kamhawi.
The same argument could hold true in Jordan, Syria
and Lebanon.
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Gaza Strip known, every effort was made by Egypt and
the other Arab states to make the Palestinians feel
that the PLO enjoyed full powers as the leadership
of the Palestinian people, and that the PLO received
unlimited support from the Arab states.
alestine Liberation Organization : Ideology and
olitical Strategy
From its establishment, the Palestine Liberation
rganiza-tion (PLO) did not adopt a particular ideo-
ogy or political doctrine, other than its stated
im of the 'Liberation of Palestine". Its formation,
hich started from the top to the bottom, and its
ubjection, during its formative stage, to the various
onflicting interests and strains of inter-Arab poli-
ics, were among the important reasons for the absence
f a well-defined ideology and political strategy.
he Palestine Liberation Organization, as an outcome
f the policy of Arab Summit Conferences, had to be
ased on a policy of compromise, that is, the PLO
tself was a compromise solution. This compromise
as all the more fundamental in that the activities to be
ponsored by the PLO as the representative of the
alestinian people meant that the scope of the PLO
perations had to cut across the various interests
nd political orientations of many Arab states, which
ere themselves in conflict. This meant that the
LO, in order to be able to function, was forced to
adopt a policy of appeasement and compromise.
The "ideology of liberation" and the political
strategy adopted by the PLO and manifested in the
Palestine National Covenant stressed the links which
bind "Palestine" and the Palestinian people with the
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Arab World and the Arab nation 1 . It also stressed
the right of the Arab Palestinian people, wherever
they might be, to return to Palestine and to live
there on equal terms with Jews who were living in
Palestine in 1947, or their children. Furthermore,
the Covenant expressed, as part of its political
strategy, its rejection of the establishment of the
;tate of Israel, the Balfour Declaration and the
ritish Mandate as being "illegal", "false" and a
fraud" 3 . Zionism was also denounced as being U a
olonialist movement in its inception, aggressive
nd expansionist in its goals, racist and segrega-
;ionist in its configurations and fascist in its
4
reans and aims" • The Covenant demanded from all
ations to consider Zionism "an illegal movement and
o outlaw its presence and activities"5.
The Covenant included other articles which were
rimarily meant to appease some Arab states, although,
s we will see, such an appeasement was sometimes at
he expense of the legitimate authority that the PLO
as supposed to exercise over the Palestinian people.
rticle 24 of the Covenant confirmed that the PLO
Des not exercise any sovereignty over Palestinian
erritories under Arab control. This, of course, was
ant to appease the Arab states concerned. In
ractice, however, the adoption of this article, which
ems to have been, under the circumstances, a tmustt
r the PLO, resulted in a serious hindrence to its
work and activities 6 . Article 26 which confirmed
'See, the Appendix, articles 1, 3, 8, 11, 12, 13 & 14.
2lbid., articles, 6 and 7.
3lbid., articles 17 and 18.
4Ibid., article, 19.
5Ibid., article 20.
6See, pp.315-318.
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that the PLO "does not interfere in the internal
affairs of any Arab State", was used, by some Arab
states, mainly Jordan, to put limitations on the
activities of the PLO on the grounds that such activi-
ties constituted an intervention in the internal
affairs of the state, since the situation of the
alestinians residing in the Host-states, especially
s related to political and military activities, was
iways viewed as being an internal matter subject to
he domestic regulations and security of the state
Dncerned.
alestine Liberation Organi7ation: Military Strategy
The military strategy adopted by the PLO upon its
stablishment was conventional in the sense that the
LO adopted a strategy which aimed at the "Liberation
I Palestine" through a Palestinian military role
upportive to that of the Arab states. In other words,
he PLO, upon its establishment, based its military
trategy on the assumption that the major burden for
he "Liberation of Palestine" rested on the Arab states
rid the Arab armies, and that the role of the Pales-
inians came, through the Palestine Liberation Army
rid through the organization and mobilization of the
alestinian masses, as a spearhead of the battle for
liberation' when the Arab states decide to initiate
uch a battle.
The Palestine Liberation Army itself was establish-
ed on conventional bases, trained and equiped in the
manner of a regular army. Attempts, in the form of
studies and recommendations, were made in 1965
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to transform the Palestine Liberation Army into a
popular unconventional army, on the lines of commando
units'. Such a recommendation was, however, rejected
by the leadership of the PLO2.
Unpublished Document. (From the private papers of
Valid Kamhawi). This study was made and presented
by the ex-army officer and Head of the PLO office
in Damascus in 1965, Mustafa Sahtut.
In February 1968, the command of the Palestine
Liberation Army established the Popular Liberation
Forces on the lines of commando units. These forces
were not, however, a substitute for the Army, but
part of it.
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Al-Fatah : Palestine National Liberation Movement,
A Palestinian-Sponsored Form of Palestinian Entity',
" From among our steadfast people, waiting
at the borders, our revolutionary van-
guard has issuöd forth, in the belief
that armed revolution is our only path
to Palestine and freedom. Let the
imperialists and Zionists know that the
people of Palestine are still in the
field of battle and shall never be swept
2
away"
Communiqué No. 1,
The Asifa Forces3
This Communique No. I, by the Asifa Forces, marked
he commencement of paramilitary, and eventually, poli-
ical activities by the Al-Fatah: Palestine National
iberatjon Movement. It served as the first public
anouncement of the existence of a Palestinian para-
Llitary organization called the Al-Asifa. Shortly
rter the issuance of Communiqué No. I, on January 6,
65, the Al-Fatah declared, on January 28, 1965, its
Ustence as the mother-organization of the Asifa.
us declaration marked the culmination of long secret
eparations towards the formation of a Palestinian
,vement which would shoulder the responsibility of
e Palestinian military and political struggle for
ie t liberation of Palestinet.
1Unless otherwise mentioned, the information provided
in this part about Al-Fatah is based on the following
interviews:
- An interview with Yasser Arafat (AbuZAmmar),
Beirut: February 7, 1975.
- An interview with Khalil El-Wazir (Abu-Jihad),
Beirut: January 3, 1975.
2Arab political Documents: 1965. Doe. No. 4,
oJ3.cit. ,pp.11-5.
3The Asifa Forces are the military wing of the Al-Fatah.
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..lAl-Fatah: Background and Origin
The background to the origin of the Al-Fatah
could be found in the circumstances and conditions
under which the Palestinian in the Arab world lived
2in .the 1950 ! s • In this context, the experiences and
nceptions of those Palestinians who were largely
sponsible for initiating the efforts and moves which
rentually led to the emergence of the Al-Fatah occupy
imary importance. Those experience5 were political
id paramilitary, organizational, and the experiences
employment. While these were not necessarily ex-
rienced equally or wholly by each one of the
)unders of the Al-Fatah, they, nevertheless, con-
bituted, as a whole, and in general, the background
the majority of the founders of the Al-Fatah.
)litical and Paramilitary Experience
The majority of the Palestinians who participated
the creation of the Al-Fatah had the common politi-
.l experience of having been members of political
rties, most important of which was the Moslem
otherhood Movement 3 . In being so, those Palestinians
quired their basic political experience and were
ought up in the militant atmosphere of the Moslem
rhis account of the .origin of the Al-Fatah Organiza-
bion is exclusively based on interviews with Yasser
Arafat and Khalil El-Wazir, who were mainly respon-
sible for the creation of the Al-Fatah. It is, how-
ever, to be mentioned that the complete authentic
story of the creation of the Al-Fatah has never been
revealed in its entirety.
2See, Chapter Four, pp. loo-209 , Chapter Five, pp.
26-27l ,and Chapter Six, pp. 273-295.
3See, Chapter Three, pp. 148-150.
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1Brotherhood Movement where the concept of Jihad
occupied a central importance.
" We used to listen to the heroic stories
of the Mujahidin (fighters) of the
Moslem Brotherhood Movement, the same
way a pupil would listen to his teacher.
Their heroic operations against the
Zionist invaders used to stimulate us.
2We learned a lot from them"
More important was the actual practice of the
oncept of Jihad. In 1952, Yasser Arafat 3 took part
n many of the commando operations against the British
ases in the Suez Zone. In l95 1t, another of the
ounders of the Al-Fatah, Khalil E1-Wazir, 4 together
ith two others 5 formed a small guerrilla organization
n the Gaza Strip, which was known as Shabab Al_Thatr
.1-Arabi (Men of Arab Revenge) 6 , and which undertook
any operations inside Israel. Most important among
hose operations was that of blowing-up the Zuhar
ater-reservior near Falujah inside Israel 7 , which
rought tough Israeli reprisals resulting in massive
uman losses among the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
hese losses, which resulted in huge demonstrations,
rompted Nasser to re-arm his army which eventually
ed to the Czech Arms Deal8.
The concept of Jihad is a Moslem concept which en-
courages the spirit of fighting in the service of God,
and promises that those who get killed will go to
Paradise.
2	 interview with Khalil El-Wazir. (trans. L.K.)
3Leader of the Al-Fatah, and Chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization since 1968.
One of the founders of Al-Fatah and member of its
Central Committee.
5They were Mohammad J-Iassan Al-Ifranji and Mohammad El-Ayedi.
6lnterviewswith Yasser Arafat and Khalil El-Wazir,
7An interview with Khalil El-Wazir.
8See, Chapter Five. pp . 266-268.
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Organizational Experience
Many of the founders of the Al-Fatah had organi-
zational experience related to political and para-
military formations. Some, like Yasser Arafat and
1Salah Khalaf , acquired sUch experience through the
'ederation of Palestine Students in Cairo, of which
rafat was a president during the period 1954-1956,
Lnd Khalaf was vice-president. According to Arafat,
us presidency of the Federation of Palestine Students
'as also an opportunity for him to organize para-
iilitant groups from among Palestinian students in
he form of Jawwalah (scouts) 2 . Others, like Khalil
l-Wazir, acquired such experience in the Gaza Strip,
'here he managed to organize some Palestinian students,
.n addition to the organization of the paramilitary
roup of Men of Arab Revenge 3 . To this can be added
he organizational experience which the majority of
he founders of the Al-Fatah had as ex-partisans.
'he Experiences of' Employment: The Melting-Pot
The majority of the founders of the Al-Fatah
ere working in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
tates. Thus they were better exposed than their
ellow Palestinians in Jordan, Syria or Lebanon to
he sufferings of the Palestinian people at large and
o the hardships which the Palestinians had to en-
ounter in order to secure a living for themselves
'One of the founders of the Al-Fatah and member of its
Central Committee.
2An interview with Yasser Arafat.
3lnterviews with Khalil El-Wazir and Yasser Arafat;
also see p.3211.
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and their families. This was due to the fact that
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states served as
a melting-pot for the dispersed Palestinians since
such states were the only place where the Palestin-
ians scattered in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the
Gaza Strip were able to meet, en masse, live together
.d exchange their views on the political, social and
onomic conditions under which they were living.
15 interaction was bound to escalate the resentment
d frustration of those Palestinians. Under the
.rcumstances, it was natural that those Palestinians
iould think of the means to effect a change in the
litical deadlock under which the Palestinians were
.ving since l91t8.
"The suffering and bitterness which the
Palestinian people experienced after the
loss of Palestine, the failure of the
Palestinian struggle through various
political parties, and similarily through
the many coups d'tat which the Pales-
tinians hoped would bring about an
improvement in the Arab effort to liberate
Palestine, all these led the Palestinians
to adopt an attitude of self-reliance and
dependence on themselves"1.
In addition to previous factors, the Gulf states
id Kuwait were exposed to the Arab press and media
which meant that the Palestinians there had access to
various views and diversified interpretations of news
which promoted the faculty to criticize and to analyze
among those Palestinians 2 . Besides, the relatively
interview with Khalil El-Wazir,(trans. L.K.)
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t liberal t atmosphere which prevailed in Kuwait and the
Gulf states, and the willingness of some newspapers
there to open their pages for articles and discussions
which were sponsored by the founders of the A1-Fatah,
all helped in making out of Kuwait and the Gulf states
a better breeding-ground than other Arab states1.
he Making of the Al-Fatah: The Origin
Contrary to general belief, the early moves to-
ards the establishment of a Palestinian para-military
ovement, which came to be known as the Al-Fatah, did
ot originate from one single particular group and
lace, but rather from various groups of Palestinians
a various places, though mainly in the Gulf States,
uwait and Saudi Arabia. It was only after long
ebates and discussions which extended over more than
wo years, from 1957-1959, that such groups agreed on
general political and para-military programme of
rinciples, which eventually resulted in the formation
I the A1-Fatah: Palestine National Liberation Move-
ent2 . Accordingly, the very basic foundations of
he Al-Fatah were, more or less, a coalition of' some
ara-military and political Palestinian nucleiiwhich
ad one thing in common, the desire and determination
o put the initiative of the struggle for the t libera-
ion of Palestine t back into Palestinian hands3.
Most important among those original nucleil were
two. One was in Cairo and headed by Yasser Arafat ,
and the other one was in the Gaza Strip and headed by
Khalil El-Wazir. Arafat's group, which included
Abu-lyad (Salah Ithalaf), originated and developed
through the Federation of Palestine Students in Cairo.
1lbid.
2 interview with Khalil El-Wazir (Abu-Jihad).
3Ibid.
See, p. 325.
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El-Vazir's group originated in the Gaza Strip and
developed through both student struggle and para-
military operations of the Men of Arab Revenge1.
The first contact between Arafat and El-Wazir
took place in the years 195! and 1955, when the
Latter used to write to Arafat, who was President of
L;he Federation of Palestine Students, explaining to
urn "the sufferings of the Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip" 2 . In 1956, El-Wazir and Arafat met in Cairo
ihen the former arrived there, During that meeting,
bhey discussed the general condition of the Pales-
binian people and aspects of the activities of Pales-
binian students 3 . The second meeting between the two
en took place in the Gaza Strip in March 1957, where
Lrafat was touring the Strip on a special mission
rhich was delegated by the Egyptian Revolutionary
ouncil. Shortly after this meeting, Arafat went to
rork in Kuwait and El-Wazir in Saudi Arabia.
'he Making of the A1-Fatah: The Countdown
The making of the A1-Fatah was not itself an aim
ought by its founders, but rather as a means through
hich certain political and para-military convictions
ould be implemented. While the political and para-
ilitary convictions of the Al-Fatah will be dealt
Ith in a forthcoming part of this chapter, the
mphasis here will be given to the actual steps which
were taken by the founders of the A1-Fatah and which
culminated in 1965 with the commencement of para-
military operations inside Israel.
1See, p. 321k.
2	 interview with Khalil E1-Wazir.(trans. L.K.)
3Ibid.
4lnterviews with Yasser Arafat and Khalil El-Wazir.
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•	 1According to Yasser Arafat , the making of the
A1-Fatah took place through seven phases. First was
the phase of loss which extended from 1949-1951.
Second was the phase of thinking and evaluation which
covered the period 1951-1952. Third was the phase of
contact with Palestinian revolutionary elements which
xtended from 1952-1956. Fourth was the phase of the
ove towards creating "an effective organization cap-
ble of shouldering its expected responsibilities"2.
his phase covered the years 1957 and 1958. Fifth,
he phase of declaring the existence of the Al-Fatah
hrough its mouthpiece Our Palestine (Falastinuna)
agazine. Sixth was the phase of military training
ad preparedness which extended from 1960-1964.
eventh was the take-off phase with the commencement
f para-military operations inside Israel on January
1965.
These phases could be divided into two eras. The
irst era which covers phases one, two and three
hould not, and could not, be considered as part of
he process of the making of the Al-Fatali because
hey mainly dealt with personal experiences and mental
xercises which were discussed under the previous
eading of the origin of the Al-Fatah. After all,
one of those first three phases resulted in actual
teps to create an organization, although they even-
ually laid down the mental and psychological bases
11 which the actual steps for building the A1-Fatah
rested. The second era, which covers phases four,
five, six and seven, was the era of the making of the
A1-Fatah. Accordingly, the analysis in this part
will concentrate on these phases which cover the
period 1957-1965.
interview with Yasser Arafat.
2Ibd (trans. L.K.)
- 329 -
The first important and organized move towards
the formation of the Palestinian para-military move-
ment which came to be known as the A1-Fatah took
place in Kuwait in October 1957. During that month,
five Palestinians, two of whom were Yasser Arafat and
Khalil El-Vazir, met and agreed to unite their efforts
nd to work for the establishment of a Palestinian
ara-mi1itary organization with the aim of reactivat-
.ng the efforts for the 'liberation of Palestine'
;hrough putting the initiative for political and
iilitary activities back into Palestinian hands 1 . At
;he same time, there were other groups in other places
rho were also doing the same. No contact or coordina-
ion had yet been established among those groups2.
Early in 1958, another meeting, which was also
Lttended by Arafat and El-Wazir was held in Kuwait.
:n this meeting, the decision to establish a "Pales-
;inian movement on a Palestinian basis" 3 was taken.
'urthermore, an agreement was reached actually to
tart building a Palestinian organization which would
ulfill "the Palestinian hope of having a Palestinian
evolutionary movement".
A plan for organizational expansion was laid-
Lown. This plan was carried out in two ways. First,
contact was established with other groups which
rere known to have had similar views as to the need
or a Palestinian para-military movement and who
similarily had initiated preliminary steps in this
direction. Most important among those groups was
lj interview with Khalil El-Wazir. Also see, An inter-
view with Yasser Arafat.
2	 .	 .	 .An interview with Khalil El-Wazir.
3Ibici. (trans. L.K.)
Ibid. (trans. L.IK.)
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that of Qatar in the Gulf area, which was headed by
Mohammad Yusuf l-Najjar, Karnal Udwan and Mahmood
Abbas1 , and that of Saudi Arabia which was headed by
Abdel-Fattah Humood2 . Negotiations with the E1-Naj jar
and Udwan group in Qatar and that of Humood in Saudi
Arabia extended from 1957-1959, and ended successfully
ith a decision to incorporate all groups together in
rhat turned out to be the Al-Fatah. Second, a contact
ras also established with other individuals in the
aza Strip, Jordan (including the West Bank), Syria
Lnd Lebanon. The response of those individuals was
imited3 . Nevertheless, "none of those who were
Lpproached attempted to reveal the identity of the
)erson who contacted him,nor the nature of his
rIissionhl.h1 This was probably so because those who
iere contacted were screened in order to make sure
thether that they were true nationalists.
In January 1959, a move towards propagating the
political views and convictions of the newly found
the Al-Fatah was done through a Beirut-based magazine
called Our Palestine: The Call For Life (Falastinuna:
Nida t Al-.Hayat). During the same year, preparations
for building the para-military wing of the Al-Fatah
were initiated. These preparations extended from
1960 until mid-1964 when the Al-Fatah was ready to
commence its para-military activities5.
'Both E1-Naj jar and Udwan were assassinated in Beirut
in 1973 by Israeli agents.
2	 .	 .An interview with Khalil El-Wazir.
3lbid.
4lbid. (trans. L.K.)
5lnterviews with Yasser Arafat (Abu'Ammar) and
Khalil El Wazir (Abu Jihad).
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The period 1960-1964 witnessed, alongside para-
military preparations, the beginning of the A1-Fatah
contacts with some Arab and non-Arab states. Some
of these contacts were, however, part of the para-
1
military build-up of the Al-Fatah
Until 1963, the mainstream of the Al-Fatah para-
riilitary preparations were in the field of recruit-
rient, military training and collecting arms and
eaponry.
The A1-Fatah sought recruits from among the
'alestinians in the Gaza Strip, Jordan (including
he West Bank), Syria and Lebanon. The majority of
Lhose who joined the Al-Fatah as t fighters t were
Irawn from among the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
2
nd the West Bank • The training centres, which were
3ecret, were located in Syria, Algeria 3 , the West
.43amk and the Gaza Strip . The commencement of para-
riilitary activities was subject to debate and dis-
ussions within the A1-Fatah leadership. Some did
iot want to commence para-military operations until
bhe Al-Fatah could muster enough men, weapons and
honey to guarantee the continuity of para-military
)perations for a considerable time 5 . Others wanted
o commence para-military activities with the few
rien, weapons and money which the A1-Fatah had on the
rounds that this little would create the right con-
litions which would eventuall lead to promoting the
1	 .	 .	 .Ibid. (For more information see, pp. 333-335).
3Since 1964. See, An interview with Yasser Arafat.
4lbid. Also see, an interview with Khalil El-Wazir.
5An interview with Khalil El-Wazir.
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A1-Fatah capabilities, whether in terms of recruits,
arms or finance'. Apparantly, the second opinion
was accepted, and it was decided to commence para-
military activities as soon as possible2 . The im-
plementation of this decision was however delayed.
This delay was mainly due to an incident which took
place in Jordan in September 1963. On September 8
and 10,1963, some of the Al-Fatah leaders were in
Jordan to buy arms. They bought 43 pieces of weapon-
t'y and two tons of explosives 3 . On the 14th of the
same month these weapons and explosives, in addition
to 23 Al-Fatah recruits, were caught by the Jordanian
secruity forces in the Hebron District in the West
Bank. This constituted a severe blow to the Al-
?atah, because, on top of the loss of the confiscated
Q-eapons and explosives, the A1-Fatah had to replace
the 23 men who were caught, in addition to paying
thousands of pounds to secure their release, which
actually happened after seven months . By mid-19 4,
the Al-Fatah was able to mass enough men and arms in
rder to commence its para-military activities.
During the same period, 1960-1964, the A1-Fatah
Leadership had established contacts with some Arab
states, the most important of which were with
Ugeria and Syria.
The contacts between the A1-Fatah leadership and
the Algerian leaders dated to the early 196Os. In
1962, a delegation from the A1-Fatah, headed by
i d.
3Ibid.
4lbid.
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Yasser Arafat, went to Algeria and met the Algerian
leaders to continue talks which had been started
earlier1 . In 1963, when Algeria became independent,
another Fatah delegation, which was also headed by
Arafat, went there and arranged with the Algerian
leaders for the opening of an office for the Al-Fatah
Algeria2 . The office, which was opened in the
ame year, was headed by Khalil El-Wazir (Abu Jihad).
hat was the first office opened by the Al-Fatah in
ny Arab country. The opening of this office con-
tituted "one of the important pillars on which the
1-Fatah Movement capitalized during its early life"3.
his was mainly due to the fact that the support
endered by the highly prestigous Algerian Revolution
o the Al-Fatah by allowing them to open an office in
•lgeria promoted the chances of the Al-Fatah and its
redibility, since it was the only Palestinian group-
ng, among many others at that time, which had this
11.rivilege . More important was the fact that through
his office, the Al-Fatah leaders were able to meet
any of the world leaders and representatives of the
iberation movements. It was through such meetings
nd contacts that the Al-Fatah leaders were invited
o visit China and North Korea. In March 1964, a
.elegation which was composed of Yasser Arafat and
haul El-Wazir went to China as representatives of
he Palestinian people and confered with Premier
hou En Lai. Later Arafat went back to Kuwait and
l-Wazir proceeded to North Korea where he met the
Korean leaders 5 . In addition to facilitating such
international contacts for the Al-Fatah, Algeria also
provided facilities for the military training of the
A1-Fatah recruits through both the Algerian military
academy and summer training camps . Finally, all
lid.
2 interview with Yasser Arafat.
3An interview with Khalil El-Wazir.(trans. L.K.)
4lnterviews with Yasser Arafat and Khalil El-Wazir.
SAn interview with Khalil El-Wazir.6 Ibid.
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these achievemen.ts which the A1-Fatah got out of its
presence in Algeria helped it in recruiting more
people and thus expanding its organized base1.
The Al-Fatah relation with Syria started also in
early 1960's. This relation had its origin in Kuwait,
;he birth-place of the Al-Fatah, and it was initiated
;hrough the many personal relations which the Al-
atah leaders had with prominent Ba'thi leaders in
uwait and in Syria. Through such friends, the Al-
'atah leaders made official contacts with the Syrian
ulers 2 . In addition, some of the important Batthi
eaders in Syria, like Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer 3 , were
'alestinians. Such prominent Ba t thi Palestinians
ere approached by the A1-Fatah leaders, and in 1963,
Lbu-Maizer worked, among others, in promoting the
iyrian decision to allow the Al-Fatah presence on
yrian territory4 . In taking this decision, the
;yrian government, through its chief of military
Lntelligence, Ahmad Suwaidan, made it clear to the
Ll-Fatah leaders that Syria took this decision out of
Lts appreciation of its pan-Arab responsibilities,
specia11y regarding the Palestine Problem, and that
Lt would not, therefore, tolerate any eventual attempt
) the Al-Fatah towards the practice of brinksman-
hip, or towards putting any doubts on the nationalist
jan-Arab attitudes of Syria regarding the Palestinian
ause 5 . The Al-Fatah presence in Syria was therefore
iot as easy and free as its presence in Algeria.
Nevertheless, the location of Syria in the midst of
llbid
3He was editor-in-chief of the Ba t th Party official
daily newspaper, The A1-Ba'th. For more information
on Abu-Naizer, see, Chapter Three p . 1 59(the footnote).
4ArL interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer; also see,
an interview with Xhalil El-Wazir.
5An interview with Abdel Muhsen Abu-Maizer.
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the Arab World, and the fact that it has borders with
Israel made the presence of the A1-Fatah there very
crucial for the actual practice, by the Al-Fatah ,
of para-military operations against Israel, which
eventually started on January 1, 1965.
Originally, the decision was taken by the Al-
'atah leadership to commence para-military operations
.n 1964. This was meant to serve as the Palestinian
nsver to the Israeli plan to divert the tributaries
f the River Jordan.' On September 5, 1964, the
iilitary council of the Al-Fatah was meeting secretly
n Amman to discuss the timing of the commencement
f paramilitary operations, when it learned of the
Lrab League endorsement, through the Second Arab
;ummit Conference, of the establishment of Palestine
'iberation Army2 . This endorsement caused a split
n the military council of the A1-Fatah. Some were
f the opinion that the establishment of Palestine
,iberation Army was a good initiative and that the
ominencement of para-military operations must be
)ostponed in order to give enough time for the
'alestine Liberation Army to prove itself and to see
thether it was meant to be a credible fighting army
r a ceremonial symbolic army 3 . Others within the
Ll-Fatah military council were of the opinion to
;tart para-military operations immediately irrespec-
;ive of the decision to establish a Palestine Libera-
;ion Army. Apparently, the decision was to postpone
para-military operations 4 . This postponement was
also accompanied by a decision, which was suggested
by Mohammad Yusuf El-Najjar, which recommended that
lJ interview with Yasser Arafat.
21b ± d.
3Ibid.
4
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the Al-Fatah para-military operations should initially
be propagated under another name, in the event that
such operations fail, the A1-Fatah would not then
suffer any premature set-backs and would remain "to
continue the march". On these lines, it was decided
by the Al-Fatah military council to commence para-
ilitary activities on January 1, 1965, under the
of the Al-Asifa (the Storm). Concurrently,
Lohammad Yusuf El-Najjar was appointed the military
ommander of the Al-Asifa Forces2.
.l-Fatah: Political and Military Strategy
The political and military strategy advocated by
he Al-Fatah, and the line of analysis adopted by it
Luring the period 1 959-1 9 65, constituted a basic
hift in the political thinking and orientation of the
Lajority of the Palestinian masses3.
During the 1950s and early 1960 t s, the general
rend among the Palestinians was towards pan-Arabism
nd Arab unity. Moreover, the majority of the
a1estinians who were seeking to t liberate their
Lomeland t
 did not embark on the national (Palestinian)
'ath, but rather on the extra-national (Pan-Arab and
:0 a much lesser degree Islamic) path for the t libera-
;ion of Palestine 5 . Accordingly, when in 1959, at
time which witnessed the zenith of the spread of
an-Arabism and Arab unity, the Palestinian-sponsored
Al-Fatah preached the necessity of adopting the
'Ibid.
3See, Chapter Two pp. 53-63 , Chapter Three, pp.125-143,
Chapter Four, pp. 213-215, and 238-240.
4See, Chapter Three, pp . 125-143.
5Ibici. Also see, Chapter Three, pp. 143-169.
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national (Palestinian) path as the primary way, poll-
ticially and militarily, in any serious effort towards
the 'liberation of Palestine t , this call seemed, at
the time, to have been at best unrealistic, and at
worst suspicious.
In its early literature, the Al-Fatah gave the
bases on which it justified its preaching of the
iaational (Palestinian) path for the t liberation of
Palestine' as compared to the extra-national (pan-
krab) path.
According to the early Al-Fatah literature, the
Pan-Arab approach for the 'liberation of Palestine'
iad led to conducting the struggle for the 'libera-
tion of Palestine t in such a manner that the
?alestine Problem became a tool of brinksmanship in
inter-Arab differences. The absence, since l98, of
my Arab achievements towards the 'liberation of
'alestine t meant that the struggle for Palestine was
;ubmerged by the various Arab states and was given a
3econdary importance to other problems, which were
1
onfronting each of the Arab States
"The means adopted by the Arab Govern-
ments in dealing with the Palestine
Problem were and are still based on
giving priority to temporary regional
interests over challenging the usurping
enemy
'For more information see, Chapter Six, pp.286-295.
2A1-Fatah: Palestine National Liberation Movement.
Studies and Revolutionary Experiences,No. 1 (1966),
p. 8.(trans. L.K.)
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Moreover, the early Al-FaLah literature stressed
that the denial, by the Arab States, of the Pales-
tinians' right to shoulder the responsibility to ini-
tiate, direct and conduct the struggle for the
'liberation of Palestine' whether alongside, or apart
from the Arab States, had contributed, to a great
x:tent, to the weakening of the Arab struggle for the
Liberation of Palestine t , because the principal
tor (the Palestinians) were simply discounted.
"We believe that the Jews were able to
establish their entity (in Palestine)
only after the (Palestinian) Cause
moved from our hands (the Palestinians)
to other hands (the Arab States). We
also believe that we (the Palestinians)
should have the primary role in our
Cause. Besides, we are sure that
things will deteriorate more if we
were forced to remain out of action,
and if were not consulted in matters
which are directly related to our
existence. The starting point towards
solving our Cause lies in elevating
our Cause above Arab differences"1.
The basic principle underlying the Al-Fatah
olitical strategy during the period 1959-1965 called
or the need, on the part of the Arab States, to
allow the Palestinians to take charge of their oin
affairs. More precisely, the Al-Fatah called for
1Falastinuna: Nida' A1-Hayat (Our Palestine: The Call
For Life), Vol. III, No. 17 (Beirut, May 1961),
pp. 9 and 26. (trans. L.K.)
- 339 -
the necessity of giving the Palestinians the freedom
to organize themselves and to undertake military and
political activities with the specific aim of
1
'liberating their homeland', that is, Palestine
This was also accompanied by a call for establishing
a Palestinian entity on parts of Palestine under Arab
Dntrol.
"There are some parts of Palestine
under Arab control. On these parts,
we (the Palestinians) must establish
a Palestinian nationalist revolutionary
rule which would undertakes in coopera-
tion with Arab States, the task of
liberating Palestine. •
This call must be seen in relation to the Al-
tah belief that the catastrophe in Palestine befell
ie Palestinians as a result of Arab intervention in
destine in 1948, and also as a result of 'the Arab
;ates' refusal, since 19148, to allow the Palestinian
ople the freedom of organization and political and
.litary action for the liberation of Palestine.
"The real catastrophe started on the
day when Palestinian people were isolated
from their battle as a result of the
imperialist and Zionist cooperation.
Accordingly, the imperialist Zionist
forces were able, through their indirect
1Falastinuna: Nida' A1-Hayat, op.cit., Vol. III, No.13
(Beirut, January 1961), p.5; Also see, interviews
with Yasser Arafat (Abu t Ammar) and Khalil El-Wazir
(Abu Jihad).	 -
2Falastinuna: Nida' A1-Hayat, op.cit., Vol. II, No. 11
(Beirut, November 1960), p. 2. (trans. L.K.).
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influence over the Arab regimes existing
at that time, to hit the Palestinian
nationalist movement and to isolate it
from its battle-ground....
This isolation started actually before
May 15, 19 )48, at the hand of the Saving
Army with the active support of the
British imperialist forces in Palestine.
Accordingly, when that day (May 15 )
arrived, the Palestinian nationalist
forces were dispersed, paralyzed, depriv-
ed of arms and of all means of fighting.
Simultanously, a dirty campaign in some
traitorous Arab newspapers was launched
with the aim of minimizing the Pales-
tinian heroic struggle.
The second act of this imperialist plan
was executed at the hands of the Arab
armies which were under traitorous
commands, and which surrendered to the
Jews more than three-quarters of
1Palestine...."
The early Al-Fatah literature spelled-out, in
ome detail, the conditions for the establishment of
• Palestinian entity on parts of Palestine under Arab
ontrol, as well as the nature and aims of such an
.ntity. Basically, the early Al-Fatah literature
frequently made it clear that its demand for a Pales-
tinian entity was firm and unqualified.
*Saving Army(Jaish A1-Inkaz) is the name given to all
the Arab armies which entered Palestine on the eve of
May 15, 1948, with the aim of saving Palestine from
the Zionists.
• 1Falastinuna: Nida t
 Al-Hayat, op.cit., Vol. V, No.32
(Beirut, August 1963), p. 4.(trans. L.K.).
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"We the Arabs of Palestine declare that
we do not accept any alternative for
our entity which would serve as the
base for our revolution towards the
liberation of Palestine"1.
['his entity, according to the Al-Fatah, should come
t a stage subsequent to the start of Palestinian
nilitary operations inside Israel. When such opera-
Iions come into existence and prove to be viable,
time is then ripe for establishing a Palestinian
entity on Arab controlled parts of Palestine. 2 This
entity would then serve as the base for Palestinian
)rganization and mobilization and as the logical and
Legitimate grounds for launching the Palestinian
struggle for the 'liberation of Palestine' 3 . More-
Dyer, this entity, as sought by the A1-Fatah, had to
be a product of Palestinian will, and not that of the
&rab States4 . Besides, this entity had to be "free",
"independent", and not subject to the influence or
iiandate of anybody except the Palestinian people5.
In advocating this line of political analysis,
the Al-Fatah literature argued contrary to the
general Pan-Arab thinking which was accepted by
1Falastinuna: Nida' Al-Hayat, op.cit., Vol. III, No.
13 (Beirut, January 1961), p.5. (trans. L.K.)
2Falastinuna: Nida t
 Al-Hayat, op.cit,, Vol. II. No.
12 (Beirut, December l96OJ p.4.
3lbid.; Also see, Ibid., Vol. III, No. 17 (May 1960),
p. 26.
4lbid.
5Falastinuna: Nida t
 Al-Ha at, 2.p.cit., Vol. III,
No. 15 (Beirut, March 19 1 , p•5,
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perhaps the majority of the Arab masses during the
1950's and early 1960's. While the accepted princi-
ple was that Arab unity was the means to liberate
Palestine1 , the Al-Fatah argued that the liberation
of Palestine was the means to Arab unity 2 . Never-
theless, this did not mean that the Al-Fatah was
asking the Arab States to disengage themselves from
any responsibility for the 'liberation of Palestine2,
but rather that the Arab States and the Arab people,
should shoulder that responsibility together with
the Palestinians who will be spearheading that
responsibility.
The early Al-Fatah literature on military stra-
tegy must be seen in the light of its political
strategy. The essence of the Al-Fatah military
strategy called simply for the need on the part of
the Palestinians to follow the path of armed struggle
as the only means towards 'liberating' their home-
land. The initiation of this armed struggle and its
nature were spelled-out by the early A1-Fatah
literature in the following manner:
"What is needed is to have groups of
Palestinians in every Arab State, with-
out necessarily being, at the beginning,
under one command, but rather seeking
the same aim. The aim should be to
launch attacks and undertake sabotage
'See, Chapter Three, pp. 125-lLt3.
2lnterviews with Yasser Arafat (Abu t Ammar) and
Khalil El-Wazir (Abu Jihad).
3Falastinuna: Nida A1-Hayat, op.cit., Vol. II,
No. 11 (Beirut, November l960J, p.2; also see, Ibid.,
Vol. II. No. 12(December 1960), p.4.
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operations inside Israel with the aim
of keeping the enemy (Israel) occupied
and alert. In other words, what is
needed is a new guerrilla movement which
originates in all the Arab States
surrounding Israel, and which should be
purely Palestinian, and enjoy the support
of Arab governments without involving
such governments, either internationally
or nationally.
If this takes place, then, we, the
Palestinians would be walking in the
right path for solving our Problem....
....If the groups succeed in proving
themselves, then their unification should
be inevitable".
that follows from this principle of guerrilla warfare
-s the rejection, by the Al-Fatah, of the classical
;heory of conventional warfare under which Arab armies
Tould fight the Israeli army. This the Al-Fatah re-
jected on the grounds that the Arab armies were not
inited and that most of the Arab regimes were "not
;rustworthy militarily" 2 . Besides, the Al-Fatah
iilitary strategy rested on the basic principle that
;he military struggle for the liberation should be
.nitiated and conducted by the Palestinians them-
;elves and that the role of the Arab states, and
consequently Arab armies, should be a supportive
one
1Falastinuna: Nida !
 Al-Hayat, qp.cit., Vol. II, No.
12 (Beirut, December l 9 6 ä] p. Li.(trans. LUK.).
2lbid., p . 3. (trans. L.K.).
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In its inception, the A1-Fatah claimed itself
to be a non-ideologically oriented organization with
the sole aim of initiating and conducting the struggle
against Israel until liberation. When liberation
takes place, the Al-Fatah argued, the Palestinians
can then entertain whatever ideology or ideologies
they want. In this respect, the A1-Fatah was closer
to the Guevara and Regis Debray theories of starting
with armed struggle than to Mao Tse Tung's theory of
stages which gives the priority to ideology and
political indoctrination of the masses to be followed
by armed struggle. However, such questions pertain-
ing to the assessment of Palestinian strategy became
more acute after 1967. The Al-Fatah was, then, no
longer the only militant Palestinian organization.
Other militant Palestinian organizations which came
into being after 1967, such as the Popular Front for
the liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) and the
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (P.D.F.L.P.), both of which call themselves
Marxist-Leninist, adopted the Maoist line of penetra-
ting and indoctrinating the masses as a pre-requiste
for a successful armed struggle. A comparative
analysis of the A1-Fatah and that of other Pales-
tinian organizations with other theories of guerrilla
warfare goes beyond the scope of this study.
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Chapter Seven
Palestinian-Arab Relations: A General Assessment
Any attempt to analyze the issue of Palestinian-
Arab relations should be undertaken with a high degree
)f academic caution and an exceptional exercise of
ontrol on the conduct of the research. As we have
seen, the issue of Palestinian-Arab relatl.ons touches
lmost on every aspect of life of the Arab Host-
3tates, as well as of the Palestinians. Moreover,
the issue itself lies at the very heart of intra and
inter Arab politics, and plays a significant role in
tthe relations between the Arab states concerned and
he outside world1 . Finally, a special political
sensitivity has often been attached to the issue of
Palestinian-Arab relations, since all the Arab Host-
3tates who adopted and advocated the Palestinian
ause were keen not to be accused of any sort of
political suppression, discrimination and the like
against the Palestinians residing on their respective
eerritories. Similarly, individual Palestinians who
played official roles in the shaping of this relation-
ship, especially in Jordan, were also keen not to
stab1ish any direct personal link with policies or
acts of suppression against their fellow Palestinians,
r more important, against the interests of the
Palestinian cause itself. While the writer acknow-
Ledges that this research was conducted against these
and other disadvantages 2 , he, nevertheless, hopes
that the findings of this research, inconclusive as
they may be, will help to shed some light on the
1 See, Chapters Four, Five and Six
2See, The Introduction, pp.7.10.
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nature of Palestinian-Arab relations during the
period 191t9-1967, and that such findings may also
help in explaining other similar issues, if any, or
indeed aspects of them.
In our general hypothesis, we have identified
the Palestinians in the Arab-Host states as the in-
truding-element, and the Host-States as the existing-
elements1 . Our general hypothesis stipulates that
the intruding-element attempts to establish as many
common bonds with the existing-element as possible
and that the intruding-element would attempt to
stress most among those common bonds those which suit
2its cause and needs best . Following the establish-
sent of the common bonds, the intruding-element
attempts to identify its cause in terms of the broad
national interests of the existing-element. In so
doing, the intruding-element seeks legitimacy through
identifying its interests with those of the existing-
element 3 . Furthermore, our general hypothesis
stipulates that the intruding-element tends to
advocate, create and support extra-national tendencies
and movements in the existing-elements. We have
also suggested that through the existence of such
tendencies and movements, the intruding-element
hopes to be able to fit in and to find a legitimate
place for itself within the framework of the existing-
elements. Further to this general hypothesis, it
was argued that in the Arab case, the existence of
Pan-Arabism as an extra-national framework which is
'See, Chapter One, pp. 29-30.
2Ibid., pp. 33-3k.
3lbid.
41b Id.
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broadly accepted by the Arab people and the Arab
states, facilitates the attempts of the intruding-
element towards promoting and creating extra-
national tendencies and movements within and across
1the boundaries of the existing elements • In this
respect, it was pointed out that although the intrud-
Lng-element advocates extra-national tendencies it,
ievertheless, exhibits a high degree of national
self-consciousness which serves as a means towards
preserving its own national identity as a substitute
to the non-existent political entity. The achieve-
nent of the nationalist goals of the intruding-
element constitutes, in fact, the essence of its
extra-national attitude in its relations with the
existing-elements2.
In the remaining part of this chapter, we shall
consider this hypothesis in the light of the findings
Df this study, to which will be added a brief allus-
Lon to the applicability of our hypothesis to other
cases.
The Palestinian case has tended to support the
validity of our hypothesis. The findings of this
research have shown how the Palestinians in the Arab
lost-States adopted, during the period 1 949- 1 9 6 3, a
policy which consistently emphasized the extra-
national tendencies in the Arab Host-States and in
the Arab World at large. These covered religion ,
class, and - in the Arab case - Pan-Arab tendencies3.
'Ibid.
2lbid.
3See, Chapter Three, pp. 123-169.
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The Palestinians, however, in appreciation of the
• necessity of direct Arab participation 1 in any effort
to liberate Palestine, oriented most of their acti-.
vities towards the promotion of Pan-Arabism. This
direct Arab participation, although essential, was,
nevertheless, not viewed by the Palestinians as
meaning Palestinian non-participation. The Pales-
tinian formula seemed to call for direct participa-
tion by all Arab states combined with indirect
participation on the part of the Palestinians and
the Arab masses through extra-national channels such
as political parties and political literature.
From the very beginning, the Palestinian appre-
ciation of the importance of direct participation by
Arab states was confronted with inter-Arab conflicts,
and the barely concealed plans of Transjordan to
annex parts of Palestine under its control 2
 , as
determining factors in channeling the future of the
Palestinians in what seemed to be an inevitable
course. This was largely carried out during the
immediate stage which extended from l9L8_l95O.
direct participation:- official participation
and involvement by state authorities and
institutions,
- indirect participation:- legal participation and
involvement on the popular level by the masses
as well as popular organizations as compared
with state organized bodies without a genuine
popular character. (In this definition, the word
legal means that such popular participation is
to take place publicly and not to be suppressed
by the state).
- non-participation:- participation is either not
allowed at all even indirectly, but possibly
secretly, that is, illegally.
2See, Chapter Four, pp. 170-186.
3See, Chapter Two, pp. 76-88.
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For some Host-States, direct Palestinian
participation in legitimizing the course determined
for them was important. This largely applied to
Transjordan and was aimed at legitimizing the Trans-
jordanian attempt to unify the West Bank and Trans-
jordan1 . In this case, direct Palestinian participa-
tion was designed to be a temporary one. Subsequent-
ly, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Transjordan
were expected to participate within the framework of
the institutions of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan2.
Concerning the other Host-States, direct Palestinian
participation was not desired since it served no
goal for the Host-States, although it was encouraged
by Egypt and Syria on a very limited scale, and only
inasmuch as it served to frustrate the intentions of
the Transjordanian regime in annexing the West Bank.
In this respect, the short-lived All-Palestine
Government was the best example3.
By the end of l9L9, the stage was, more or less,
set between the intruding-element(the Palestinians)
and the existing-elements (the Host-States) on the
basis that the former would not undertake any direct
participation. This was, to a great extent,accepted
by the majority of the members of the intruding-
element who were aware of their military and economic
vuliierability, and who were seeking the support and
direct participation of the existing-elements in
bringing about a solution to the nationalist problem
1See, Chapter Four, pp.170-185.
2For more information see, Chapter Four, pp.186...191,
201-209.
3For more information on the All-Palestine Govern-
ment see, Chapter Six, pp. 275-278.
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of the intruding-e1ment. The majority of the Pales-
tinians called, through their political activities1
2and political literature , for the substitution of
direct Palestinian participation, which presupposed
a form of separte Palestinian political entity, with
direct Arab participation, combined with indirect
Palestinian participation. This formula required
that the intruding-element should attempt to find as
many common bonds with the existing-elements as
possible, and to stress most among those bonds the
ones which suited its cause and needs best. Indeed,
the Palestinians explored all possible common bonds
with the Arab states including extra-national
religious, class and pan-Arab bonds. The latter
proved to be the most viable framework for linking
the Palestinians, the Arab states and the Arab people
at large, and it was, therefore, stressed most by
the majority of the Palestinians3.
In adopting the pan-Arab approach, the Pales-
tinians were keen to have their cause identified
with that of the Arab Host-States and the Arab
states at large, in terms of the national interest
of each one of those states. Although this was
achieved rather early, both officially 4and through
1See, Chapter Three, pp. 143-169 and Chapter Four,
pp. 210-21t0.
2See, Chapter Three, pp. 123-1'+3.
3See, Chapter One, pp. 27-29 and	 Chapter Three,
pp. 123-169.
The mere fact that the armies of seven Arab states
have taken part in the wars with Israel since May
15, 19118, suggests that the Arab states identified
the Palestinian cause in terms of their national
interests.
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the Arab league 1 , the important task of translating
this official identification into actions and poli-
cies was still to implemented, and it depended very
much on the activities of the intruding-element it-
self. In order to achieve this, the Palestinian
political literature portrayed the Palestine Problem
as a pan-Arab problem, and envisaged its solution in
a pan-Arab manner 2 . More important, however, was the
stress in the Palestinian political literature on
the assumption that the existence of the state àf
Israel constituted a threat to the Arab states them-
selves, and that the liberation of Palestine would
therefore remove such a threat 3 . In addition to the
political literature, the Palestinians played an
active, and often a leading role, in all extra-
national political parties in the Arab world,
especially the pan-Arab ones 4 . Furthermore, the
Palestinians founded extra-national political parties,
the most important of which was the Arab Nationalist
Movement which, in advocating Pan-Arabism and Arab
unity, gave a central importance to the Palestine
problem as an obstacle to the achievement of Arab
unity, thus opening the door for the long-debated
question of whether Arab unity will lead to the
liberation of Palestine, or whether the liberation
of Palestine will preceed Arab unity 5 . Finally, the
1Palestine was given a seat at the Arab league. See,
Chapter Six, pp. 295-297.
2See, Chapter Three, pp . 123-143.
3See, Chapter Three, p. 126.
4For more information see, Chapter Three, pp. 143-166;
Chapter Four, pp. 2 33 23 1t , 238240.
5See, Chapter Three, pp. 161-162.
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Palestinians called for the need to modernize the
Arab world as an important prerequisite for any
serious attempt by the Arab States to liberate Pales-
tine and to defeat the Zionist tcultural invasiont
which cleverly utilized modern technology'. Con-
sequently, the Palestinians were aware of the impor-
bance of education, science and technology, and it
ias, therefore, natural that they should embark on a
iigorous search for education. In so doing the
'alestinians eventually opted to infiltrate the
ducational and economic sectors in the Host-States
md Arab states, as a means of enhancing Palestinian
Lnfluence, of promoting extra-national tendencies and,
iltimately, of helping to modernize the Arab world.
En this respect, one should nevertheless, point out
Lhat the stZ'ess on infiltrating the educational and
conomic sectors in the Arab world did not find its
Lnitial motivation as a means to enhance Palestinian
influence and the Palestinian cause, but rather in
urely economic terms 2 . However, those Palestinians
ho happened to be educated and were thus among the
E'irst to work in such sectors quickly comprehended
bhe importance of infiltrating the educational and
conomic sectors in enhancing Palestinian influence
uid promoting the Palestinian cause. Accordingly,
?alestinian infiltration of the educational and
conomic sectors of the Arab world acquired, in
addition to its economic advantages, a political
importance.
In adopting the pan-Arab approach, the Pales-
tinians created two taboos which could not be violated
1lbid., pp.l33-l3.
2See, Chapter Three, pp. 118-123.
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in the course of the pan-Arab struggle for the
liberation of Palestine. The first taboo consisted
of a set of political principles which constituted,
in Palestinian eyes, important safeguards for the
preservation of their cause until such time as the
liberation of Palestine took place. This set of
principles stressed the non-recognition of the State
of Israel, the right of the refugees to return to
their homeland in accordance with Resolution 194(111)
of the General Assembly1 , and until this is effected,
the refusal to solve the Palestine refugee problem,
and the preservation of the refugee-status of the
Palestinian refugees 2 . Secondly, the Palestinians
refused to grant any single Arab state, or party, or
a group of Palestinians the right to act as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinians with
authority to seek a solution for the Palestine
problem3 . All eforts by the Jordanian regime to
acquire such a mandate from the Palestinians failed4,
and often resulted in Palestinian rioting 5 . Simi-
larly, when President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon in
19536, and President Nasser of Egypt in l95l1. attemp-
ted to solve, unilaterally, the Palestine refugee
1See, Chapter Two, pp. 84-86.
2lbid., pp . 90-101.
3See, Chapter Six, pp. 279, 283- 284, 285-286.
4See, Chapter Four, pp. 173-174, 184-186.
i d.
6See, Chapter Six, pp. 282-284.
7See, Chapter Five, p. 268.
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problem, they were faced with an all-Palestinian
opposition. Any solution of the Palestine Problem
was, therefore, to take place in accordance with the
political taboos, and with the consent of the Arab
states. Indeed, demanding as they were, these two
taboos were, among other things, largely responsible
for the failure of the pan-Arab approach. If we
accept the Palestinian argument that their political
taboos are a legitimate Palestinian mechanism to safe-
guard their cause, securing all-Arab consent to a
solution was clearly an impossible undertaking for the
Palestinians, let alone the Arab states themselves.
rhis is due to the fact that each Arab state had
lifferent interest, and grouping them together was
lmost impossible, if for nothing other than the
simple fact that the Palestinian presence in four Arab
ountries (the Host-States) made the nature of any
solution to the Palestine Problem an issue of
iational interest on which most of the Host-States
ere, more or less, at odds. In the case of Jordan,"
;he nature of the solution could affect, or even
letermine, its very existence as a state 1 . As for
'ebanon, it could seriously alter the secterian
alance, and, thus, upset the basis of the Lebanese
olitical system if the.solution meant that a vast
umber of Moslem Palestinians would become Lebanese
itizens 2 . Although Egypt and Syria have had no
imilar threats to their national existence or
nternal political system, yet, they could not have
'This is due to the fact that more than half the
population of Jordan is Palestinian 0 Moreover, the
richer part of Jordan is the West Bank. For more
information see Chapter Four.
2See, Chapter Two, pp. 76-78.
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solved the Palestinian Problem alone without secur-
ing the consent of Jordan, Lebanon and, indeed, the
Palestinians.
The failure of the pan-Arab approach was not
confined to the necessity of securing all-Arab con-
sent, but also to the policies adopted by the Host-
States towards the Palestinians residing on their
respective territories.
In adopting the pan-Arab approach, the policies
of the Arab Host-States towards their respective
Palestinian communities largely reflected what seem
to be conflicting interpretations of the ways and
means of applying the pan-Arab approach. Most of
the Host-States seemed to accept the notion of
direct participation, and to forego that of indirect
Palestinian participation. Apparently, the Host-
States were willing to accept Palestinian participa-
tion only through the institutions of the state it-
self1 . In other words, the Palestinians in the
Host-States were pratically forced into a position
of illegal indirect participation, that is, non-
participation, which was eventually bound, among
other things, to increase Palestinian frustration2.
Since indirect participation was the only way to
protect their cause. In Jordan, for example, the
citizens, including the Palestinians, were allowed
to participate only through the institutions of the
State 3 which were not necessarily in conformity with
1See, Chapter Four and Chapter Five.
2See, Chapter Six, pp. 289-290.
3Although political parties were allowed in Jordan
until 1957, yet, we note that extra-national poli-.
tical parties were not legalized by the Jordanian
regime and were actively suppressed most of the
time,For more information see, Chapter Four, pp.233-',O.
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the needs of the Palestinian cause due to the basic
contradiction between such needs and the interests
of the Jordanian regime. Any Palestinian participa-
tion in institutions or political organizations out-.
side the framework of those provided by or in support
of- the state invited the reaction of the Jordanian
regime, and since the majority of the Palestinians in
Jordan (and elsewhere) were inclined to participate
outside the framework of the state t s institutions,
it was, therefore, inevitable that the Jordanian
regime should suppress the Palestinians and develop
an attitude of suspicion towards them. This was
developed into an all-out discrimination against the
Palestinians in Jordan1 . The practice of structural
violence by the Jordanian regime invited the reaction
of the Palestinians in the form of manifest violence
against the Jordanian regime 2 . The failure of Pales-
tinian manifest violence in bringing about any change
in the regime or its policies due to the maximum
utilization by the Jordanian regime of its tools of
coercion facilitated, in due time, the Palestinian
shift from the pan-Arab to the nationalist approach.
In the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians, although
not actually discriminated against, had, nonetheless,
any political activities suppressed if channeled
outside the institutions of the Egyptian Administra-
tion3 . This does not, however, imply that the Pales-
tinians in the Gaza Strip lived under similar coercive
conditions to those in Jordan. Nasser, unlike
Hussein, was considered by most of the Palestinians
as being their best hope in liberating Palestine.
1 See, Chapter Four, pp. 191-209.
2Ibid., pp. 210-233. 2kO-24Z.
3See, Chapter Five.
See, Chapter Three, pp. 1 2-169.
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This, however, does not mean that the Palestinians
in the Gaza Strip did not in fact suffer many frus-
trations under the Egyptian Administration. The
authoritarian nature of the Egyptian regime reflec-
ted itself in the Egyptian Administration of the
Gaza Strip through the vesting of all powers in the
General Administrative Governor of the Strip, who
was always an Egyptian1 . Subsequently, the Pales-
tinians in the Gaza Strip 'were granted a minimal role
in running the internal affairs of the Strip which
led to a feeling of bitterness and resentment
especially among the intellectuals 2 . Furthermore,
the absence of political freedom, and the right of
association and expression, unless approved by the
Egyptian General Administrative Governor, created a
ruler-ruled relationship between the Egyptians and
the Palestinians in the Strip, and reflected itself
in a general state of uneasiness3.
Finally, and taking all the previous factors
into consideration, the fact that the Palestinian
nationalist cause was at the core of the Palestinian
pan-Arab attitude, and the failure of the pan-Arab
approach to bring about any solution to the Pales-
tine problem, was likely in its turn to bring about
the Palestinian shift from a major stress on pan-
Arabism and Arab unity as a means to liberate Pales-
tine to a major stress on reviving the Palestinian
national entity, thus moving the Palestinians from a
position of indirect or non-participation, into a
position of direct and independent participation.
Added to this was the collapse of the unity between
Egypt and Syria in 1961, which constituted a severe
1See, Chapter Five.
3See, Chapter Five.
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blow to the cause of Arab unity1 , and the success
of the Algerian Revolution which was conducted by
the Algerians themselves with Arab support, and
which provided a successful practical example for an
alternative Palestinian approach to the liberation
of Palestine 2 . To put in differently, if the strug-
gle primarily through the extra-national approach
proves,in terms of actual achievements, futile, the
intruding-element is likely to shift back to the
nationalist approach. This does not take place
suddenly, but rather through a process of accumula-
tion. The shift, however, does not indicate a
denounciation, by the intruding-element, of the
extra-national approach, but rather giving primacy
to the nationalist struggle of the intruding-element.
Such a shift is likely to invite severe
reactions by the existing-elements, who,in identify-
ing the nationalist cause of the intruding-element
in terms of their own national interests, are uneasy
in allowing the intruding-element to play the major,
and more precisely, the decisive role in determining
the course of their national interest, with all its
political and military implications. In this case,
the existing-elements are likely to pursue one or
more of the three following options:
Pirst, to suppress the nationalist political activi-
ties of the intruding-element as being trai-
torous to the extra-national linkage on the
grounds that such nationalist tendencies
'See, Chapter Six, pp. 287-289.	 S
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would weaken or undermine the extra-national
struggle. In. so doing, the existing-element
(s) is normally backed by the great prestige
which the extra-national linkage (in our case
Pan-Arabism) enjoys among the masses of both
the existing-element(s) and the intruding-
element. This option was exercised by Jordan
in its attitude towards the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization1 and later towards Al-Fatah2.
This option was also adopted, although to a
much lesser degree, by Egypt in expressing
its early hostile attitude towards Al-Fatah.
Second, the existing-element(s) might sponsor a form
of nationalist organization for the intruding-
element with enough guarantees for the
existing-element(s) to have an influence over
such an organization. Thus, the existing-
element(s) hopes to pre-empt any attempt by
members of the intruding-element to establish
an activist nationalist organization which
could be outside its influence, and ultimately
a source of political embarrassement and
possibly of military involvement. This option
was mainly exercised by Egypt. The Palestine
Liberation Organization was an Egyptian-
sponsored initiative 3 . More important, how-
ever, was the way the PLO was created,
financied and organized , which would indicate
1 See, Chapter Six, pp. 299-321.
2lbid, pp. 322-3Lt.
3See, Chapter Six, pp. 297-299.
Ibid., pp. 299-321.
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that the PLO was meant to be symbolic rather
than effective, and above all, in constant
need of Arab help and support.
Third, if the regime of any of the existing-elements
represents an extra-national political party,
than such a regime is inclined to establish a
nationalist organization, which would enjoy
the backing of the existing-element concerned,
from amongst the ranks of the intruding-
element members of its extra-national party.
Such an organization would then serve as the
spokesman of the existing-element within the
nationalist movement of the intruding-element,
as well as a justification for such an
existing-element in its suppression of other
non-loyal members of the intruding-element.
This option was exercised by Syria and Iraq
1both of which are ruled by Bat thi regimes
While the main findings of this research are
in support of our hypothesis, there are however
certain limitations which are either not covered by
the hypothesis, or are simply a reflection of the
particularities of the subject-matter of this study
which means that the findings need not necessarily
apply to the relationships between other intruding-
elements and other existing-elements. These limi-
tations are:
'This was exercised after 1967. Syria established
its own Palestinian organization under the name of
As-Saiqah comprising Ba 1
 thist Palestinians.
Similarly, Iraq established the Arab Liberation
Front.
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Firstly, that the general hypothesis assumes
that the intruding-element would attempt to establish
as many common bonds with the existing-element(s) as
possible. Such bonds could be cultural, linguistic,
social, ideological, historical, political, economic,
or whatever, in any combination. Our hypothesis does
not stipulate whether such bonds should be already
existing, or whether they can be developed, elabora-
ted or even created by the intruding-element itself.
Secondly, the general hypothesis assumes that
there is a dual character for both the intruding-
element and the existing-element(s), and that one
aspect o this dual character is commonly shared by
both. In our case, this common aspect of the dual
character was Pan-Arabism. This pan-Arab linkage
implied by definition the existence of many common
bonds between our intruding-element (the Palestinians)
and its respective existing-elements (the Arab Host-
States) in such areas as history, language, culture,
religion and so on. More important, however, is the
fact that Pan-Arabism did not simply indicate the
existence of such common bonds, it was rather an
ideology and a broad framework for political identi-
fication which was accepted by the intruding-element
and the existing-elements. This provided our
intruding-element (the Palestinians) with a unique
exception which should not necessarily apply to
other intruding-elements at least to the same degree.
Thirdly, our general hypothesis stipulates that
the intruding-element can be dispersed in various
existing-elements which themselves are linked together
whether in terms of language, culture, history, and
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so on, or who enjoy a broader identity which is
accepted by all of them. While our intruding-element
was dispersed in various Arab existing-elements
which enjoyed all the above common bonds, this does
not necessarily hold true for other intruding -
elements and other existing-elements. The Kurds or
the Armenians, for example, are dispersed in various
existing-elements which have no common bonds such as
those enjoyed by the Arab existing-elements. In
addition, the general hypothesis stipulates that the
intruding-element would have one enemy. In the case
of our intruding-element (the Palestinians) this
holds true. However, this could be the exception
rather than the rule. In other examples, such as
the Kurds, the intruding-element, in its effort to
re-establish its state-in-image, is confronted by
more than one enemy.
Finally, in retrospect, the general hypothesis
does not draw a distinction between the unique
aspects pertaining to our intruding-element, and the
impact of such unique aspects on the form of support
sought by the intruding-element, and the form of
support expected from the existing-element(s). In
the Palestinian case, it was possible for them to
expect their respective Host-States to identify the
Palestinian cause in terms of the national interest
of each of the Host-States, and to seek support, in
any form, whether diplomatic, political, military,
financial, or otherwise, from other existing-
elements. This may not be possible for other
intruding-elements. Accordingly, although the
intruding-element may seek various forms of support
from its existing-element(s), it does not necessarily
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hold true that every intruding-element can demand or
should expect that its own cause be identified in
terms of the national interest of the existing-
element(s) concerned.
Now that we have examined Palestinian-Arab
relations, where does this case stand in terms of
current trends in world society? This study seems
to suggest that the Palestinians in the Arab Host-
States, and indeed elsewhere, are no exception to
current trends in world society. The aspiration for
independence, which, in the Palestinian case is
synonymous with liberation of Palestine is their
ultimate goal. It is a part of the ubiquitous
struggle against colonialism. In attempting to
liberate themselves equally from the tutelage of the
Arab states, and in their recent shift towards
stressing their national identity, they likewise
reflect the general aspirations shared by other
peoples. By embarking on the para-military option
as a means of achieving the goal of independence
(liberation), the Palestinians are clearly in line
with one of the most important current trends as
witnessed in a plethora of wars of national libera-
tion, The Palestinians also stressed the universa-
lity of' their struggle by relating their own cause
to the general struggle against colonialism and
imperialism in the world, and by allying themselves
to the Third World. In being subjected systematically
to various forms of structural and manifest violence,
the Palestinians t lot was similar to that of many
other deprived and aspiring national groups. But
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their experience has likewise shown that, in the
contemporary world, it is hard to defeat people
because they will not accept defeat, they refuse
to be l integrated t and they cannot be exterminated.
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Appendix
IN THE NAME OF ALMIGHTY, THE MAGNIFICENT, THE
MOST MERCIFUL
THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who waged
fierce and continuous battles to safeguard its home-
land, to defend its dignity and honour, and who
offered all through the years continuous caravans of
immortal martyrs, and who wrote the noblest pages of
sacrifice, offering and giving.
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who faced the
forces of evil, injustice and aggression, against
whom the forces of international Zionism and colo-
nialism conspired and worked to displace it, dis-
possess it from its homeland and property, abused
what is holy in it and who inspite of all this
refused to weaken or submit.
We, the Palestinian Arab people, who believe in
its Arabism and in its right to regain its homeland,
to realize its freedom and dignity, and who has
determined to amass its forces and mobilize its
efforts and capabilities in order to continue its
struggle and to move forward on the path of holy war
untill complete and final victory has been attained.
We, the Palestinian Arab people, depending upon
our right of self defence and complete restoration
of our lost homeland a right that has been recognized
by international covenants and common practices
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including the charter of the United Nations, and in
implementation of the principles of human rights
and comprehending the international political rela-
tions, with its various ramifications and limits,
and considering the past experiences in all that
pertains to the causes of the catastrophe, and the
means to face it.
And embarking from the Palestine Arab reality,
and for the sake of the honour of the Palestinian
and his right to free and dignified life.
And realizing the national grave responsibility
placed upon our shoulders, for the sake of all this,
We, the Palestinian Arab people, dictate and
declare this Palestinian National Covenant and vow
to realize it.
Article 1- Palestine is an Arab homeland bound by
strong Arab national ties to the rest of
the Arab Countries and which together
from the large Arab Homeland.
Article 2- Palestine with its boundaries at the
time of the British Mandate is a regional
indivisible unit.
Article 3- The Palestinian Arab people has the legi-
timate right to its homeland and is an
inseperable part of the Arab Nations. It
shares the sufferings and aspirations of
The Arab Nation and its struggle for
freedom, sovereignty, progress and unity.
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Article 4- The people of Palestine determines its
destiny when it completes the liberation
of its homeland in. accordance with its
own wishes and free will and choice.
Article 5- The Palestinian personality is a permanent
and genuine charactaristic that does not
disappear. It is transferred from fathers
to Sons.
Article 6- The Palestinians are those Arab citizens
who were living normally in Palestine up
to 1947, whether they remained or were
expelled. Every child who was born to a
Palestinian parent after this date whe-
ther in Palestine or outside is a
Palestinian.
Article 7- Jews of Palestinian origin are considered
Palestinians if they are willing to live
peacefully and loyally in Palestine.
Article 8- Bringing up Palestinian youth in Arab and
nationalist manner is a fundamental
national duty. All means of guidance,
education and enlightenment should be
utilized to introduce the youth to its
homeland in a deep spiritual way that
will constantly and firmly bind them to-
gether.
Article 9- Doctrines whether political, social or
economic, shall not occupy the people of
Palestine from the primary duty of
- 368 -
liberating their homeland. All Pales-
tinians constitute one national front
and work with all their feelings and
spiritual and material potentialities to
free their homeland,
Article 10- Palestinians have three mottos: National
unity, National mobilization, and Libera-
tion. Once liberation is completed, the
people of Palestine shall choose for its
public life whatever political, economic
or social system they yant.
Article 11- The Palestinian people firmly believe in
Arab unity, and in order to play its role
in realizing this goal, it must, at this
stage of its struggle preserve its Pales-
tinian personality and all its consti-
tuents. It must strengthen the consciou-
ness of its existence and stand against
any attempt or plan that may weaken or
disintegrate its personality.
Article 12- Arab unity and the liberation of Pales-
tine are two complementary goals; each
prepares for the attainment of the other.
Arab unity leads to the liberation of
Palestine, and the liberation of Pales-
tine leads to Arab unity. Working for
both must go side by side.
Article 13- The destiny of the Arab nation and even
the essence of Arab existence are firmly
tied to the destiny of the Palestine
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Question. From this firm bound stems the
effort and struggle of the Arab Nation to
liberate Palestine. The people of' Pales-
tine assumes a vanguard role in achieving
this sacred national goal.
Artilce ll The liberation of Palestine from an Arab
view point, is a national duty. Its
responsibilities fall upon the entire
Arab nation, governments and peoples, the
Palestinian people being in the fore-
ground. For this purpose, the Arab
nation must mobilize its military, spiri-
tual and material potentialities, speci-
fically, it must give to the Palestinian
Arab people all possible support and
backing and place at its disposal all
opportunities and means to enable them
to perform their role in liberating their
homeland.
Article 15- The liberation of Palestine, from a
spiritual view point, prepares for the
Holy Land an atmosphere of tranquility
and peace, in which all the Holy Places
will be safeguarded, and the free wor-
ship and visit to all will be guaranteed,
without any discrimination of race,
colour, tongue, or religion.
For all this, the Palestinian people
look forward to the support of all the
spiritual forces in the world.
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Article 16- The liberation of Palestine from an
international view point is a defensive -
act necessitated by the demands of self
defence as stated in the charter of the
United Nations. That is why the people
of Palestine desiring to befriend all
nations which love freedom, justice, and
peace, is looking forward for their
support in restoring the legitimate
situation to Palestine, establishing
peace and security in its territory, and
enabling its people to exercise national
sovereignty and freedom.
Article 17- The Partitioning of Palestine in 19117
and the establishment of Israel are
illegal and false regardless of the loss
of time, because they were contrary to
the wish of the Palestine people and
its natural right to its homeland, and
in violation of the basic principles
embodied in the charter of the United
Nations. Foremost among which is the
right to self-determination.
Article 18- The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate
system and all that has been based upon
them are considered fraud. The claims
of historic and spiritual ties between
Jews and Palestine are not in agreement
with the facts of history or with the
true basis of sound statehood. Judaism
because it is a divine religion is not
a nationality with independent existence.
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Furthermore the Jews are not one people
with an independent personality because
they are citizens of the countries to
which they belong.
Article 19- Zionism is a colonialist movement in its
inception, aggresive and expansionist in
its goals, racist and segregationist in
its configurations and fascist in its
means and aims. Israel in its capacity
as the spearhead of this destructive
movement and the pillar for colonialism
is a permanent source of tension and
turmoil in the Middle East in particular
and to the international community in
general. Because of this the people of
Palestine is worthy of the support and
sustenance of the community of nations.
Article 20- The causes of peace and security and the
needs of right and justice demand from
all nations, in order to safeguard true
relationships among people, and to main-
tam the loyalty of citizens to their
homeland, to consider Zionism an illegal
movement and to outlaw its presence and
activities.
Article 21- The Palestine people believes in the
principle of justice, freedom, sovereig-
nty, self-determination, human dignity,
and the right of peoples to practise
these principles. It also supports all
international efforts to bring about
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peace on the basis of justice and free
international co-operation.
Article 22- The people of Palestine believes in
peaceful coexistence on the basis of
legal existence, for there can be no
coexistence with aggression, nor can
there be peace with occupation and
colonialism.
Article 23- In realizing the goals and principles
of this Covenant, the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization carries out its com-
plete role to liberate Palestine in
accordance with the fundamental law of'
this Organization.
Article 2k- This Organization does not exercise any
regional sovereignty over the Western
Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of' Jordan,
on the Gaza Strip or the Himmah Area.
Its activities will be on the national
popular level in the liberational,
organizational, political and financial
fields.
Article 25- This Organization is encharged with the
movement of the Palestine people in its
struggle to liberate its homeland in
all liberational, organizational, poli-
tical, and financial matters, and in all
other needs of the Palestine Question in
the Arab and international spheres.
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Article 26- The.Liberation Organization co-operates
with all Arab governments each according
to its ability, and does not interfere
in the internal affairs of any Arab
State.
Article 27- This Organization shall have its flag,
oath and a national anthem. All this
shall be resolved in accordance with a
special system.
Article 28- The Fundamental Law for the Palestine
Liberation Organization is attached to
this Covenant. This Law defines the
manner of establishing the Organization,
its organs, institutions, the special-
ties of each one of them, and all the
needed duties thrust upon it in accor-
dance with this Covenant.
Article 29- This Covenant cannot be ammended except
by two-thirds majority of the National
Council of the Palestine Liberation
Organization in a special session called
for this purpose.
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FIRST CHAPTER
FUNDMIENTAL LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 1- The Palestinians among themselves in
accordance with the rules of this Law
form an organization known as the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization.
Article 2- The Palestine Liberation Organization
assumes its responsibilities in accor-
dance with the principle of the National
Covenant, the rules of this Law and
regulations and resolutions proclaimed
and based upon them.
Article 3- Relations with the Organization are based
upon firm adherence to the national
struggle and endeavour at the various
levels from the foundation of the Orga-
nization to its collective Leadership,
on the basis of the respect of the
minority to the wishes of the majority
and gaining confidence of the people
through persuasion and the persuit of
the struggle to perpetuate the Libera-
ting thrust among the masses. In execu-
ting and practising this principle, the
Executive Committee is called upon to
draft a special system for the different
formations of the Organization taking
into consideration the conditions of the
Palestinians in their places of gather-
ing, and the realization of the goals
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of the Covenant and this Fundamental
law.
Article 4- All Palestinians are natural members in
the Palestine Liberation Organization
They execute their duties in liberating
their homeland according to their abili-
ties and capabilities. The Palestinian
people is the basic foundation of this
Organization.
SECOND CHAPTER
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
Article 5- Members of the National Council are
elected directly by people of Palestine
in accordance with a Law to be prepared
for this purpose by the Executive
Committee.
Article 6- Should election of the members of the
National Council be impossible to carry
out, the National Council continues to
function untill favourable conditions
prevail.
Article 7- The National Council is the Supreme
authority of the Liberation Organization.
It formulates the polices, plans and
programs for the Organization.
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Article 8- The National Council is elected for a
period of three years. It is called
into a meeting in an ordinary session
once every year in the month of May by
its Chairman upon the request of the
-	 Executive Committee or one fourth of its
members. It meets in Jerusalem or Gaza
or in any other place depending upon the
necessary conditions. Should the Chair-
man fail to call the Council into session,
the Council meets in the place and at the
time prescribed in the request of its
members or the request of the Executive
Commi ttee.
Article 9- The Council has a presidency office com-
posed of the President, two Vice-
presidents and a Secretary General,
elected by the Council during its first
session.
Article 10- The National Council during its ordinary
session considers the following:
a) The annual report submitted by the
Executive Committee on the achieve-
ments of the Organization and its
various organs.
b) The annual report of the National
Fund and the approval of the budget.
c) Suggestions submitted to it by the
various committees of the Organiza-
tion.
d) Any other issue submitted for its
consideration.
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Article 11- The.National Council sets the necessary
committees to facilitate its functions.
These committees submit their reports
and recommendations to the National
Council which debates them and issues
the needed resolutions.
Article 12- Two-thirds of the members of the Council
form the quorum and decisions are adopted
by simple majority.
THIRD CHAPTER
THE EXECUTIVE COW4ITTEE
Article 13- The National Council elects the Chairman
of the Executive Committee from its
members and the Chairman selects the
members of the Executive Committee.
Article 14- The Committee is made up on fifteen
members including the chairman. They
elect one of their members as Vice Chair-
man.
Article 15- The Executive Committee is the highest
executive authority in the Organization.
It is always in session. Its members
devote their full time to its work. It
executes the policies, plans and programs
formulated by the National Council. It
is responsible to the National Council
collectively and individually.
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Article 16- The Executive Committee takes chargé of
the following:
a) Representation of the Palestine
people.
b) Supervision of the different forma-
tions of the Organization.
c) Issuing schedules, directions and
adopting the necessary decisions to
organize the functions of the
Organization, provided these do not
contradict the Covenant or the
Fundamental Law.
d) Executing the financial policy of
the Organization and preparing its
budget. On the whole, the Executive
Committee conducts all the responsi-
bilities of the Liberation Organiza-
tion in accordance with the general
plans and resolutions issued by the
National Council.
Article 17- The city of Jerusalem is the permanent
headquarters of the Executive Committee
which can hold its meetings at any other
suitable place.
Article 18- The Executive Committee establishes the
following departments:
a) Liberation Department.
b) Department of Political and Informa-
tional Affairs.
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c) Department of the Palestine National
Fund.
d) Department of Public Affairs and
National Guidance.
e) Any other Department that the
Committee finds necessary to estab-
lish. Each Department is headed by
a director and has necessary staff.
A job sheet for each department is deiris-
ed by the Executive Committee.
Article 19- The Executive Committee strengthens the
relations and coordinates work between
the Organization and other Arab and
International Organizations, Federations
and Institutions that have similar goals
and purposes or help the Executive
Committee in achieving the goals of the
Organization.
Article 20- The Executive Committee continues to
perform its functions and duties as long
as it has the confidence of the National
Council. The Executive Committee should
submit its resignation to the new National
Council at its first session. The
Council may re-elect the outgoing Chair-
man.
Article 21- Two thirds of the members of the Execu-
tive Committee form the necessary quorum.
Decisions are taken by simple majority.
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FOURTH CHAPTER
GENERkL RULES
Article 22- Special Palestinian Military Units are
formed in accordance with the military
needs and the plan adopted by the Unifi-
ed Arab Command in approval of and in
cooperation with the Arab States con-
c erned.
Article 23- The Executive Committee works to enrol
Palestinians in Arab military colleges
and institutions, and mobilizes all the
capabilities and abilities of Palestin-
ians, and prepares them for the battle
of liberation.
Article 24- A National Palestinian Fund is establish-
ed to finance the activities of the
Organization. The Fund is managed by a
board of directors composed in accordance
with a special law issued by the National
Council.
Article 25- Sources of income for the National Fund
are the following:
a) A fixed tax on Palestinians levied
and collected in accordance with a
special system.
b) Financial contributions given by the
Arab Governments and peoples.
c) The revenue from a liberation stamp
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issued by the Arab Governments and
used in mail and other services.
d) Donations and wills.
e) Loans and contributions from Arab
Governments or from friendly nations.
f) Any other source approved by the
National Council.
Article 26- Committees for the support of Palestine
are set up in various Arab and friendly
countries to raise funds and back-up
the organization in its national
endeavours.
Article 27- The Executive Committee determines the
level of representation of the Palestine
people to the Arab institutions and con-
ferences. It also names a Palestinian
representative to the rulers of Arab
States.
Article 28- The Executive Committee has the right to
issue the necessary schedules to imple-
ment the rules of this law.
Article 29- Ammending this Fundamental Law, changing
it, or adding to it, is a function of
the National Council by a two - third
majority.
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FIFTH ChAPTER
PROVISIONAL RULES
Article 30- The first National congress becomes a
provisional National Council. Its
period expires when the First National
council is elected in accordance with
the rules of this law. It performs all
the functions and rights of the National
Council.
Article 31- The duration of the present national
Council is two years starting with 28th
May, l96t.
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